Twenty Days with Claude Lévi-Strauss in Korea

A Workshop on Anthropology and Korean Studies, October 14-29, 1981

Edited by
Kang Shin-pyo
Emeritus Professor of Anthropology and Sociology
Inje University
Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 3
1 Kinship and Social Organization (October 14th) ................................................................. 6
2 Mythology and Collective Representation (October 15th) .................................................. 33
3 East-West Comparative Studies (October 16th) .................................................................. 56
4 Open Topics and Free Discussion (October 17th) ............................................................... 82
5 Koreans in the Modern World (October 29th) .................................................................... 92
6 Appendix 1 – List of Participants ....................................................................................... 103
7 Appendix 2 – Photos ............................................................................................................. 105
8 Appendix 3 – Itinerary of Claude Lévi-Strauss in Seoul ..................................................... 120
9 Appendix 4 – Comments and Afterword by non-Korean Participants .............................. 121
9-1 Some Thoughts on Korean Social and Symbolic Space (David B. Eyde) ................. 121
9-2 Ecological Anthropology and Korean Studies (Henry T. Lewis) ................................. 130
9-3 Korean Cultural Conceptions of Health and Symbol in the Modern World
   (David Y. H. Wu) .................................................................................................................. 134
9-4 The Ethnological Dimension of Western Science (Bob Scholte) ............................... 140
Introduction

This book is the record of a remarkable conversation between Claude Lévi-Strauss, the leading proponent of structural anthropology in the twentieth century, and a group of South Korean scholars invited as leaders in their respective disciplines. It took place in Seoul, in the context of a seminar that was conceived as an encounter not only between scholarly generations but also between East and West and North and South. The conversation filled five days in October 1981, interrupted for eleven days while Lévi-Strauss traveled in the South Korean countryside to explore aspects of the country’s cultural traditions.

The seminar was initiated by Kang Shin-pyo, then Chairman of the Department of Socio-Cultural Research at the Academy of Korean Studies. Kang had begun to apply a structuralist approach to the analysis of East Asian cultures in the course of his doctoral studies at the University of Hawaii and became acquainted with Lévi-Strauss’ work during academic sojourns in London and Paris. In this respect he was typical of a generation of South Korean humanities scholars who by the mid-1970s were internationally mobile and alert to developments in European and American theory and methodology. The 1981 seminar provided an opportunity for them to engage with Western scholars on their home ground; although Lévi-Strauss and his ideas were the focus of the seminar, other North American and European anthropologists took part by invitation: David Eyde, David Wu, Bob Scholte and Henry Lewis.

The institutional context in which these scholars came together was the work of the Academy of Korean Studies, which was sponsoring a project on the theme of Symbol and Society in Traditional Korea. The Academy had been created in 1978 by the South Korean Ministry of Education, Science and Technology under the government of President Park Chung-hee. Park had established a military dictatorship in 1963 and sealed its authoritarian character with the Yushin constitution in 1972. Under his leadership the country underwent a process of rapid forced modernization sustained by a combination of police repression and the mobilization of popular consent. The creation of the Academy was part of a strategy of “balancing” the effects of technological and economic change through the promotion of cultural or spiritual values; its name was literally Research Institute of Korean Spiritual Culture. Under the dictatorship its function was to legitimate the regime at the level of culture as well as to provide materials for the construction and dissemination of a nationalist historical narrative. Accordingly, the “Korean Studies” that it looked to develop was not an area studies of the kind that were developing in the West at the same time (although, like the Western version, it was multi-disciplinary), but rather a program of research and development directed inwards with national consciousness as its object.

The 1981 seminar thus took place at the heart of a significant moment in South Korea’s political economy, but the character of that moment and the paradoxes it implied for the mission of a humanities project with “traditional culture” at its center are largely absent from the conversation. When Lévi-Strauss, at his own insistence, went in search of tradition in the provinces, his attention was directed to the restored manor houses of the provincial service (양반 yangban) elite and the folk villages (민속마을 minsokmaeul) maintained as showpieces by local and regional governments. These preserved the traces of a historical way of life whose disappearance was being accelerated by forced development in the
countryside; the icon of rural modernization under the banner of the New Village (새마을 saemaelu) Movement launched in 1970 was the replacement of wood and thatch roofs with corrugated iron. That the author of Tristes tropiques recognized this tension is apparent when, in his concluding remarks, he expresses the “hope that Asia comes up with a solution to the problem of how to live with the free market and industrialization without the destruction of interpersonal relationships and the destruction of meaning.” And the problem of reconciling “industrialization” and tradition – the Academy’s underlying agenda – is certainly part of the conversation here, acknowledged and embraced in particular by David Eyde.

It is notable, though, that the forces challenging “tradition” appear in these conversations as impersonal and global. Eyde in particular falls easily into the language of Westernization, Americanization and (Western) imperialism. The particular circumstances of South Korean’s modernization, in which Park’s illiberal state in partnership with big corporations controlled the market and enforced low wages and poor working conditions by manipulating and criminalizing the labor movement, are unspoken here. In effect the Korean and Western speakers are talking about different things, and it is not clear how far the visitors are aware of it. Similarly striking is the candor with which Bob Scholte articulates his (generational) challenge to the authority of anthropological knowledge in “neo-Marxist” terms (along with the exchange about Lévi-Strauss’ comparison of South Asian Buddhism to Marxism). In 1981 a new dictator, Chun Doo-hwan, was consolidating his position following the brutal suppression of democracy movements precipitated by Park’s 1979 assassination, and the seminar participants’ presumption of open intellectual exchange contrasts sharply with the repression of the left which was part of everyday life on South Korean campuses at the time.

These contradictions, however, reflect the inherent ambivalence of the Korean Studies project. The developmental dictatorship’s interest in state-building coincided with the intellectual ambitions of a generation of scholars who were equally committed to identifying the elements of a post-colonial national identity “from the bottom up.” The fact that most of them had completed their doctoral studies abroad is itself a marker of that post-colonial moment, and one of their shared concerns was to explore the cultural and intellectual foundations for building strong, independent and locally rooted scholarship and scholarly institutions. In this sense, Korean Studies was a declaration of independence – from Western culture, but also from a well-established East Asian Studies which originated in Europe and in which Korean traditions were overwritten by Japanese and Chinese culture – and a quest in its own terms for a counter-balancing authenticity. Accordingly (as the list of participants indicates), with the notable exception of a number of scholars of French literature, most of the Koreans who attended the seminar were already engaged in the study of Korea’s historical culture from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. And they were facing a complex task: first, to introduce cosmopolitan discourses while negotiating the exit from post-colonial tutelage, and then to position themselves safely (and with intellectual integrity) between the nationalist dictatorship and the people, both generally symbolized by men in uniform.

In the light of this wider picture, what we can observe in this seminar is the Academy – in spite of the intentions of its state founders – offering a safe space for intellectual interchange. (The proceedings were published in full in Korean at the time.) The outcomes of
these conversations can be seen in the ways in which the seminar participants contributed to the development of public life and the critical academy in South Korea following democratization after 1987. A few examples: Lee Gwang-Gyu and Choi Hyup were among those who contributed to establishing a research base for the institutionalized national project. They laid the foundations for research on the Korean diaspora based on Lévi-Straussian approaches to family structure, and Lee was later appointed as the first president of the Overseas Korean Foundation. Kang Shin-pyo himself became a leading voice in an ongoing debate about whether it would be possible to generate forms of social theory that were distinctly Korean, derived from the characteristic elements of Korean culture. Yu Jung Ho can stand for the literary scholars who would introduce post-structural theory to the debates, through translation and original work; he was also active in movements for civic empowerment and in discussions about the politics and ethics of engaged scholarship. Cho Hae Jung and Cho Ok La, who did their research on women in Korean society, founded the organization Alternative Culture (또 하나의 문화 Tto Hanaui Munhwa), which was the cradle of cultural feminism in the 1990s.

As the present text makes clear, the seminar was carried on mainly in English, with occasional interjections in French. The transcript is presented here in English for the first time. The Korean version was published by the Academy of Korean Studies in 1983 under the title Anthropology of Lévi-Strauss and Korean Studies (레비스트로스의 인류학과 한국학). That edition included documentation on the planning of the seminar and short reflective essays by Lee Gwang-Gyu, as well as the photographs included here. The 1981 transcription was done by Bernard Olivier, and the present edition was prepared from the original typescripts by Cheong Hee Yun (Sogang University) and Eve Rosenhaft (Sogang and Liverpool Universities).
1 Kinship and Social Organization (October 14th, 1981)

Kim, Yer-su: All of us at this Academy are very pleased and honored to host this workshop on anthropology and Korean Studies with Professor Lévi-Strauss and several dozen distinguished scholars both domestic and foreign who are active in such diverse but related fields as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history and literature. This gathering surely promises to be a meeting of minds East and West and it is a particular privilege for me to declare this meeting open.

Koh, Byong-ik: On behalf of the Academy of Korean Studies, I would first of all like to extend a very cordial welcome to all present, particularly to Professor Lévi-Strauss, who despite his advancing years has undertaken a very strenuous journey half way around the world in acceptance of our invitation to come to Korea to engage in an intellectual dialogue with his colleagues East-West and North-South, and also to Professor David Eyde, University of Texas at El Paso, David Wu, University of Hawaii, Bob Scholte, University of Amsterdam, and Henry Lewis, University of Alberta, Canada, all of whom in addition to their participation in this workshop will work in close cooperation with this Academy in coming months on the project Symbol and Society in Traditional Korea. Welcome also to my Korean colleagues, most of whom have been carefully selected by their respective professional associations to take part in this workshop.

During the next four days, the attention in this workshop will be focused on two topics: Claude Lévi-Strauss and Korean culture. Today’s and tomorrow’s sessions will be devoted to a stock-taking of Professor Lévi-Strauss’ scholarly achievements. The sessions on Friday and Saturday will be devoted to Korean culture in comparative perspective. After an interlude of approximately ten days, during which Lévi-Strauss and other scholars will do extensive fieldwork, the workshop is scheduled to resume on October 28th, when the specific focus will again be on Korean culture. It is the hope of this Academy that this series of activities will help to place Korean culture in its rightful place on the East-West and North-South cultural map of the world.

In concluding, I’d like to thank you all for your participation in this workshop. I’d like to wish you very fruitful and productive meetings during the next few days and I hope that the stress of the discussions and the shortcomings of the facilities do not damage your health. And for Professor Lévi-Strauss and other colleagues from abroad I hope you will be able to grasp as much of Korean culture as possible within the short period of the time available to you, so that you may be able to help us understand our own culture better.

Thank you.

Kim, Yer-Su: The next item in our order of business this morning is a brief presentation of the highlights of Professor Lévi-Strauss’ curriculum vitae. The presentation will be made by Professor Kang, Shin-pyo, who is, as you all know, the architect and prime mover of this workshop.
Kang, Shin-pyo: Now it’s my honor to introduce Professor Lévi-Strauss. Surely you all know that Professor Lévi-Strauss escaped from philosophy to anthropology, that his most extensive field research was with Brazilian Indians during the period 1935 to 1939 when he was professor of sociology at Sao Paolo University, and that after a wartime period in New York he returned to Paris, where since 1960 he has been Professor of Social Anthropology and Director of the Laboratory of Social Anthropology at the Collège de France. Surely you all also know that in the course of his career, Professor Lévi-Strauss has written a series of books and articles, perhaps most notably Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté, Anthropologie structurale, Le Totémisme aujourd’hui, La Pensée sauvage and Mythologiques, which have shown him to be one of the eminent minds not just of 20th-century anthropology, but of the intellectual life of the 20th century.

His structural anthropological approach to kinship and marriage, totemism, primitive classification, myths, and a variety of other topics has brought new perspectives and stimulated creative debates not only amongst anthropologists but throughout the social sciences and the humanities everywhere. The movement called structuralism which traces its ancestry largely to the ideas of Lévi-Strauss, even though he might well disavow some of its manifestations, is one of only a small handful of intellectual currents in the latter half of the 20th century which have generated new insights and creativity. Much of Lévi-Strauss’ thought reflects a deep awareness of process as an ongoing interplay between opposed and complementary poles. His structuralism at its most basic levels has a fundamental compatibility with traditional Asian world views. It’s therefore highly appropriate that his work with us leads off our research project on Symbol and Society in Korea.

In the interplay between data and theory, between structuralism and practical reason, between East and West, between North and South, we may hope and expect that there will be created new perspectives and insights into Korean culture, Asian culture, and human culture.

Lévi-Strauss: I cannot start this presentation without first of all expressing my wife’s and my own feelings of gratitude to the Academy of Korean Studies, to President Koh, and to Professor Kang, for having made our trip possible and for the marvelous welcome they have given us. And listening a moment ago to President Koh’s words, I was also a little bit confused and ashamed that you should expect me to bring you anything new in the matter of social anthropology.

For it seems to me it’s a very old tradition in Korea to be interested in this kind of studies and even older perhaps than in the Western world. I’ve been told that Korean scholars consider that anthropological studies about Korean people and culture go back to the 18th century, when a group of people, belonging to the school of Silhak if I am not mistaken, published books on rural life, folk customs, and agricultural technology. And it so happens that, by a piece of luck, last night I was given the opportunity of reading a French student’s master thesis which is an annotated French translation of an 18th-century Korean book, which I don’t dare to pronounce, Kyongdo Chapchi, and I was really amazed at the details of ethnographical information, the precision of the details it’s possible to find in your old literature. And at the same time I was wondering if the tradition of anthropological studies in Korea doesn’t go back even earlier. When I read your great book, the Samguk Yusa, I noticed that in the seventh century King Munmu wished to appoint his half brother Prime
Minister and that the latter accepted on the condition that he first be allowed to travel incognito throughout the country to observe the living conditions of the people, their labor and leisure, that is, doing anthropological fieldwork.

He said that at that time, each family of informants gave him a very pretty concubine to spend the night with, something which does not very often happen to contemporary anthropologists. But I noticed too that (also in the seventh century) a monk called Wonhyo had a son, very intelligent, who, it is said, composed books on folk customs and the place names of China and Silla. This son was considered one of the sages of Silla, which really puts anthropological research on a very high level.

And I have another reason to be confused and a little bit ashamed because we have to carry out our exchange in a language which, except for a few distinguished colleagues from the USA and Canada, is not our native tongue, and as you may have noticed already, my English is rather poor and I have a very strong French accent which makes it even more difficult for you to understand. Besides, when I try to express myself in English, I feel exhausted pretty soon, so I shall ask you as a favor not to hesitate to interrupt me if you don’t understand what I say, to ask me to repeat it, and if you disagree with what I am saying, to object. Really this will be a great help to me, because it will give me some relief when I’m trying to speak to all of you.

Today we are expected to discuss problems of kinship and social organization, and it’s not particularly, or it’s not exclusively, about my own work that I wish to talk, but about the kind of research which is being carried on nowadays in France, not only by me, but also by my associates and some younger colleagues. But since this research is always in the line of structural analysis, it is perhaps suitable that I should first of all begin by explaining what I understand, what I mean, by structure. The main distinction to be made in this respect would be between two notions: system and structure. What is a system? It is a grouping of elements and relations between those elements which fit together and which brings about a certain result. Let’s say for instance that an automobile engine is a system, so that if any element is modified or breaks down, the engine will not function anymore.

Structure is something rather different, or I would say it’s a special case of a system. It is made up of elements and relations like a system but also of the whole group of their transformations. By this I mean that in a structure, if an element or relation is changed, another change or several other changes will occur in the other elements or relations, while certain propositions will remain true about the structure.

It seems to me that this idea of a structure should be very easily grasped by people like you who have been brought up in the tradition of Confucian thought, because, really, I couldn’t find a better example of structural thought than ancient Chinese tradition. In that tradition, there are different systems. There is a cosmological system which is ruled, so to speak, by the Yin-Yang opposition. But this opposition can be transformed into many other oppositions, so that it can be said that Yang is to Yin as light is to darkness, as male is to female, as sky is to Earth, as the emperor is to his subjects, as ancestors are to the living, as a father is to a son, a husband to a wife, a master to a disciple or to the servants, and so on.

So we have different systems: cosmological, sociological, political, religious, but there is a close correspondence between all these systems, and when we shift from one to the others,
there is a basic relationship or several basic relationships which remain the same. And what appears to me to be a characteristic of traditional Chinese thought is also a characteristic of many other kinds of thought all over the world; for instance, in ancient Greece, we find practically the same way of thinking. It has also struck me quite often that the reason, or one of the reasons why anthropological structuralism (which contrary to what is usually believed, did not really originate in France, but was first of all expressed in the Netherlands through the work of men like Russell, Van Wouden, Josselin de Jong and several others some years before we tried to do the same in France) developed among our Dutch colleagues first is that they were studying Indonesia and that Indonesian thought is itself structural. Really, structuralism is not a creation of the Western world, impressed with technology, pseudo-scientific minds, etc. It’s a kind of thought which we received from the people whom we study. When we try to make structural analyses, what we are actually doing is to borrow the thought of the people we study, either in the distant past or in the present, and use it in order to better understand them, as if in this kind of thought, there was a kind of common denominator, a kind of common ground which extends to all mankind including ancient thinkers and contemporary native thinkers, but a real mode of thought which is best able to help us translate one way of thinking into another way of thinking.

Now, coming to our topic, I shall certainly not try to repeat what I’ve said in a very old book called in French Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté, and which some of you may know, as it was translated into English 30 years after its first publication in France, but I’d like only to point out that what I’ve tried to do is exactly to apply to a particular field, the field of kinship, the principle of understanding which I’ve just outlined. That is, while we’re confronted with a fantastic number of different kinship rules and kinship classifications which, if you try to study each of them in isolation, don’t seem to make sense at all, as soon as we try to consider that they can be transformations of each other and that there are some invariant principles which hold true for all of them, then everything becomes clear.

What we have is that some people make a distinction between siblings and cousins, while some others don’t, that some cultures make distinction between what we call parallel cousins and cross-cousins, while some others don’t, that some cultures claim that the best spouse for a man should be the daughter of the mother’s brother, while a tribe nearby would consider that a crime and say that the right spouse is on the contrary the daughter of the father’s sister, and so on, and even more complicated rules. But we can reduce all these rules, each of them seemingly meaningless and absurd, to a meaningful whole if we consider that there’s something invariant in all of them, that is that they express in different ways the fact that women can be exchanged between groups of men. (I would be quite ready to express it the other way round to say that men can be exchanged between different groups of women; it would be just about the same. It just so happens that except in some parts of Indonesia and perhaps in other places, it’s generally from a male point of view that things are expressed rather than from a female point of view. But if you want to express it the other way as the feminist movement would like to, you just have to change the signs and the operation will remain exactly the same.) And accordingly we can explain every style of marriage preference according to whether a society consists of an even number of groups exchanging between themselves (the simpler case being societies made of two groups, A and B, where A gives a wife to B, and B gives a wife to A, which immediately generates, if I may say so, the distinction between cross-cousins and parallel cousins), or whether the
society is made up of an odd number of groups where it’s possible that A gives wives to a group B, which gives to a group C, to a group D, to a group N, and back to group A (which will immediately generate a matrilateral marriage with a very long exchange cycle or with a very short exchange cycle, where a group A will receive in one generation from group D, and in the next generation gives back a daughter to that group D, and receives from group D, and while in the next generation, it will give back to this group D, and this will generate immediately preferential marriage with the father’s sister’s daughter, and so on).

But I shall only mention these conclusions, just to outline that there were two difficulties remaining, which at that time, I didn’t try to solve and couldn’t solve for several reasons. The first one is that since the time I wrote the *Elementary Structures of Kinship*, it has been discovered that in many parts of the world there are societies which cannot be considered patrilineal or matrilineal, but which we call in our lingo “cognatic,” that is like Western societies, where it’s possible to follow either the father’s line or the mother’s line, or even to follow both together. And these societies are much more numerous than we thought at first, and it complicates the problem to some extent, because in those societies, we don’t know exactly how the groups which are involved in the exchange are able to define themselves as closed groups in comparison with simpler groups. And there was also the problem of the so-called Crow-Omaha kinship systems, which are a special case of primitive systems which are much more complicated than the ones we’re used to, because instead of stating positively the kind of kin one should preferentially marry, those systems dictate only marriage prohibitions — but a tremendous number of marriage prohibitions, much more numerous than our own. They resemble Western systems, inasmuch as everything which is not forbidden is permitted, but there are many more things which are forbidden in those systems, and we don’t know exactly how they work. And after, well, giving up social organization and kinship, for about 20 years, during which I devoted myself to the study of mythology (but this will be tomorrow’s topic), I decided that at the end of my academic career I had to go back to social organization, and try to give some reflection to those two difficulties, the cognatic system on the one hand, and the Crow-Omaha system on the other.

For the past five or six years, all my lectures at the Collège de France have been devoted to a kind of round the world trip amongst cognatic societies and the starting point (and this is only point that I’d like to take up this morning, because we can discuss some other aspects during the afternoon session) is a case which is very famous in North American anthropology, that is the case of the Kwakiutl Indians who, as you know, lived and still live on the Pacific coast of British Columbia - that is they are more or less your next neighbor on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. And the Kwakiutl Indians are especially interesting, because as you know, the great American anthropologist, one of the founding fathers of modern anthropology, I mean Franz Boas, whom I was privileged to know, studied them during practically all his life and was never himself satisfied with the kind of account he was giving of their social organization. So there is a typical problem there. The Kwakiutl are established on the North Western part of Vancouver Island and on the mainland coast facing it, and they were divided into local groups which Boas called tribes. In his first works, he noted that these tribes were subdivided into smaller formations of the same type, each comprising a variable number of social units, which he called gens, the Latin word, because in contrast with their northern neighbors, who were all matrilineal – the Tsimshian, Haida and Tlinglit – the Kwakiutl have a patrilineal orientation and display in this regard certain
affinities with the Salish-speaking group who are their southern neighbors. But difficulties immediately arise, as Boas was fully aware. First, it’s impossible to assert, as the theory of unilineal systems would have it, that the gens are exogamous since each individual considers himself a member, in part, of his father’s and, in part, of his mother’s gens.

Moreover, matrilineal aspects persist, because amongst the aristocrats, the Kwakiutl forming a stratified society, the husband assumes the name and the arms, in the heraldic sense, of his father-in-law, and thus becomes a member of his wife’s lineage. Both name and arms pass on to his children. The daughters keep them, the sons lose them when they marry and adopt their wives’. Consequently, in practice, the emblems of nobility are transmitted through the female line, and each bachelor receives those of his mother. But other facts work in the opposite direction: It’s the father who is the head of the family, not the mother’s brother; and above all, authority is passed on from father to son. At the end of the 18th century several individuals of noble birth claimed titles inherited from both lines. And these uncertainties explain why, on second thought, Boas should have changed his perspective and his terminology as illustrated in his early work *Indianische Sagen* (1895) and his great work on Kwakiutl social organization and secret societies (1897). Until then he had likened the Kwakiutl mainly to a matrilineal people, and then he shifted his opinion and became more impressed by the similarities between the social organization of the Kwakiutl and that of the Salish to the east and south, and believed that the Kwakiutl, originally patrilineral, had partly evolved towards a matrilineal organization, and so on. When we follow Boas’ work through all these years, his very important paper in 1920 published in *American Anthropologist* and his posthumous work published in 1966, more than 20 years after he died, we feel that during all his life he was uncertain about the social organization of the Kwakiutl, not knowing exactly whether they were patrilineral or matrilineral and deciding at the end that it was impossible to fit them into the categories which are currently used in anthropology. He had to describe them as a special case. We find this late stage of his thinking in his posthumous work I just mentioned. Instead of trying to fit the basic unit of Kwakiutl society into basic classical categories such as the gens or sib or clan or lineage or anything else, he decided that he had to call it by the native name “numaym,” and he said, and I beg your permission to quote him in full, he said, “It might seem that the numayma as here described are analogous to the sibs, clans or gentes of other tribes, but their peculiar constitution makes these terms inapplicable. The numaym is neither strictly patrilineral nor matrilineral, and within certain limits, a child may be assigned to any one of the lines from which he or she is descended, by bequest even to unrelated lines.” What is then a numaym?

The structure of the numaym is best understood, wrote Boas, if we disregard the living individuals and rather consider the numaym as consisting of a certain number of positions to each of which belongs a name, a “seat” or “standing place”, that means rank, and privileges. Their number is limited and they form a ranked nobility. These names and seats are the skeleton of the numaym, and individuals, in the course of their lives, may occupy various positions and with these take the names belonging to them. The striking fact is that this type of organization, which Boas described as peculiar to one tribe and only one tribe, in fact exists outside America, notably in Polynesia, in Melanesia, and even in Africa, although for the past 25 years, in all their studies devoted to systems spoken of as non-unilineal, I don’t like this terminology. I’d like to just briefly explain why: because I think it’s better to call them undifferentiated, because to say that they’re non-unilineal may mean that they are
ambilineal and ambilineal may mean that one element of status is transmitted in the father’s line and another element of status is transmitted in the mother’s line, which is completely different from a cognatic system where it’s possible that any element of status be transmitted in either one or the other line. Ethnologists have not recognized it for what it is and one can see two reasons for this. First of all, this type of institution does not fit with any of the three modes of descent — unilineal-bilineal-undifferentiated — which, more often than not, are treated as separate categories, whereas institutions of the numayma type cut across that. And in the second place, the reason is that to understand this institution it’s necessary to go outside the anthropological field and start cooperating with historians. Because it’s much more clearly expressed in the European Middle Ages for instance, or in ancient Greek societies, or in Japan of the Heian period than amongst the so-called primitive tribes.

Another example of these societies, which comes more or less from the same region, is the case of a small coastal population from the north of California, the Yurok, which were studied by another great American anthropologist, Alfred Kroeber, who practically devoted his life to the study of the Yurok, exactly as Boas devoted also his life to the study of the Kwakiutl. And it’s a striking example of the way unilineal descent disintegrates, if one may say so, upon contact with the institutions of the type under consideration. The Yurok are patrilineal, but Kroeber emphasizes that a group of kinsmen is not a circumscribed group, as a clan or village community or tribe would be. It shades out in all directions, and integrates into innumerable others. Among the Yurok, he says kinship operated in at least some measure bilaterally and consequently diffusely, so that a particular unit of kinsmen acting as a group capable of constituted social action did not exist. It’s striking that Kroeber, who was a great anthropologist, only records, only pays attention to the negative aspects of such a situation. The Yurok, he writes, have no society as such, no social organization. Government being absent, there is no authority. The men called chiefs are individuals whose wealth and their ability to retain and employ it have clustered about them an aggregation of kinsmen, followers, and semidependants to whom they dispense assistance and protection. Such familiar terms as tribe, village community, chief, government, clan can therefore be used with reference to the Yurok only with extreme care. In their current sense, they are wholly inapplicable.

It’s difficult to imagine that a human collectivity, endowed with a language and a culture of its own, could be invertebrate to this degree. But in reality the institutions which support Yurok society do exist; they are, first of all, the 54 “towns” among which the population distributed itself and, above all in the heart of each town, the “houses.” At last, the word is out. The same word, as a matter of fact, as the Yurok use to designate these, in principle permanent, establishments, each bearing a descriptive name which is inspired by the location, the topography of the area, the decoration of the facade, the ceremonial function, the name from which is derived that of the one or several owners.

And in order to recognize the “house” as a special type of social structure correctly, we need to look at the history — not only Asian history but also European history. If we have a look at medieval Europe, there are astonishing similarities between what European medievalists call “houses” and what Franz Boas says about the “numayma” of the Kwakiutl. In fact, when I asked my colleagues who are experts on the European Middle Ages for a bibliography on medieval houses, it was surprising that they told me there aren’t any. Apparently, apart
from the German scholar Karl Schmid, there is no one who has done research on medieval houses. In 1957, Schmid published “Zur Problematik von Familie, Sippe und Geschlecht, Haus und Dynastie beim mittelalterlichen Adel. Vorfragen von Thema ‘Adel und Herrschaft in Mittelalter’” in a German journal. Before reading this publication, I had pointed out that the line of descent of the nobility is not necessarily cognatic, and that there are even cases of descent bypassing the basic bloodline. However, Schmidt denied that there are any factors defining noble lineage other than its spiritual, material heritage - including wealth and power, title, symbolic status, affinity, origin, and dignity, things that legitimized a family’s tradition and distinguished them from other noble families. Let me show this on the blackboard — on the left I write Boas’ definition of “numayma”, and on the right the definition of European medieval houses. We can see now that the two definitions are almost identical — in this sense, we are looking at the same system. Hence, I’d like to propose a provisional term. One corporate entity, which owns an asset encompassing both material and immaterial wealth, perpetuates itself by passing down goods, title and status. And it is both forms of wealth that legitimize both the real and imaginary lineage through which kinship and affinity are perpetuated. This entity can express itself in the language of kinship or of affinity, and most often in both, because as I shall try to show later on what is really specific in the house as an institution is that kinship and affinity are mutually substitutable.

And once we pay some attention to the medieval house such as existed in Europe, but also elsewhere, we find all the paradoxical traits which embarrassed Boas when he found them amongst the Kwakiutl, and which with regard to other populations continue to embarrass anthropologists. And I’d like to take them one by one. Just like its Indian counterpart, the European house possesses an estate consisting of immaterial as well as material wealth. The chief of the house is rich, sometimes immensely so, in any case rich enough for his fortune to constitute a political tool and a means of government. There’s an old French *chanson de geste* that uses what I think is a very striking expression for a noble name: “a gift which constitutes his towers and his battlements.” The wealth of the house also included names, titles and hereditary prerogatives, what used to be called “honoures” in medieval terminology, to which must be added, as with the Indians, goods of supernatural origin, for instance St. Martin’s cloak, the Holy Ampulla, St. Denis’ banner, the Crown of thorns, Constantine’s holy lance, St. Stephen’s crown, or again in the absence of the objects themselves, the memory of them, like the Grail and the Lance of Arthurian legends, which Glastonbury Abbey put to the fore in order to enhance the Plantagenets’ prestige.

A second aspect, fictitious kinship, also existed. I’m using French examples, but it would be very easy to find similar examples elsewhere. For example, chroniclers claimed Carolingian descent from the Capetians on the highly whimsical ground that Henry I’s maternal grandmother’s first husband, who died without an heir, had been the last Carolingian. That is, there’s no relationship whatsoever, just a distant alliance. I have several examples, but the most important is the role played during the Hundred Years War by Charles VI and Isabella of Bavaria’s adoption of Edward V to the detriment of their son, which really was a fictitious kinship relationship at the start of a very important period of Western history.

The existence, and this is the third point, the existence amongst the Kwakiutl, of a line of descent going from the grandfather to the grandchildren through the intermediary of the daughter and her husband has fueled unending discussions amongst anthropologists. But this type of succession seems to have been quite frequent in old Europe where on many
occasions the question arose of deciding if a woman could, we say in old French faire le pont et la planche, that is to say, if a woman could make up the bridge and the board, that is, if she had a son, transmit to him the rights which, as a woman, she would be unable to exercise (except of course in the case of female fiefdoms, which a woman could inherit). In the 16th century still, Montaigne made fun of the importance his contemporaries attached to the detailed representation of coats of arms, because he said, a son-in-law will carry it over into another family, and we have very numerous examples of the kind.

The fourth point is that Boas had been struck by the fact that, in spite of their patrilineal orientation, the Kwakiutl gave the mother’s name in reply to the question: Whose child are you or is he? And this has struck anthropologists, not only about the Kwakiutl, but also in Polynesia, where we have many similar examples of the mother’s name used in case of a patrilineal society and we had exactly the same phenomenon during the European Middle Ages, where it has been noted that the matronym, instead of the patronym, is quite frequently used in the medieval European legal texts. And this is a problem which, as a matter of fact, exists as much for medievalists as for contemporary anthropologists.

When I was living in the USA during the war, I had to teach in English at the New School for Social Research. That was a university for adults, and when people registered there they knew exactly as little English as I knew myself, because they were mostly refugees themselves. So we could very easily make ourselves believe that we understood each other. And since that time, I have had very few opportunities to express myself in English and I get mixed up with the words after a short time. When I say “house” I don’t mean “household,” which is something entirely different; “household” is the people living in the same house, it’s not the social institution, but the house is a social institution.

I have tried to explain how it seems to be the most adequate one to account for societies like the Kwakiutl, And starting from the Kwakiutl or the Yurok, I engage in a kind of trip round the world, trying to find out if the notion can apply elsewhere, and where, and the first place is Indonesia. It’s Indonesia because I have been in great many discussions about Indonesian society to discover what is the foundation of the social group, whether it’s descent, or property, or residence, and each time I have tried to use one of these criteria, the criterion immediately vanishes, and it’s impossible to hold on to it. This is because the “house” is not an objective reality, which we may find in the blood or in the land, or in the locality, but it’s rather what I’d call in philosophical terms, and perhaps it’ll not be quite clear, it’s rather the objectification of a relationship. That is, when we study these kinds of societies, we’d better be very careful to make a distinction between three types of relationship which have not been clearly distinguished, and most often, there’s a confusion between them. I’d call them dominance, status and power. A society may be characterized by male dominance or female dominance, according to whether women are exchanged by groups of men or sometimes, in Indonesia, men are exchanged between groups of women. This is male dominance or female dominance, but this aspect has nothing to do with the rule of descent, because a matrilineal society can be characterized by male dominance and a patrilineal society can very well be characterized by female dominance. It’s irrelevant from the point of view of descent. The same holds true for the respective status of wife-givers and wife-takers. Marriage can be hypogamic or hypergamic, that is, wife-givers may be superior to wife-takers, or the contrary, but this can exist as well in patrilineal or matrilineal societies. But there’s the problem of power and power is entirely different from dominance or status.
For instance, in Indonesia, we have, generally speaking, a hypogamic type of marriage, that is the wife-givers have a status superior to the wife-takers. But nevertheless, the wife-takers may have more power than the wife-givers. And this is exemplified, for instance, among the Batak, especially the Kaso Batak or the Atoni, in Timor, where in order to establish a village, or, I’d say in my language a house, it’s necessary to have three lines together closely associated: the line which is founding the village together with its wife-givers and its wife-takers. And while from the point of view of the status the founding line is inferior to its wife-givers, from the point of view of political power as the founder of the village, it is superior. And it is really fascinating to find in the layout of the houses in many parts of Indonesia – and Indonesia is a very good example for the problem of the house, because the house there doesn’t exist only as a social institution, but the social institution is so to speak inscribed in every detail in the construction of the house itself – a representation of the social structure and of the social system. It’s fascinating to see how there are ways to overcome this contradiction between the differences of status which are not the same as differences of power, as if, for instance, some aspects can be expressed in the house according to whether the family inhabits the western part or the eastern part, the lower part or the upper part, or the central part or the outside part. There is a fantastic dialectic, I’d say topological dialectic, which is used to overcome these oppositions. Then it’d be very bold of me and even preposterous to say a word about Melanesia in the presence of Professor Eyde, who know these things better than I. But I’d think that even in Melanesia, where, in the mountains, we’ve very primitive people whom it’s difficult to compare with the nobility of the European Middle Ages or the Japanese nobility of the Heian period, nevertheless, we’ve exactly the same kind of problems, which are to overcome the tension between the groups, wife-givers and wife-takers. Because of course a patrilineal society is a society where the wife-takers are able to hold the power, but a matrilineal society would be a society where the wife-givers are holding the power, and it seems to me that in Melanesia, we’re confronted all the time with the problem of the balance of power between wife-takers and wife-givers, and this is objectified, well, I’d not say in the house, except for the fact that we are in Melanesia (and there is a very complicated dialectic to overcome the opposition between agnates and non-agnates, and to have special devices to throw people out of the agnatic line into the cognates, or reciprocally to reintroduce the cognates into the agnatic line), but I’d say rather that in Melanesia – but it’s not a statement I’m making, it’s rather a question I’m putting to Professor Eyde – that what is expressed elsewhere in the house would be expressed in Melanesia in the individual human body, where the female principle, the maternal principle rather than the paternal one, coexists, but coexists in a kind of internal fight which it’s necessary to overcome through special devices such as washing out the maternal impurity.

The Melanesian case seems to me particularly interesting on account of the way they handle a classical opposition between exchange and marriage. In New Guinea, the opposition between consanguinity and affinity cannot be defined in classical terms. In most societies which are studied by anthropologists, we have put consanguinity on one side and affinity on another side, together with alliance and exchange. In New Guinea, the line of demarcation is moved and it distinguishes consanguinity and affinity put together from exchange, which is almost a separate kind of order. This was perfectly grasped almost half a century ago by Margaret Mead in 1934 in her fieldwork on the Manus, when she was able to show that the
principle of a such system lies in the liberty they take when they incorporate or reject
cognates to assimilate cross-cousins sometimes to siblings and sometimes to allies. Thus,
there’s a margin where the distinction, which is so clear elsewhere, between consanguinity
and affinity disappears, while there’s another distinction which appears on a new plane,
between two categories of kin, those with whom one exchanges and those with whom one
shares. And instead of it being the case that the distinction between consanguinity and
affinity allows one to delimit the domain of exchange, it’s exchange which permits one to
distinguish amongst kin between consanguines and allies. But you can decide with whom
you exchange and with whom you don’t exchange and this operates exactly like fictitious
kinship elsewhere.

There are also fascinating observations from this point of view which could be made in New
Zealand, in Madagascar, and in Micronesia but I’d prefer to say a word about the other
problem, that is the Crow-Omaha problem. When I was writing my book on kinship, I already
felt that there was there a fundamental problem, but which would be extremely difficult to
solve on account of almost mathematical difficulties. Crow-Omaha systems, matrilineal in
one case, patrilineal in another case, are systems where one is forbidden to marry
somebody who belongs either to the father’s clan or to the mother’s clan or according to the
type of system, to the father’s mother’s or to the mother’s father’s clan; so that we have to
ask the question whether people would marry anybody outside these prohibitions, or if the
very fact that the prohibitions are so numerous does not produce some kind of unseen
effect in the society at large, which, after all, is not numerically very large. Crow-Omaha
societies were societies including a few thousand inhabitants in North America, so that
unknown to us and unknown to the natives themselves, some kind of relationship would
exist between people who got married even if they didn’t know it, even if they’re not aware
of it. The problem was extremely difficult to solve for America, because we can only rely on
observations made in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; those systems are no longer in
operation, and the material is too scanty to be used.

Therefore, it has been very important that an associate of mine, Dr. Françoise Heritier,
discovered systems of the Crow-Omaha type still in operation in West Africa – even more
complicated systems than those we tried to record in America with many more prohibitions
and in societies which were also more numerous. The problem was so very difficult, because
what we wanted to know was whether people who actually married were related or not
related, and in case they were, in what kind of relationship? Was it any kind of relationship
or did a certain type of relationship emerge? And it was impossible to do it using the usual
craft of anthropologists, it was necessary to use computers. Just one example: If you take a
genealogy going back nine generations and if you want to find out if in the last generation,
people who marry are kin or not, you have to explore 512 different lines for each individual.
And no existing program could be used, because the programs available to the social
scientists usually make use of samples that are representative for the society at large. In this
case, it was necessary to explore exhaustively a finite corpus and to try to represent it in a
graph, which took years and years of preparation. Now the amazing result which comes out
is that in such societies, and these are African societies I remind you, after people have been
subjected to many prohibitions, they don’t marry randomly. They actually marry as close as
possible considering the prohibitions. That is in the fourth generation following a common
ancestor, which means that a purely negative system like the Crow-Omaha system can be
translated in the terms of a preferential or a prescriptive system, and that the Crow-Omaha system is an Aranda system once removed, just one degree further, and as soon as this was discovered in Africa, it was seen by associates of mine, and there are several in the younger generation of French anthropologists who are presently working along this line, that the same kind of system exists in other parts of the world. And for instance that it was possible to reinterpret along this line results which were obtained by a north American colleague in the Peruvian Andes and also to reinterpret along this line results obtained for the Inca by Dr Zuidene. There, we’ve very strange systems, because we’ve two lines, a purely patrilineal line and a purely matrilineal line and these lines cross each other every five generations and it can be reinterpreted that way. It also can be shown that the same type of marriage exists in several parts of Indonesia. Even more strikingly, it was shown that an Italian theologian of the ninth century, Peter Damian, said – I’m quoting the old text – that where the hand of kinship is missing (that is, where there are no more words to express kinship, words which could unite those that the hand of kinship had grasped) then marriage operates in order to reintegrate into the kin those who were separated because there were no words in the vocabulary to express the relationship. And along another line, the genealogies in all the sagas from northern Europe, Icelandic mostly, were studied, and the same things were discovered. Quite recently, a young French anthropologist has studied through deeds of property and church registers the way not women but estates and dowries circulated in a part of Southern France during the 17th and 18th centuries, and following the circulation of estates and dowries, it was possible to show that this periodic return after the lapse of four or five generations also operated there. Even more, in contemporary French society, in the countryside, I have a team in my laboratory that has been working for the past ten years in a village in Northern Burgundy. And they discovered that the people say that cousin marriage is coming up again. Why? On account of the development of the means of communication and especially the automobile, because the automobile makes it possible to re-establish contact with distant collaterals who had been lost sight of during the intervening years. And as soon as contact is re-established with them, then intermarriage takes place. And the people in the country say that the best kind of spouse is a stranger who is a little bit kin. So, it now appears through the study of the Crow-Omaha system that what we call complex societies and simple societies, or complex and simple systems, aren’t so different as we thought. And that it’s possible to find a continuous gradation going from the one to the others and that even in systems which only forbid and don’t prescribe, there are nevertheless preferences and regularities which operate. Therefore, the road is open to a general theory of kinship and marriage not only in primitive tribes, but in human societies, in all kinds of human societies, and these are the lines along which the French anthropologists are presently working. But there’s also a very important fact to be stated, to be extracted from this work, and that is that in order to reach those results, it was not sufficient to limit one’s outlook to the so-called primitive societies which we study, generally speaking, as anthropologists. They could only be achieved through a close cooperation with historians. We feel more and more that the kinds of research that historians are doing and that anthropologists are doing are closely linked and that progress can only be made by working together, and that the relationship between the two approaches could be more or less like in a crossword puzzle, the relationship between the black squares and the white squares: One discipline is able to fill in the black squares and it is incumbent on the other discipline to fill in the white squares and reciprocally. And speaking of Korea, because after all we’re here
together in order to discuss the development of anthropological studies in Korea – if they need development, which I’m not sure, because they seem to be fully developed right now – I’d think that as a society with several dynasties, which you’re able to follow through the centuries, you have a very rich field which can be exploited in the same way as we are, in Europe and in France, trying to exploit the field of studies of genealogies, discovering the way regularities may appear in domains where one could believe that we were only dealing with individual strategies, or with purely haphazard phenomena.

I have been personally much interested in recent still unpublished papers dealing with familial relationships as they can be grasped from medieval Japan from their great book, the Genji Monogatari, which I was unable to read in the original but which I’ve been reading in a translation which a Japanese friend tells me is very reliable. And we have in that book something which is entirely missing in the whole anthropological literature, that is the psychological attitude of a society which knows cross-cousin marriage well, which practices cross-cousin marriage frequently, but which is at the very moment of giving it up and losing interest in cross-cousin marriage. And it’s very striking to note the reason which the characters of the novel give.

Of course, one can marry a cross-cousin; it’s been done and it is done quite often, it’s still done, but they say it’s not exciting and not interesting. But it’s interesting to contract a new type of union which will permit social speculation, if I may say so. And it’s only in one case in the Genji Monogatari that cousin marriage is advocated, that is in order to solve a difficult problem of marrying the daughter of a mother who is not of imperial blood, and who should not lose too much status, so cousin marriage is in that case a kind of solution. As a matter of fact, this situation is exactly repeated in the French royal history in the 17th century.

So we have in this medieval literature a tremendous opportunity for sociological observation, and from this point of view medieval Japan can be closely compared, because the situation there is exactly the inverse of Fiji, where cross-cousin marriage was to some extent practiced, but wasn’t mandatory in any case, but where as soon as a marriage was contracted, even if it wasn’t with a cross-cousin, all the kinship terminology was changed and the new terminology was as if the two families were in a cross-cousin relationship. So that, at the time when while medieval Japan was still practicing cross-cousin marriage, but on the way to give it up in order to enter history, so to speak, in Fiji, it was just the opposite; they were not practicing it as a matter of obligation but they had a kind of nostalgia for it, and they were trying to make themselves believe they were still faithful or fully faithful to cross-cousin marriage. And this interrelationship between societies traditionally studied by anthropologists and societies whose study is the privilege of historians is right now a future field for anthropological research which might completely renew our outlook on all our oldest problems.

**Intermission** (In the following part of the conversation, Lévi-Strauss is referring to a set of written questions prepared by participants in the seminar.)

**Lévi-Strauss:** I noticed that there are two main sets of questions and that the second one deals with Korean studies and East-West relations. I think that these questions should be left for the next meeting. In the first set, there are several questions on mythology which probably should be left for tomorrow.
I must confess quite frankly that I’m not sure I understand the remaining questions, because we have different intellectual traditions, and you’re thinking in a language which is not the same as my language. So, I shall be grateful to the questioners if they’re willing to explain; but just in order to start the ball rolling, let’s take the first question, by Lee, Jung-kee. Lee, Jung-kee suggests that I’ve been following John Lyon’s operational theory of meaning in his *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*. I must confess that I never heard the name and I don’t know the book. By the way, what is the year of the publication, because I can’t read it? Aha, 1968; I could then hardly follow a book published years after my theory.

**Lee, Jung-kee:** It was published in 1968 and your theory was before that.

**Lévi-Strauss:** But nevertheless, I’d fully agree with the statement you quote, that any linguistic element which occurs has meaning in an utterance only if it isn’t completely determined, obligatory in that context, because obviously, to give meaning to something is to be able to translate it into a language other than the language in which it was first expressed.

I don’t understand what the question has to do with kinship, because I’ve no feeling at all that I’ve been giving kinship meaning only in one context, and what I’ve been trying to do is to explain something about kinship, but I’m not trying to explain everything. There are a lot of things to be said about kinship which I never dared to say because they were not the things I was interested in. But kinship can most certainly be translated, if I may say so, into different languages and into different contexts. And if you allow me, I’d like to give just one example, which may interest you because it belongs more or less to your cultural area. It’s about the Kachin system, the Kachin are a very large population living in Northern Burma and just across the Chinese border. According to the author who first studied the Kachin, they had marriage regulations which certainly did not correspond to what they were actually doing, but were a kind of ideal chart they had in mind. And since there’s a blackboard, I shall do it on the blackboard.

The Kachin say that they’re divided into five main groups; Marip, which gives wives to Lathong, which gives wives to Laphai, which gives to Nkhum, which gives to Maran, and which gives wives to Marip. There is also a secondary system where Nkhum gives wives to Lathong, Laphai to Marip, Marip also to Nkhum and Lathong to Maran. There is a very striking correspondence with the Chinese system of the five elements.
The arrow would then indicate produces, which corresponds to give women to, because they also produce the group giving women. But for the other system, which also holds true for the Chinese cosmological system, what is said is that water is stronger than fire, that wood is stronger than Earth and so on. So the arrow would be inverted. But it is the same configuration. This has not been discussed about the Kachin, but it seems obvious there’s a correspondence between cosmological systems prevalent in the area and a marriage system that could be considered as symbolizing the other (or the other way around), so it’s perfectly obvious that kinship or facts about kinship are translatable into different systems, and they are sometimes actually translated by another people. It’s not an operator at all, there’re two different problems, entirely different problems – which nevertheless have something in common. What was the problem about kinship when I tried to think about kinship? It was that we have great many very different marriage rules across the world, that they don’t seem to make sense, and what I was trying to find out is if it was possible to give them a meaning, to make these rules meaningful. And I hope I succeeded by showing that the meaning of these rules was always fundamentally the same, that is rules of exchange, and that each rule did correspond to a different social structure where the numbers of partners were not the same and where the types of exchange were not the same, although there was always an exchange. After that I’ve shifted to a different domain, which is that of mythology. What is the problem about mythology? It is that all over the world, men are telling stories which seem utterly absurd, meaningless, exactly like the marriage rules, and I tried to find out if it was possible to make these stories meaningful, to extract a meaning, to give them some meaning. So really it was the same task which I undertook about kinship and about mythology, but neither kinship nor mythology are an operator which I’m using to explain anything else. I’m trying to make sense of marriage rules, I’m trying to make sense of myths, and that’s all.

Choi, Hyup: Question No. 2 on the prepared paper: How would you respond to the charge that structuralism is incapable of grasping the real nature of social relations? The background to the question is as follows:

1. Edmund Leach argued that a study of kinship systems involves understanding both the system of verbal categories and the system of behavioral attitudes which are interconnected. Therefore, kinship terminology must always be understood in relation to the social context in which it is being used. However Lévi-Strauss has remarked, with regard to the analysis of kinship terminologies: “F.G. Lounsbury and I.R. Buehler have proved that these nomenclatures manifest a kind of logical perfection which makes them authentic objects of scientific study.” For this reason, Leach pointed out, Lévi-Strauss is liable to become so fascinated by the logical perfection of the “systems” he is describing that he disregards the empirical facts.

2. In his critical review of Lévi-Strauss’ analysis of Kachin society, Paul Kelemen (1976) has reached to the following conclusion:

   Lévi-Strauss’ analysis of Kachin society ... points, as do his theoretical texts, to structuralism’s incapacity to grasp the real nature of social relations. A prisoner of the anthropocentric conception of the social process, he escapes its theoretical obstacles by situating the determination of the structure of society outside that process. But dissociated on the level of their determination, the articulation of the
social structure and the social process is realized at the cost of a formalist conception of the social structure and a reduction of the social process to the symbolic.

**Lévi-Strauss:** I’d just like to put a question in answer to his question. He says: How would you respond to the charge that structuralism is incapable of grasping the real nature of social relations? My question is: What is the real nature of social relations? Let me elaborate a little bit. Let’s suppose you’re a biologist. You have a microscope which has lenses of different strength. You take the first one and you look at a drop of water and you can say whether this water is pure or contains impurities. Then you shift to a stronger lens and you perceive a lot of small animals, who are making love, or eating each other. Then you shift to a stronger lens, and the animals disappear and what you see are only the cells constituting their bodies, and that a lot of processes are also going on. And then you shift to a stronger lens, and what you see is molecular structure. And if your microscope is an electronic one of the highest power, you shift and what you see is the atomic structure of these molecules. What is reality in that? Is there any level you may decide is the true one, and the other levels are not true? So, this is my answer to your question.

**Choi, Hyup:** It satisfies me, but I was just interested in your response to Leach’s charge that you tend to or you often ignore what does not fit your models or explanations. How do you respond to that charge?

**Lévi-Strauss:** Then, you should produce the fact which doesn’t fit. Leach, who is a good friend of mine, we fight with each other, but, nevertheless, we have very friendly relations, is not interested in the same things I’m interested in. He’s within his rights and I’m within my rights. And I think we’re both helping knowledge to make progress, but we’re not obliged to decide that this is the only level we should be interested in. This would not happen in biology, this would not happen in physics and this kind of dispute is the best proof that the social or human sciences are not sciences at all.

**Cho, Ok La:** The third question: In your paper “Structuralism and Ecology” you indirectly reject the idea that the structures of thought determine and indeed are culture. But in your various works you emphasize the inner laws governing mind, and analyze the social organization and myths in those laws. Then, what is the difference between structure of thought and inner laws governing minds?

And also in the same article you say “an empirical study alone can reveal the particular ‘structure’ of each system.” Is this structure not the same as the inner laws governing minds? If not, would you explain us what do you mean by “structure” in this case?

**Lévi-Strauss:** This question is about my paper on “Structuralism and Ecology” and perhaps you don’t know that this paper was bitterly criticized by Marvin Harris and I wrote a rejoinder to M. Harris and the discussion is not finished, but nevertheless, the question is a good question because what you ask is about the relationship between two kinds of determinisms, the determinism of the mind and the determinism of the world all around. And I think that we always have to deal with these two determinisms and that what we find at any given point is the result of an interaction between the determinism of the mind which has to be adapted to the determinism of the environment. You see, if you’re studying a myth, in this myth you’ll find two different kinds of relationships. The first one is the relationship of this myth with another myth which is itself in relationship with another myth.
and so on. And at the same time, in a given population, this myth will take a shape which is determined by the environment. Of course, an agricultural people cannot have exactly the same mythical representation as people living only from hunting and gathering. And the contents of the myth will change, but at the same time, the relationship will subsist between the two myths. So, you have two kinds of determinism, let’s say a horizontal determinism which links a mythological system with another mythological system, according to certain constraints of the mind, and at each point, at each moment, there is also the need to shape out this particular determinism by reference to the empirical conditions of the environment. But it’s not a choice between one and the other; you have to take both into account, and you’ll find what you’re trying to explain at the intersection of the two determinisms.

**Cho, Ok La:** You didn’t answer the second question, because the second question was about your general structuralism, so how do you compare structuralism and the laws governing mind in your paper “Structuralism and Ecology” to the ones that you used in studying mythology in general?

**Lévi-Strauss:** In my books on mythology, I’ve always been extremely careful to take into account the empirical conditions regulating the life of every tribe and if you care to look in the index under infrastructure, you will see a lot of references which have entirely to do with the actual relationship of the people with their environment.

There are several questions about Chomsky. Some say he is a structuralist and some others say he is not. Chomsky once told me that when he was a student at Harvard University he listened to one of my lectures, which had to do with the beginning of my work on mythology. Perhaps there’s some hidden contact between us which goes back to this early time. I’d say, definitely, that in my mind, Chomsky is a structuralist. It is a special blend of structuralism, but he is a structuralist inasmuch as what he is trying to do is to find universal constraints which operate in languages all over the world and whatever the language.

But there’s probably a great difference between us, which concerns how we conceive surface structures and deep structures. If I understand Chomsky right, for him, surface structures are linguistic, and deep structures are also linguistic, since he can express them in linguistic terms. And in my opinion, this can be very dangerous because you cannot decide if this is really a deep structure. If the deep structure is also linguistic, then there can be deeper structures, also linguistic, and deeper and deeper and so on, indefinitely. And in my work on mythology, I certainly distinguished between surface structures and deep structures, but those deep structures are not of the same nature as the surface structures. So, in my opinion, they have a great explanatory power.

**Lee, Jung-kee:** What is the difference between deep structures and the innate capacity for mental processes? Chomsky talked about deep structures and in general we can say human beings have their own innate capacity for thinking.

**Lévi-Strauss:** An innate capacity for speaking. Because for Chomsky, there is a kind of faculty for speaking which is innate. This is a problem for linguists to discuss, and for neurophysiologists. For my work, I don’t need an innate capacity for mythologizing. I only need an innate capacity for symbolizing, which can express itself in language, in myths, and perhaps in many other different things, in the arts.
Lee, Chungmin: Do you believe you can have certain kind of correspondence rules relating the deep structural level of social phenomena to the surface structural level? Just as in linguistics?

Lévi-Strauss: I’ll not claim there are the same deep structures for all social phenomena. My feeling is that the way we perceive reality and the way the people we study perceive reality do not correspond necessarily to the deep functioning of their societies. For instance, when the Bororo Indians in Central Brazil, where I worked years ago, explain that they’re divided into two moieties, and that each individual in one moiety is obliged to marry an individual in the other moiety, this is a surface structure which is very apparent to them, and which is very apparent in the layout of the village, because it’s really drawn on the ground. But in fact their society does not function that way, but functions on a ternary basis, not on a dualistic basis, and this would be the deep structure of Bororo social organization. But I wouldn’t claim that, if you study for instance Bororo mythology or Bororo art, you’ll find the same deep structure. Perhaps it’s a different one, I don’t know.

Lee, Kiyong: In your article “Structuralism and Ecology”, you express an interest in constraints on the human mind, and Chomsky claims that linguistics is a branch of psychology. In that respect, would you be able to equate your interest in the human mind with Chomsky’s views of linguistics?

Lévi-Strauss: I wrote explicitly in La Pensée sauvage and if I’m not mistaken, I said that anthropology is a branch of psychology.

Lee, Kiyong: You express some doubt about the notion of deep structure in Chomsky’s linguistics. But wouldn’t you admit multi-level analysis for language or any possible system? Suppose you want to build a linguistic system, and building a linguistic system, you want to have the system generate structures. You’d not just generate structures at one level, whether surface or abstract. Wouldn’t you admit many levels of analysis or many levels of structures in your analysis? You talked about transformations not arising from structures. If you do admit transformations, aren’t you admitting different levels of analysis?

Lévi-Strauss: I think in my four volumes on mythology, there is a kind of logical progression; it’s not only that starting from South America, I moved progressively to North America, but also that I moved from myths which involved a logic of classes to more elaborated myths which involved a logic of propositions. So there are certainly several levels of analysis.

David Eyde: I guess I have either two questions or two parts of one question. In the first place, I thought I heard you implying that the house tends to be endogamous, that is that one of the principles that unify it is marriage between distant kin, and I’d like your comment on endogamy as a characteristic of the house. And from your discussion of the Batak, I was wondering if you were not implying that some people who are consciously patrilineal nevertheless can be usefully analyzed in terms of a cognatic house structure.

Lévi-Strauss: First, the point about distant kin. This was in the part of what I said this morning about solving the Crow-Omaha problem, and not at all related to the house, because in the case of the house, the interesting fact is that in the house, we find all the traditional distinctions which we use in anthropology overcome. And for instance exogamy and endogamy are used together. Exogamous marriage in order to secure new alliances, and to acquire new titles, and endogamous marriage on order to keep them once you have
acquired them. So, the house is certainly not characterized by marriage with distant kin. It’s characterized by a kind of alternation of marriage, with distant kin and with near kin. About the second point, about the Batak, yes, I’d feel there are many more cognatic aspects amongst the Batak than can be described by considering simply them as a patrilineal society.

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: Let’s see. The Crow-Omaha type of society is quite unusual, but we also have similar phenomena in Korean society, but I’m especially interested in your concept of “house.” This is an oriental concept, an Asian concept. For example, if we use the family, we cannot cover all of our social life with this terminology. You mention “house,” in French maison, and this is very similar to the Korean “house.” On this topic, you have also an article about the family. Now will you continue to use “family” in the future? Or will you use maison instead of “family”?

Lévi-Strauss: It’s not at all on the same level. Of course, the family exists everywhere and in societies with houses, there are of course families included in the houses, but what I was saying a moment ago in answering Professor Eyde is that the typical phenomenon in the house is that there is a constant playing out of two parameters. We used to consider societies as either patrilineal or matrilineal. We used to consider filiation and alliance as entirely different phenomena. We used to consider descent and residence as different criteria. But in the maison, there is always a combined use of patrilineal-matrilineal, filiation-alliance, descent-residence.

In the European Middle Ages, there is a classical distinction between two kinds of names, which I call either race names, which come out of filiation, and land names, which come out of residence. There is an interesting phenomenon of a shift from race names to land names in the French nobility. And by looking around at cognatic societies all over the world, it seems to me that this phenomenon, this dual use of race names and land names, exists in many other societies, and even in Melanesia. Endogamy and exogamy, I’ve just said, are constantly played in interaction, also heredity and election, the question whether the chief is elected or inherits the chieftainship, and you have all over the world the two systems which are combined, especially on the North West coast of which I was talking this morning. There is a kind of dialectic of all these parameters, which permits a corporate group to appear, and there is a striking fact in the history of the European houses, in that you have two parameters, one which is usually the male one, which is race, that is filiation, the other one which is matrilineal and which is the land. Then you have the case where the land becomes more and more important and the race less and less important, and it is precisely at this point where the race element in the man is going down, and the land element in the women is going up, that you find the maison. This is very striking, for instance, in the case of the origin of the French royal family, the house of Bourbons, which comes from a very junior son of a French king, that is where the race element is at the lowest, and he gets land from marriage and then he is able to establish a new house.

Byun, Kyu-yong: (in French, summary) You insisted in your lectures that the concept of fetishism could be transposed to the maison, as Marx applied it to merchandise, and that the valeur d’échange was fetishized in merchandise. How could you succeed in transposing to the maison the concept of fetishism in Marxist terms? Is it possible to transpose this notion of fetishism to understand the family, the Sino-Korean maison?
Lévi-Strauss: It is not at all a Marxist interpretation. It is rather a comparison to make clear what I have in mind. What Marx said about la valeur d’échange is that it was fetishized in merchandise in order for a conflict between individuals or groups to be transformed into a pseudo-reality and be more easily accepted. And it seems to me that there is something of the same kind in the case of the house, because as I said this morning, we may be confronted with three situations in human societies. First, the wife-takers are the stronger and this is undisputed, and then we have a patrilineal society. They can be inferior in status, that is a different affair, but they have more political power. Second, the wife-givers have more political power and this produces a matrilineal society. But third, we also have societies where there is a constant pull between the wife-takers and the wife-givers. And they are more or less in equilibrium, and of course that creates a society which is unstable and in order to disguise this opposition or this contradiction, this tense relationship between the wife-givers and the wife-takers is fetishized or hypostatized, if you prefer, as the house - the house being created at the intersection of two lines of descent, the one which provides the wives, and the one which provides the husbands, and which becomes a reality in its own right.

Lee, In ho: I am a historian by training and my question will clearly show that I am really quite ignorant of questions of kinship, but may I ask you an elementary question? You say in your paper “La famille” that the family is not the constitutive element of the social group and that the society’s primary concern is not to perpetuate the family, it is only a stop in a long march which has to continue, and my question is: What do you precisely mean by a social group or society in this sense, and can one not think of instances of the family surviving after the society disintegrates?

Lévi-Strauss: If you take the special case of a society that disintegrates, it is quite possible that families will still exist, but it is not just one family. If there is to be a society after the disintegration of this society, you cannot rebuild it with one family but you need several. You see, the point I was trying to make is that a family can only exist if there is another family to provide it with women. And so society in this sense exists before the family, logically, not of course historically.

Lee, In ho: I haven’t really grasped your concept of structuralism, but what are in the end the constitutive elements of the social group?

Lévi-Strauss: I have written several papers about what I called the atom of kinship trying to define precisely the constitutive element. I tried to show that the constitutive element is always made up of elements coming from two different families.

Henry Lewis: As someone who has worked in the Philippines, I was particularly interested in what you had to say about cognatic societies because I think those of us who have worked in areas like this, including David Eyde in Melanesia, have often felt a little unsecure, somehow anthropologically inferior that we haven’t been able to come up with unilineal descent groups. Melanesia, particularly, has suffered as a result of the search for unilineal descent groups there. George Apell particularly has been looking at the question of houses and household groups, going back to Murdock’s argument that the family is a corporate group. It seems to me that what you are arguing here about the estate is close to what George Apell is looking at. We still seem to be plagued, however, with notions of unilineal descent. I am
wondering if you see how we can avoid these kinds of problems, largely of definition, that we have inherited from traditional British social anthropology.

**Lévi-Strauss:** Well, of course, I am not as familiar with the Philippines as you are, but it seems to me that in Barton’s work it was already very obvious that it was impossible to use either descent or residence exclusively, but that it was a specific combination of both. And there has been a very interesting thesis in France recently, not on the Philippines, but on some island south of the Philippines, I don’t know exactly which one. But it is quite obvious that the only social reality is the house. There are houses, they have names, and the society is made out of these houses. Families appear and families disappear, but what is important is that houses remain. Such a house is simultaneously a building and a social institution.

**Henry Lewis:** Well, I think it is particularly interesting that in South East Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Micronesia, when you do get unilineal groups they certainly appear to evolve out of cognatic societies. It seems to me important that rather than ignoring these areas as has been so much the case, or seeing groups like the Balinese and others as special cases to be studied in their own terms, you are trying to relate them back to the problems emerging from the study of cognatic societies.

**Lévi-Strauss:** About Bali, there’s is something which I think is rather interesting because in his book on Balinese kinship, Geertz was certainly embarrassed by the type of grouping which is called Dadja, if I am not mistaken. When he is talking of noble Dadja, he has no hesitation. He considers them as noble houses, but he gets very much embarrassed with the commoners and it seems that he doesn’t exactly know what it is. Is it a descent group, a political faction, a commercial undertaking or what? There is a book you certainly know, which is very sophisticated, by a certain, James Boon, on Bali, and he says that it is a little bit of all that. And it is very curious that there is the same problem in the European Middle Ages about the guilds. The guilds, which we consider as commercial undertakings, were originally religious groups and came to be considered on the same footing sometimes as noble houses; with the same kind of rights. And this is also one of the points where I strongly believe that social anthropologists should not always limit themselves in the case of traditional cultures like Bali to exotic cultures, for in the past of their own civilization they will find institutions which are absolutely similar, and they would understand much better what they are studying if they were a little bit more historically minded.

**Hwang, Juck-ryoon:** Different kinship systems in different societies are, I think, reflected in the languages used in these societies. And I think that few people can hold a linguistic determinist position and it would be hard to believe that a language determines the kinship system; it is rather vice-versa. I’d like to know if you think that a language would ever contribute to perpetuating or at least maintaining the kinship system for a longer time?

**Lévi-Strauss:** I doubt very much that it is possible to give a single answer to such a question. There are cases where the kinship system remains remarkably stable within a language. The best example I know is the Japanese where the kinship system doesn’t seem to have changed a great deal since the tenth century up to now. And it is the same system the same language, the same world. But we have side by side cases of that type and cases of a completely different type where there are alterations coming in succession. I’d not give a single answer. It depends.
Lee, Kiyong: It may be easy to set up oppositions and analogies, but how would you determine whether certain oppositions or analogies are significant in describing structures? By intuition..?

Lévi-Strauss: By trial and error.

Lee, Kiyong: You compare certain structures and show that a particular description is much better.

Lévi-Strauss: It is better when it can explain more things with fewer elements. So we can say, but we should never forget that we, in the human and social sciences, we never have a final explanation. We have always provisional explanations which will be superseded by better ones.

Choi, Shin-duk: What would be the contribution of structuralism when applied to our Korean kinship system which is patrilineal but having a few bilinear elements?

Lévi-Strauss: I am completely ignorant about the Korean kinship system. I can answer that I am not trying to explain a system, I am trying to fit many systems in to a general typology and see where a particular case should be put, exactly like a naturalist meeting a flower or an insect which was never seen before, and instead of leaving it as something unique, exceptional, which has no place at all, trying to fit it into a taxonomy and to attempt a further explanation of the relationship with the neighboring systems or species. So, if I were studying the Korean kinship system, I’d try to say it is a system of this type, which is midway between such a system and such another system, and then would raise questions for the historians, in order to see whether its place in a typology corresponds with a historical relationship with other groups and so on.

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: I analyzed the Korean kinship system during the Silla period with your model, and it turned out to be Kachin type at first, then, in the middle of the Silla period, it turned into a Gilyak system and then later into a Kachin system. Do you have any other example of a change from Kachin to Gilyak and from Gilyak type to Kachin type?

Lévi-Strauss: Right away, I don’t know; of course, they are closely related systems. They belong to the same family, but should this be the case, it would be very interesting and perhaps you have done it already, you should try to find a correlation with other changes in economic life, for instance ...

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: Is it possible that changing the political and economical system also means changing the kinship and marriage system?

Lévi-Strauss: It will always be a matrilateral type of system.

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: That is also connected with Korean kinship. You have never used Firth’s concept of “ramage”. Is there no connection between your concept of maison and his ramage?

Lévi-Strauss: It is very difficult to discuss the concept of ramage, because it was used first by Firth about the Tikopia and then he gave it up, at least for the people where he first used it. But I’d certainly think that there are some cases where the so-called rages are actually houses.
Cho, Hae Jung: Can I assume from your presentation that balancing power between wife-giver and wife-taker is more prevalent in a cognatic system than in a unilineal system, and also that the concept of house, and probably preferred cross-cousin marriage, is most frequently found in cognatic systems?

Lévi-Strauss: Not the second point. On the first point, yes, I think that the house system consists in putting two into one or disguising two under the appearance of one. There are two rival families and they hide this rivalry behind something which originates at the intersection of both. For instance, if you have a lineal society, either patrilineal or matrilineal, the house is generated by breaking up these two lines and constituting a unit. Cross-cousin marriage may happen in societies with houses and would be then understood as a form of endogamy. But always combined with exogamy. You have a kind of rhythmical alternation between exogamous and endogamous marriage.

Park, Ynhui: Structuralism presents itself as a methodology of the social sciences and if we agree that all social phenomena can be explained in relation to causal connection to other social phenomena, which methodology is the best one? You said structuralism had a powerful explanatory power because it proposed a unified and universal principle of explanation of all social phenomena. If the same phenomena can be explained in causal terms, and since causal explanations can be applied not only to social phenomena, but also to natural phenomena, I think we might say that casual explanations have a more general explanatory power than structural explanations. Then, we might say that what you call structures can be a kind of derivation from certain causal laws. Do you accept this conclusion?

Lévi-Strauss: Not exactly. I don’t agree with you on the terms. I would like first of all to dispel a misunderstanding. I never claimed that everything in social life could be explained structurally. Some can, but obviously, between those things, there are a lot of other things which escape a structural explanation. Still, whenever we are able to explain something structurally, it is a very powerful way of explanation. Then, some of us, I don’t mean all of us, because as we say in French, there is room for everybody at the right hand of the Lord, some of us should concentrate on those phenomena, but there are a lot of things which cannot be explained structurally and which depend, for instance, on probabilities. Secondly, I don’t understand your opposition between structural and causal, because, in my mind, the terms don’t belong at all to the same logical levels. There are causalities in structural explanation as there are causalities elsewhere. And by causalities you probably mean the kind of explanation which is used in the natural and physical sciences, but what I’ll answer to that is that, as a French scientist said after all, structuralism is nothing special, it is only the application to human phenomena of the type of explanation that the hard sciences are using. I think that what the physicists and the biologists are doing is really to use structural explanation and we very timidly and cautiously are trying to do the same in our field but only very partially.

Park, Ynhui: But there seems to be quite a difference between structural explanation and causal explanation in the natural sciences. Because we talk about presupposed notions of norms or rules, which are quite ...

Lévi-Strauss: We use the term rule because we don’t dare to use the term law.
Park, Ynhui: When we talk about social laws, we are not talking about the causal laws people are talking about in natural sciences. Even though we use the same word, we mean quite different things.

Lévi-Strauss: If you speak of juridical laws, certainly, but is we speak of the laws of exchange, in marriage, then it is law exactly in the same sense as in the physical sciences.

Park, Ynhui: I feel uncomfortable with the metaphysical implication of your ...

Lévi-Strauss: No metaphysical implication.

Park, Ynhui: You tried to say that culture is a part of nature, but at the same time, you are opposing culture to nature. Can you say culture is after all a part of nature?

Lévi-Strauss: It is obvious that culture is a part of nature, but that doesn’t mean that we have to use exactly the same principles when we study this part of nature as when we study other parts of nature. That is when you study phenomena dealing with life, you cannot use the same type of causal explanation as you use when you study matter. We can discuss that question philosophically, but you know very well that if you want to make progress in your particular field, you have to use different kinds of conceptual frameworks. There is the hope that in the long run, it will become unified, but it is not right now. Perhaps a time will come when we will be able to use exactly the same type of explanation for every natural phenomenon including culture, but we are unable to do so at the present time.

Son, Bong-ho: You deny that your structure is anything metaphysical, but there is then a misunderstanding at least amongst philosophers who find that your structure is a bit metaphysical, especially when you emphasize determinism and don’t accept the view there is a free will in human beings, etc.

Lévi-Strauss: I never discussed the problem and it doesn’t interest me at all.

Son, Bong-ho: I read some dissertations written about you where it is said that you regard free will as the spoiled child of Western culture.

Lévi-Strauss: I read it too, but I never said that. I did not say free will, I said the individual subject, “I.” I think the individual subject has been the spoiled child of philosophy, because philosophy has been interested for the past years, and perhaps centuries, in the individual, and considering that what “I” was thinking, what “I” was doing was the most important. What I tried to say is that there are things more important to deal with than our little “I.”

Son, Bong-ho: Don’t you think there is some metaphysical implication when you say that “I” is not important?

Lévi-Strauss: I say it is not important from the point of view of the progress of social sciences and that we can make better advances in considering not the individual, but what individuals are doing when acting in groups.

Son, Bong-ho: There is a difference between saying the individual is not important in the social sciences, and saying the individual is not important, just like that. I’d agree with the first, but with the second, you are going beyond your claim.

Lévi-Strauss: Not beyond my claim because you’d be right if philosophers didn’t impose their views upon the social sciences. But they are actually trying to do so. Take the case of
Sartre, for instance. And then we were compelled to fight back, to save our freedom, if not our free will.

**Kim, Kwang Ok:** You say you can find some invariant rules, universal rules by cutting away meaningless factors. I wonder who can decide which elements are meaningless and which are meaningful. Do you decide yourself about that or do Kwakiutl Indians decide it? And why your comparison between the Kwakiutl and European Middle Ages? Why not 15th-century Indian society and the Kwakiutl?

**Lévi-Strauss:** Because we know nothing about 15th-century Indian society, but it would be very interesting. The first question, I can not understand.

**Kim, Kwang Ok:** My first question is related to the problem of emic and etic in anthropology. The so-called emic and etic approach to anthropology.

**Lévi-Strauss:** It depends on what you can explain using one or the other. You just have to consider the value, the power, of the explanation you get. For the time being, we get a better explanation or we can explain more things by using one approach or the other.

**Kim, Han Gu:** In the context of social structure, how would you differentiate the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage you speak of from the Chinese type of patrilateral cross-cousin marriage?

**Lévi-Strauss:** A matrilateral cross-cousin marriage is a marriage with the mother’s brother’s daughter and a patrilateral one with the father’s sister’s daughter.

**Kim, Han Gu:** I’d like to know what is the difference between the two types what are the sociological and anthropological implications of the difference.

**Lévi-Strauss:** One implies long exchange cycles and the other one short ones. With patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, the cycle is closed after one generation and in a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, it can be closed soon but it can extend as long as you wish.

**Choi, Jai Seuk:** Descent is a very important term in analyzing kinship, but there are several definitions of the concept of descent. You emphasize the legal principle governing inheritance of ownership of name from generation to generation, but on the other hand, Murdock accents group membership, such as patrilineal or matrilineal, and some other scholars emphasize residence rules. If there are many definitions, we don’t have the same point of view. It is very inconvenient in the analysis of kinship.

**Lévi-Strauss:** There is a difficult problem of English and French terminology which is that our Anglo-Saxon colleagues use with different meanings the term “descent” and the term “filiation”, while in French, we use “filiation” practically with the same meaning as “descendance”, which would be “descent”. This creates numerous misunderstandings between especially our British colleagues, our Cambridge colleagues, and us. They have been insisting that “filiation” and “descent” are entirely different while they claim at the same time there is only one legitimate descent notion which is genealogical descent, which should be distinguished from analogical descent, which means, if I understand them well, that they are trying to have their cake and eat it. I don’t think we should embark on this kind of discussion, as it it mostly a discussion of terminology. But I’d like to go back to the question not of free will, but of the individual. Between the so-called functional or
structural-functional anthropologists, mostly in England such as Firth and Leach, and myself, there has been a long discussion, a controversy about the meaning of structure and nature, and both Firth and Leach have said, although in different terms, that structure after all was nothing more than the average conduct of individuals. That is, individuals in a society are acting more or less freely, but on average there is some correlation between their actions, and this is what we call structure. And this is a part of the individual. My position is that the fact that there is an average conduct to be extracted from all these individual moves proves that these individual moves are not solitary, there is something more which explains why instead of each individual doing something different the majority are acting the same way. And it doesn’t become metaphysical if we try to find what that something else is and show that this something else explains their conduct.

Huh, Moon-Kang (in French): Ten years ago when I explained to my students the concept of system, structure, relationship, synchrony, diachrony, they laughed at me. But many have come today to listen to you and learn from you. My first question is about the problem of diachronic dimension, then the second is about the problem of exchanging partners. In your first work on Nambikwara, you wrote at length about space and time, geographical space and historical data, and you showed the intention of studying in your monograph the problem of trying to decipher history. You collected fantastic data during your trip around the world, and you shifted from insisting on restricted systems to open systems with long and short cycles. We have the feeling that your logical reasoning connects one system to another in a perfectly logical way. But the notion of time seems to me to become more or less flattened.

In your Pensée sauvage, you explained at length the system of “bricolage” of the elements of mythological discourse, in which you try to find the system of relations which allows you to perceive a concept according to which you can establish a relation of correspondence, and which allows you to establish a system. It seems that you aren’t dealing with chronology, but with logical relationships. Just as today your students are doing field work to test your ideas, I myself have studied the royal kinship of the Three Kingdoms in Korea.

The relationships are matters of kinship. We have tried to represent this with diagrams, and we used a concept of historical change through time. Perhaps we placed ourselves in a different domain, but we tried to describe reality, while you talk about the logic underlying universal kinship. For us, time seems to be more concrete, while in your Parenté élémentaire it seems to be more or less eclipsed behind your logical reasoning.

Then, a second question is about what you think of Marcel Mauss’ “Essai sur le don.” You said that even in Japan, or in Melanesia, or in European nobility, we find a superiority of wife-givers over wife-takers. But in my research on royal kinship, the wife-givers are more or less subjects who establish a relation with the royal clan. The king is always superior, although the partner, the subjugated clan, establishes the relation of exchange. They are certainly powerful compared to the subjects of the kingdom, but they more or less submit to the taker, who is the king. I raise the question in other terms. Speaking generally you say that the wife-giver is superior, but in my particular example, as described in my monograph, the taker is superior to the giver. I’d like to know whether this exception to your generalization is acceptable to you.
Lévi-Strauss: You are perfectly right in your question about history. It’d be wonderful if we could use history in our studies, and we should use it whenever we can. Unfortunately we are working with people without writing or archives, and we have to do the best we can without history. But you are certainly in a privileged situation if you can use history. On the second point, it seems to me that by showing the royal family in Korea marrying members of subject tribes, we have a very good illustration of the fact that there is a union of the sanctity of the blood and of the land, and this is a very general situation we find all around the world. Now, about the relative superiority in status of the givers or the takers, both cases exist in the literature. You have cases where the status of the giver is superior such as the Kachin, or it is the other way round; both cases can be found.
2 Mythology and Collective Representation (October 15, 1981)

Lévi-Strauss: It was suggested that this seminar be devoted to mythology, probably on account of the four volumes and many articles which I wrote on that subject. I’d like to begin by dispelling some misunderstanding which may arise from the title which was given to the English translation of my mythological series, the fifth volume of which has just come out in English translation at the end of last month, that is two or three weeks ago.

It was against my strong protest that the British and the American publishers decided to call it “introduction to a science of mythology,” while in my opinion there is no science at all, and no science of mythology either. What I tried to do was to describe and analyze a particular mythological discourse, that is the mythological discourse of the American Indians. And to show that this is a single discourse, despite all the differences which exist between North and South America. They are completely different, the life styles are not the same, the languages are not the same, the cultures differ greatly both with and between North and South America. Yet, it seems that a similar mythological system is in operation in the two hemispheres, subject to a series of consistent transformations. For instance, if in one case we find winter patterns, then, in the other part we find summer patterns, if the central theme of South American mythology is uncooked food, the central theme of the corresponding North American mythology is nakedness, a transformation which also exists in the Western languages as exemplified for instance by the English expression “to sleep in the raw,” or by the French expression “monter à cru” that is to ride a horse without a saddle. If in one case, the story is about the origin of cooking, in the other case, it is about the origin of wearing clothes. If in one case, it is about honey, in the other case it is about salt. If in one case, the advent of culture is symbolized by the culinary art, in the other case, it is symbolized by barter or by sale of food supplies. And if in one case, I mean in North America, the most general theme is a kind of war between two different peoples, the people of Heaven and the people of Earth, in the other case, it is a family conflict between affines, but depending upon whether the populations considered are matrilineal or patrilineal, these affines are a father and a son in the first case or brothers-in-law in the second case.

Therefore, we have an application of this definition of structure which I tried to submit yesterday, that is we have elements and relationships between these elements, but most of all, these systems of elements, and their relationships are subject to a series of transformations so when something is changed, immediately, other changes appear, leaving in variant certain fundamental properties. But rather than starting with American examples I’d like to submit a few thoughts which I had when about ten days ago, in Paris, Professor Kang kindly gave me a small booklet which I understand is a reprint of an old article by Professor Kim Chewon called “Han Dynasty Mythology and Korean legend of Tan-Gun”, published in the Archives of the Chinese Art Society of America, Vol. II, 1948, 1949. I am not sure if this is a complete English translation or rather an English summary but I looked into it very carefully. Certainly ignorant as I am of Korean mythology, I am not going to submit an interpretation, but since the matter is probably quite familiar to you, I think that it would be a good example to explain, not the solution I’d suggest, but the question I’d put to myself
and then perhaps you could with better competence ask yourselves about it. As you may remember, the book is about some Chinese Han Dynasty stone slabs which were first published by the Frenchman Edouard Chavannes in 1909, where the author of the paper recognized an illustration of one of your great myths as preserved in your literature, the legend of Tan-Gun, except that there is a problem which arises immediately, because in the Chinese carving, it seems that it is the tiger and not the bear which is married to Ung, and who is the mother of Tan-Gun, because one can see the tiger holding a small human body before its mouth. Now, this is a discrepancy, since in the Korean case it is the bear and not the tiger which gives birth to the culture hero. And the author wonders about this discrepancy and suggests two explanations for it. Maybe, he says, it is the result of a confusion or corruption understandable in the light of the long time separating the written Korean legend which we know from records dating back to the 13th century and the Chinese version of the second century, or else it is perhaps the result of an influence of the beliefs of the Siberian and North Asiatic bear cult. This is typically the way traditional mythographers try to explain discrepancies, either a corruption due to a time lag or a corruption due to an external influence. The kind of method which I am following would in this case proceed in a different way. There is an inversion between the two situations: We have two animals, tiger and bear. In one case, the mother role is allotted to the bear, in the other case, to the tiger. Now, I’d ask myself, are there other inversions between the Chinese early mythology and Korean early mythology? And immediately, we look at the old Chinese texts preserved in the Shujing, And if we look at these early mythologies, it is apparent that at the beginning of time, Heaven and Earth were close together and this was harmful to mankind because this closeness of Heaven and Earth resulted in a sort of general confusion between men and animals, and especially between men and gods. And gods were constantly visiting the Earth and it was inconvenient.

So, in order for the world to be organized and regularized by the culture hero, it was necessary, first of all, to separate Heaven and Earth. Now, if I understand the Tan-Gun legend well, there the situation is inverted, because in the very beginning, Heaven and Earth are separated and they’re separated to the extent that a son of the god of Heaven, Ung, decided he should leave Heaven and go down to Earth in order to organize it.

So, we have an inverted situation which is in close correspondence to the inverted situation between the bear and the tiger. Now, the opposition between bear and tiger is not peculiar to Chinese and Korean mythology. It is also very apparent, and in similar terms, elsewhere in the world and particularly in America, where we also have stories about humans marrying animals, humans marrying either a bear-woman or a bear-man, and human women marrying, not a tiger, but a jaguar, which is the corresponding animal, and it is very striking that we have the same transformation; depending on the tribe, depending on the region, it is either the jaguar or the bear which gives birth to a human. Now I’d be very cautious, because I have some knowledge of the ethnographical context and ecological context of the bear and the jaguar in America, and I cannot assume that the context is the same here. Obviously, in this part of the world, tiger and bear may exist side by side, while in America, it is very clear that with a few exceptions, where there is a bear, there is no jaguar, and where there is a jaguar, there is no bear. So, the reason for the opposition, in America, for instance, is that the bear is a chthonian animal, it belongs to the underworld, while the jaguar is a celestial animal. It is also the fact that the bear is the only animal which eats raw food which
it is also convenient for mankind to eat raw - honey, fruits, dried seeds and the like - while the jaguar is thought of as having been the master of the cooking fire before it gave up eating cooked food and started eating its food raw. There is also the fact that like humans bears hibernate in “houses,” while the jaguar differs from humans from now on as it only eats raw food and especially raw meat, a kind of food the humans cannot eat. So I will not try to extend this system to a different part of the world. I’d only advocate that it is first necessary to understand what is the semantic position of the bear and what is the semantic position of the tiger in East Asia. We cannot assume that the situation would be the same, Nevertheless, we know that the two animals are in opposition and the fact of the opposition is significant. I just mentioned this topic to make clear, in an example which is more familiar to you than it is to me, the kind of question which one should ask oneself.

Turning to mythology in more general terms, I remember that once, as happens to university professors all over the world, I got a telephone call from a French television network, and they told me they had a special show where they answered questions put to them by telephone, and that somebody phoned them and asked for a definition of myth. Well, I tried to answer them, but it is a little bit more complicated than they thought and when we ask ourselves what a myth is, it must be said right away that it is not a simple question. There are ethnographic criteria which we find amongst the people themselves who tell the myth. For instance, there may be different names for myths, for tales, and for historical legends. There may be also special rules for telling myths which do not prevail in the case of folk tales. For instance, perhaps myths can only be told during one period of the year, or perhaps a special body posture has to be adopted and perhaps myths can also be listened to seated or lying down, or the like. Nevertheless, when we try to look at the material from the outside and not from the inside, it soon appears that, even when the people themselves make a distinction between a myth and a tale and give them different names, there is a common substance in both, and that the difference is mostly that very strong oppositions expressed in mythology, for instance, between Heaven and Earth, sun and moon, also exist in tales, but in a much weakened form.

And also the fact that tales tend to become impoverished and to assume a stereotyped aspect. This is very obvious, for instance, in the structural analysis that the great Russian folklorist Propp gave using a certain body of Russian tales, the corpus of tales which was collected by Afanasiev. If Propp is able to give a single formula for all these tales, it is because they are much more stereotyped than the corresponding myths would be. And there is also the fact that unlike myths, tales tend to have a moralistic trend, but a moralistic trend which is to a large extent arbitrary; that is, there is a moral but one never knows what the moral will be. I remember in that respect that the great Russian-born linguist Jakobson, who is still alive in the USA, started his professional career collecting folk tales in Russia. And he once told me that one of these semi-professional story tellers told him once, “I only tell stories in order to contradict.” It sounds better in French, because it’d be: “Je ne conte que pour contredire.” And I said, “What do you mean by that?” He said, “I am in a pub, hearing some man saying life is very hard, difficult and that there is no God, because if there were a God, things wouldn’t be so bad. And immediately, somebody stands up and says, ‘What, there is no God! Listen...’ And he tells him a story showing there is a God. And if he hears somebody saying ‘I was very lucky, I must be thankful to God’, then he gets up and tells him a story showing there is no God! and so on.” So it’s very difficult to look for a sound criterion
which allows us to define what is a myth, and, according to my experience, the best definition is probably the one which is offered by the Pacific North West coast Indians, where they consider that myths always relate to a period where humans and animals were not really distinct. And what does this mean?

This means that myths refer to a period of confusion, whatever may be the way this confusion is expressed. And that the specific function of the myth is to explain how some kind of order came to be substituted for this original confusion. If we try to explore this notion a little further, then, it appears that myth can be defined by criteria which are, on the one hand, objective, and on the other hand, internal. In the first place, in myths we witness a kind of totalization of the time dimension, that is, there is no separation between the past, the present and the future. The past is referred to in order to explain that things were not always as they are now and how they came to be as they are now. And the present is considered as a kind of charter for the future. So that really, past, present and future are put together. In the second place, an essential characteristic of the myth is what I’d call the plurality of codes. During the 19th century, there were a lot of attempts to discover the code of mythology, and we had several schools and several authors, each trying to advocate a specific code, for instance, the so-called euhemeristic code, that myths had to do with the past historical events and that the so-called gods or heroes of mythology were actually historical personages. We have Max Muller’s school, the astronomical school, which was trying to advocate another code, a celestial one in which the god or the hero was said to symbolize heavenly bodies and tell stories about cosmology and so on. It seems to me that in myths, there is never only one code, and the essence of myth is to use a plurality of codes simultaneously, so that, and we are back to the definition of structure again, there is an invariant relationship which can at the same time explain celestial phenomena, calendar, biological phenomena, theological or botanical ones, sociological ones, and the like. As, for instance, the fact that the relationship between sun and Earth should be not too close (because in that case, there would be a universal conflagration), nor too distant (because in that case, there would be an eternal night and a permanent cold), and that they should be at a good distance one from another explains at the same time: why the sun and the moon should also be at a good distance from one another, so that day and night can alternate regularly; why the sun should be at a time a little bit close, but at another time, a little bit further from the Earth, so that there should be a periodicity of seasons; and that the alternation between day and night and the periodicity of seasons are the same thing in the time dimension as the distinction between animals and men and the distinction within the animal kingdom between the animal species are in the natural order. They, too, should be at a good distance one from another, because otherwise, they’d become impure animals as the Bible says. And marriage should also be at a good distance, because if one marries too far, he is prone to marry an enemy, or someone dangerous like a sorceress, and if he marries too close, there will be incest and confusion. And when we have a myth, we have a type of story which pretends to account for all these phenomena at the same time. It’s at the same time on the spatial level and on the temporal level, on the natural and on the cultural level, static and dynamic, cosmological on the one hand, and taxonomic on the other hand. Always a kind of arbitration between continuity, which is dangerous, because it means confusion, and discontinuity which may also be dangerous if it is too great, but we need a balance between the two. Now, how does myth proceed in order to reach this result? it proceeds by a
systematic use of binary oppositions. And I’d like to show this by using one example taken from American mythology, but which I have chosen because in one respect, there is a mythological theme which also exists in eastern Asia, that is, the idea that there are wells, natural pools of water, where it is possible to go and to pray, and to get ready-made food, together with the kitchen utensils. It exists in Japan; in Ikeda’s index of folklore motifs, it is number 700, if I am not mistaken, and by reading some Korean folktales, I have also found that the supernatural spirit can come to Earth and secure ready-made food immediately and this is sometimes witnessed by humans and greatly marveled at by them if they are able to get the secret. In any case, on the west coast of northern North America, especially among the Salish Indians, we have in the same mythological corpus three stories about three kinds of women. The first type is what I’d call the well-wives who live in wells and who can produce cooked food at will for the benefit of humans. We also have the milt-girls, that is girls whom the trickster is able to produce out of salmon milt and who accordingly do not produce cooked food, but are themselves produced by raw food, the milt. And in the third case, sisters whom the trickster is able to defecate at will and reintegrate into his own body; whenever he needs advice, he defecates those sisters, who are of an excremental nature, and once he gets the advice, he reintroduces them into his body. So this third category of women are products and not producers, not of raw food, but of cooked food, since they are excremental in nature. There are other relationships between the three kinds of women, for instance, the well-women and the milt-girls can be defined on what I’d call a conjugal axis, because the first ones are positively conjugal, they are married women, and the others are non-conjugal, because as soon as the trickster tries to make love to them, they disappear.

On the other hand, there is also a definition on a linguistic axis because the well-wives are unable to speak, they can only produce blabbing sounds, while the excrement-sisters are eminently able to speak since their function is to give advice to the trickster. And finally, there is a third axis of opposition in respect to water; the well-wives belong to stagnant water while the milt-girls and the excrement-sisters belong to flowing water, the first one terrestrial water since they come from fish milt and the other one celestial water, the rain, because it is the rain which can at any moment disintegrate them. So you see we have a series of at least six oppositions, which I am going to summarize: water stagnant or flowing, water terrestrial or celestial, food cooked or raw, women as produced by food or producing food, women as conjugal or non-conjugal, women as linguistic or non-linguistic. And in respect to these oppositions, the three categories are individually and differently marked.

So, by playing with a very complex system of oppositions, it is possible to generate a mythology which in itself is rather complicated but this is the internal logic of the myth and - this has to do with a question which was put to me yesterday and which I will try to answer - it is not the only thing we should consider. We should also ask ourselves why it is that this particular system which is subject to certain logical constraints, which I have just tried to explain, why it exists among the Salish tribes and not among other groups. And in order to understand that, we have to introduce not a logical consideration, but an empirical consideration, that is the fact that these tribes were united together by a complicated system of intermarriage between foreign tribes and also inter-tribal fairs where food was exchanged, raw food against cooked food, fish or seafood, river food against inland food and the like which is, so to speak, the infrastructural foundation for this complicated elaboration.
Let me take now another example which then would be a comparison between some mediaeval mythological themes and classical Greek mythology, namely between the Greek Oedipus myth and the kind of myth which is preserved to some extent in the mediaeval literature of the Arthurian legends of Ireland, Scotland, Wales and Brittany in France. It can be easily shown that these two groups of myths are in an inverted relationship; everything turns in one case around an enigma on the one hand and incest on the other, and in the other case around the opposite of an enigma. If an enigma is a question for which no answer is expected to be given, in the Grail motif it is the opposite: there is an answer for which there is no question. As a matter of fact, this theme exists as far as I know only in two parts of the world, that is in the Grail legend on the one hand, and in Buddhist literature on the other hand. Because it is said in the Buddhist Scriptures that at the end of his life, Buddha told his disciple Ananda that he could eventually continue to live during another cosmic period. And three times, Ananda makes no reply. And then Lord Buddha sends him away and renounces what life he still has left and the ground trembles, there is an earthquake. Immediately, Ananda wakes up, and asks the reason for the phenomenon. And when he learns that it is the announcement of Buddha’s death, he begs him to stay alive and Lord Buddha says, “It is your fault, Ananda, because if you had said a word, when I might have eventually continued living, if you had only said a word then I would have. But you remained silent, and now I must die”, which is a very striking parallel to the Grail story. So, in that case too, it can be shown that from one group of myths, and I am going back to Oedipus and the Grail, and closing up my parenthesis about Buddhist literature, both group of myths can be generated by three basic oppositions, the one sexual and sociological in nature, incest in one case, which is an abuse of sexual relation, or chastity in the other case, which is just the opposite. On the semantic axis, because in one case, there is an answer to a question, and in the other case, a question with theoretically no answer, and on the cosmological axis, in one case, a general confusion and a rotten world, and in the other case, a waste land, sterile instead of being excessively productive, which is also the opposite.

So far, I have tried to explain what in my conception makes up a myth and to illustrate with a few examples. Now I can be asked the question: “That is very nice, but how do we know it is true? Or can you prove that the kind of oppositions, binary oppositions which you use are not a creation of your own mind, but that they are really operative in the mythological systems?” And I’d like to show that there are at least some cases, when it is possible to administer a proof exactly as in done in, let’s say, harder sciences than our miserable one. But in order to do that, I have first to introduce a distinction concerning two models of mythological symbolism, which I would call, in one case, empirical deduction, and in the other, transcendental deduction, using transcendental in the same sense as it is used in Kantian philosophy, that is, what are the conditions under which the deduction can be made?

What is empirical deduction? Well, it consists in attributing to an animal a function which is obviously congruent with its nature. When the jaguar, for instance, is in South American mythology, par excellence the eater of raw meat, this is an empirical statement. When it is depicted as the rival of man because both jaguar and man are hunters, this is an empirical statement too. When the deer is considered as a horticultural animal, it is obviously because deer eat only plants and this is an empirical statement. But we also have cases where an animal, or a plant, or an element of the natural world is given a symbolic function which is
not immediately apparent. For instance, why is it that in some North American myths, the crane, a bird quite familiar to you in your symbolism, the crane brings to mankind a specific technique of making fire by percussion, that is by striking two flints (and I must apologize to Professor Lewis for going into matter of the origin of fire, a matter in which he is a great expert). Why is it then? There is no obvious reason why the crane should be the master of fire by percussion. And the reason can only be reached, and I will try to make the demonstration, by what I call transcendental deduction. We have in North America a myth which explains that a crane brings mankind tobacco and the technique of making fire by percussion, and at the same time befouls the man who is going to be the beneficiary of the first two gifts with excrement. What we have to do in such a case is as always to try to find myths which say exactly the opposite. And there are two techniques of fire making, percussion and friction, so we would look into the origin of fire making by friction.

We have other myths which tell us that fire made by friction was originally vomited by another animal, the frog. So we can immediately hypothesize a relationship which would be: friction is to percussion in the same relationship as mouth to rectum, since in one case it is excrement and in the other case it is vomiting. Then we should also look, as always, into the ethnography and try to find out what symbolism is usually linked with this technique of fire making. But we have a problem: we have data for friction, but we don’t have any for percussion. Friction is very easy. We know that all over, not only America, but all over the world, where fire is made by friction, there is a sexual symbolism that fire is made with pieces of wood, one active and one passive, and that the passive part is feminine, and the active part is masculine.

And we can try, then to express this relationship between the symbolic level and what I would call the imaginary level, that is, the one that is given to us in the mythology. The symbolism is first that woman is passive, that it has to do with the front part of the body since it is a sexual relationship and with the lower part of the body, for the same reason. Then, on the imaginary level, that is the level of the myths, what we have, instead of the female being passive the female is active, she (the frog) vomits. Like sexual activity, the vomiting is equally frontal. The mouth is in the front of the body. But in one case it’s the lower part of the body, the vagina, in the other case it is the upper part of the body, the mouth. Accordingly, we have this system:

```
symbolic level  →  imaginary level
♀ passive  →  ♀ active
anterior  →  anterior
below  →  above
```

Now, let’s try the same operation for the origin of fire by friction. Well, we have the imaginary level, the myth, but we don’t have the symbolic level, so we are going to start on the imaginary level, and to do exactly the same operation. So, in the case of the imaginary level, we have also a female, the crane, which is a female in the myth, who is active, she dirty the man with excrement. The part of the body is involved is not front, but back, and the part of the body which is involved is the lower part of the body. And we are going to
make the same operation, woman active and then, we should have woman passive. Since in that case we also have an opposition between passive and active. In the second case, front-front, and it should remain unchanged, back-back. In the third case, we have an opposition between lower and upper, and this is what we obtain by deduction. Now, if back and low connote the rectum, and front and upper connote the mouth, what is the organ which can be both back and up? We don’t have any choice, it can only be the ear. This is the only organ, the only orifice which is left to us. And the conclusion is that if to vomit is an inversion of what on the symbolic level is expressed by sexual union in the case of fire by friction, it is necessary that defecation should be the inverse of audition.

Now, this completely correlates with what we find about the crane in mythology, since on the one hand, the crane is always described as a noisy bird, and not only in American mythology. As a matter of fact, in Chinese mythology it is exactly the same: the crane is the noisy bird. And since the difference between friction and percussion in producing fire is also that one is silent and the other is noisy, so we have really in the case, produced a kind of proof on the one hand that these systems of operation are valid, and on the other hand, that there is a fundamental agreement between what we know of the animal from the mythology, and what we know from its very experimental nature, since it is not just believed that the crane is noisy; the crane is actually a noisy bird.

This is the kind of technique we may use, whenever we are confronted with symbolical problems which cannot be solved on purely, let’s say, ecological or ethological grounds, that is, when we find a certain function attributed to an animal which doesn’t correspond at all to anything we can explain right away. Because it would have been very difficult to make a direct jump towards this conclusion. And in that respect, it is striking that both in the northern part of North America and in the center of South America, we find, I would not say, the same animals, because the same animals don’t always exist, but animals which are different, but very close to each other form a taxonomical point of view, used to the same end although it is not at all obvious why.

For instance, in North America, there is a representative of the gallinaceous birds, which don’t exist in South America, where gallinaceous birds are represented by a different family, tinamidae. Nevertheless, in both cases, it is suggested by transcendental deduction, that those birds, in North America as well as in South America, connote a kind of limit or border case between life and death. They are very poor game, they provide bitter broth, which is only good for the sick, and they are animals without fat. This is what the South American Indians say, but we don’t know why, and we may ask us why this specific function is attributed to the bird. When you look at North American mythology, especially in the Puget Sound region, there is a story about such a bird at the time it was a human, who had only one eye, and it is said that the blind eye looked towards the dead, and the good eye towards the living. Therefore, something which is only indirectly suggested by South American mythology is verified by the actual text of North American myths.

We also have in both parts of the American continent similar stories about the skate, which is really used on account of its ability to express binary oppositions because the skate is very wide when looked at from the front and very narrow when looked at from the side. And also the texture of the two faces is different, it is slippery underneath and it is rough on the other side. So it can be shown that in the myth, the skate plays the same role as the basic elements
of a computer, which could be “on” or “off” and the skate also can be “on” or “off”, according to whether it is looked at on the wide or on the narrow side.

Now, there is a very interesting transformation in North American mythology, as the same role is sometimes played by a skate-woman, and in some other areas, instead of a skate-woman, it is a butterfly-woman. And we can see that the situation is the same because when the wings of the butterfly are open, it is wide, and when they are closed, it looks thin. And then the same function of binary operator can be attributed to the skate and to the butterfly, and is actually attributed to both animals, both in North and in South America. The same kind of remarks can be made about animals of the squirrel family, which play the part of announcer of death and conductor of dead people in the world beyond, either in a positive way, if it is in South America, or in a negative way, if it’s in North America. And it’s clear that in both cases the reason is that those squirrels have a peculiarity, true or false, I don’t know, but nevertheless, which is believed in both in North and South America, that they climb trees head up and that they go down head down, and that they are also binary operators because they can shift position. Thus each animal is a kind of bearer of binary oppositions which can be anatomical in some cases like the skate or the butterfly, or physiological, or ethological, and which vary accordingly belong to the realm of empirical deductions.

It is a fact that the skate is wide seen from the front and thin seen from the side. But this is immediately taken up by transcendental deduction, so that these animals can be used to express different cosmological phenomena. For instance, everywhere in America, ants or wasps are presented as separators between day and night, because they have very narrow waists and can be cut in two, one part representing day and the other part representing night, but gallinaceous birds are half-way between life and death, because they are paradoxical animals. As was expressly said by one informant to an anthropologist, it is absolutely shocking that animals which have such good meat should have no fat at all. And then it is an animal which is half-way between meat and non-meat, just as in Christian history there has been a lot of discussion over whether some fowl could be eaten during the lenten period or not, that is whether they are really on the meaty side or on the unmeaty side.

Well, flat fish can be wide or narrow, and animals of the squirrel family make a complete turn according to whether they go up or down, and this is expressed by transcendental deduction. In the case of gallinaceous birds, there is the head, which is alive on one side, the good eye, and dead on the other side, the bad eye. The squirrels are supernatural carriers and the skate are used to explain the difference between permanent constellations which can be seen all year round, which correspond to the skate seen from front, or constellations which can only be seen during one half of the year, expressed by the skate seen in profile. Therefore, it seems as if the myths were always producing, according to the variants, the full gamut of the possible transformations, that starting from one stage of the transformation, the next one is immediately generated and the like, so that the whole field of mythology can be considered as offering to mankind an unlimited number of solutions for certain problems.

And it becomes particularly interesting when these solutions belong not to the cosmological world, but the sociological world, that is as if mythology was offering sociological possibilities for actual use by society, and so that societies would have to make choices
amongst these possibilities offered by mythical thought. This looks as first sight to be a kind of, we would not say a paradox, but rather a play on words, since societies are not individuals who can pore hungrily over a list of institutions as if they were choosing from a mail-order catalogue.

Nevertheless, and this will be the last part of my presentation, I’d like to show, as I did previously, that this situation can actually be verified when myths propose several solutions to a social problem, and societies which have the myth have actually made a choice. And since I have probably spoken too much about American mythology, I shall now take my example from Polynesia. There are many different parts of Polynesia, but nevertheless it is well known that Polynesia was occupied by waves of migrant seafarers and that there is a cultural unity which makes it possible to consider Polynesia as a whole, so that each Polynesian culture can be in itself considered as a variation on common themes which are basically the same from the Samoa and Tonga in Western Polynesia to Hawaii in Eastern Polynesia and from the Marquesas to New Zealand. There is a common ground which allows us to consider Polynesia as a closed system. If I take the case of Fijian society, we have a patrilineal ideology, numerous lineages which are making alliances between them at will. Inside the lineage, there is a strong taboo between brother and sister which is so strong that it is extended to their children who cannot marry, no cross-cousin marriage for instance. In Tonga and Samoa, the taboo extends even to their descendants as long as the initial relationship is remembered. However Hocari, who was the first great specialist on Polynesia, and more recently Quain, showed that there are some other groups in Fiji, mostly in the northern island Vanua Levu, which are matrilineally oriented and where exogamic moieties exist. And there is the curious fact that in that part of Polynesia, Vanua Levu, where exogamic moieties exist, there is no taboo between the siblings, and where there is a sibling taboo, there are no exogamic moieties.

And this is rather difficult to explain at first sight. Now let’s proceed step by step. In the first place, there is in Polynesia a general inversion between the relationship between brother and sister and the relationship between husband and wife. For instance, in Tokelau, which is about 500 km northwest of Samoa, there is a strong taboo between siblings, but the relationship between husband and wife is, as the linguists would say, unmarked. They are attributed the same role in the conception of children; there is no sentimental or amorous literature showing love relationships and no love songs, showing that the relationship between the sexes is not considered very important. But in in Southern Polynesia, in Pukapuka, which belongs to the Cook Islands, it is exactly the opposite. No taboo between brother and sister, but each sex is attributed a specific role in conception, and sentimental poetry is extremely important. Now, the origin myth of Pukapuka introduces the two rules, that is exogamic moieties, and brother-sister taboo, as alternative solutions.

They say that the origin of mankind is the marriage of an autochthonous man, who was living on a rock, and a female stranger. That they had four children, alternately boys and girls, that the elder pair inter-married and committed incest, and similarly for the younger pair. The result for the first pair was the origin of hereditary chiefs and a sacred virgin who couldn’t have any descendants, because it would be very dangerous for a hereditary chief if a woman of the same line could have a descendant which could try to rival the main line, and the other pair gives rise to the common people, which were divided into the moieties land and sea.
And this in Pukapuka corresponds to the real situation. In the nobility there was a hereditary chieftainship and the sister was considered sacred and couldn’t marry, and the common people were divided into two moieties, which were probably exogamic at least in the beginning. So the myth expressed two ways, one aristocratic and one commoner, to avoid the incest which was committed in the second generation and gave rise to mankind, and this can very well explain the contrast of the custom in Vanua Levu, since in one case incest is avoided through a taboo between brother and sister, and in the other case, the democratic solution is provided by the division into two exogamic moieties. In Tonga, we have the myth about siblings born from a rock, who in the end intermarry, while Fiji explains the origin in terms of a man who is a stranger and a woman who is an autochthonous. Now we have other transformations; for instance, in Fiji, the sister is considered as inferior and the brother as sacred to his sister. In Samoa, Tonga and Pukapuka there is a privileged position for the sister.

On the other hand, in Samoa and Tonga, the woman of the paternal line, that is the father’s sister, can harm her nephews and nieces with magical means so that they won’t have any descendants. In Pukapuka, the situation is inverted: the man doesn’t permit his sister to have any descendants and it is the wife who is able to curse the husband. And in Tokelau where we have the third stage of the transformation, the spell-throwing sister is called sacred mother, so she is a mother like the spell-throwing woman in Pukapuka and she is sacred like the sister in Samoa. So really the spell-throwing function can belong either to the sister or to the brother or to the wife and accordingly we have rules of transformation.

Therefore, it’s obvious that in such cases, and Tokelau is about 1,500 km from Pukapuka, the fact that the spell-throwing sister is called sacred mother - mother as in Pukapuka, sacred as in Samoa - shows that any given sociological formula is always accompanied by a kind of latent consciousness of the opposite formula. And that what the myth does is nothing other than to express at the conscious level several possibilities which, through transcendental deduction, we can extract from the sociological data. Therefore, we have here a case where a myth incorporates two models for solution of the same problem and there are actual societies which have either, like Pukapuka, adopted both solutions (one for aristocrats, the other for commoners), or societies which have adopted either one or the other, as for instance in Vanua Levu. Some societies have adopted exogamic moieties and rejected the taboo between brother and sister and neighboring societies have made the opposite choice. It is much more frequent that those different solutions are each illustrated by a different variant of the myth. But in this case, we have the possibility of finding two solutions illustrated in the same myth.

At the beginning, I tried to make a clear distinction between myths, tales and historical legends, but it is obvious that myths have a life of their own, that they evolve through time and that they become something different from themselves. It is possible in some cases, and I have tried to show this in a paper called “How myths die,” to show that the same myth can have different articulations in neighboring groups, that it can become in one group a novel, belong to a literary genre, but in the next group, it can have a juridical function or rather a jural function, that is to establish certain prerogatives of clans, and in a third case, it can be incorporated into recent history, while in our own society, what we have witnessed is rather a kind of explosion of the different functions which were originally attributed to mythology. I have tried to show there is always a plurality of codes, and that myths try to give one
explanation which will be valid at the same time on the cosmological level, on the meteorological, sociological, botanical, zoological levels and so on. I’d then say that in our own society myths have exploded and that functions which were originally united in mythology are now devolved either to religion, or to law, or to science, or else to history. But nevertheless, it is probably in the use we are making of history that we find the closest approximation to the function of mythology because we use history for political action, that is, we use the past to explain not that the future should be like the past, but that the present should be different from the past and that the future should be different from the present.

And the history of the same society as conceived by one political party is not at all the same thing as the same history as conceived by another political party. We were saying yesterday that new progress in the field of kinship and social organization probably can be made only by a closer cooperation between anthropologists and historians, and here we find here again an approximation between history and anthropology, but by looking at history as the modern way in which mythical thought continues to be active in our own society.

Intermission

Lévi-Strauss: I’m slightly embarrassed because among the written questions there’s only one, Question 8, which directly relates to mythology. And I understand that the author of the question, Professor Kim Youl-kyu cannot be heard this afternoon. I don’t like to start a discussion without him, but nevertheless, I can use his question just to clarify a few points which need to be clarified. Professor Kim says that he’s extracting several of the criticisms of my Mythologiques, and first of all, that my proposition that myth is a mediator of binary oppositions, is an adaptation of Hegelian dialectics. On this point, I’d like to remark first that I don’t think that myth is mediator of binary oppositions. What I’ve tried to show is that, in general, myths try to overcome contradictions, but contradiction is not at all the same thing as binary opposition. And there are two reasons why this cannot be an adaptation of Hegelian dialectics; in the first place, because binary oppositions are in my conception not at all the ultimate achievement of the human spirit, but rather the raw material out of which the mind is working.

In discussions with my British colleagues, I have had a very hard time trying to explain that when I speak in French of l’esprit humain, I do not mean at all “spirit” in the Hegelian sense, but the “mind” almost in a neurophysiological sense. So, for me, binary oppositions are the bricks out of which thought is being built up, but not at all the ultimate expression of an impersonal spirit. And in the second place, there’s a big difference from Hegelian dialectics, where contradictions are always subsumed under a synthesis which is the starting point for another contradiction. I’ve always tried to show that myths make attempts to overcome contradictions but that they never succeed in doing so, because if they succeeded in doing so, we’d still be thinking mythically and not scientifically. And -- precisely - scientific thought is able to overcome contradictions which mythical thought is always unable to overcome.

The second criticism says that myth is applicable to a privileged material, for instance, myths of some American Indians, but is not applicable to the Sumerian, Babylonian, Hellenistic and Oriental myths. First, the kind of work I’m doing is certainly applicable, though perhaps with different results. I’ve never pretended that there is only one mythological system all over the world, but in France there is an entire school, the school of my colleague Jean-Pierre
Vernant, which is doing exactly the same kind of things I’m doing with Greek mythology. And in Belgium, there’s my colleague Luc de Heusch, of the University of Brussels, who is also doing exactly the same thing, but with African mythology, and there are young people in France working in India who are trying to do the same thing with the mythology of India. So, really it’s not at all limited to a certain region.

Now it’s perfectly true that for instance, since these are the cases which are quoted, we would run into difficulties with the mythologies of Sumerians or Babylonians, Why? Because we lack the ethnographical context. And it’s impossible to do structural analysis without having available to us the ethnographical context, and an ethnographical context we know independently of the myths themselves. It’s well known for instance that Leach has attempted to use my method for interpreting some parts of the Bible and I couldn’t agree with him, because in the case of the ancient Hebrews, all the ethnographic knowledge we have of them comes in effect from the same material, that is the Biblical texts which we’re trying to interpret. And then we’re in a kind of a vicious circle. We’re lacking the objective background which would allow us to interpret the mythology.

One can never know or guess the semantic position of a plant or an animal without knowing it from an empirical point of view. What is a snake for a South American Indian? What is important is that it sheds its skin and then can be used as a symbol of not immortality, but life indefinitely continued. For us Europeans, this is entirely irrelevant. What is important in the snake is that it bites and also that it crawls on the ground and has no legs.

If I take the opposition I was mentioning this morning between still water and running water, it would be impossible to know what it means if we don’t have an ethnographic correlation. For instance, in the case of the Chinese, without knowing the ethnographical context we could never guess that in the Chinese calendar there’s an isomorphic relationship between river and lake, that is running water and still water, as between mineral ore and a manufactured object made of iron for instance, or between natural fire and the domestic fire. These are things we cannot invent, we just have to take them from the ethnography and this is the clue for the interpretation of the myth. So when we lack ethnographic context, we may make guesses, but we cannot carry on the analysis.

Another important point is the neglect of oral style. If we’re trying to make a comparative study of American mythology, or it could be African mythology or the like, we’re running against great odds because in some cases, we have the myth recorded in the native language, and in some cases, we only have it in translation. And if we aren’t permitted to use all the material available, we’ll often come to a standstill. Besides, even if we have the myth recorded in the native language, we don’t know the oral style because apart from the text itself, we know very well that in narrating myths there are gestures, intonations and the like, and these are not present. So if we insisted on always having the oral style, we might as well abandon the task as useless.

I don’t mean that it would not be a great help to be able to use the oral style. But what makes a myth is mostly that it tells a story and the proof is that if we’re told a myth from a culture we don’t know anything about, we’ll recognize immediately that it is a myth. There’s something in the structure of the story which makes up the myth. And if we were able to consult the oral style, while it would certainly add a new dimension and enrich our study, I don’t think it would change it substantially.
A final point to be clarified is the relationship with the study of my colleague Professor Dumézil. Professor Kim seems to think that there’s a gap between Dumézilian comparative study and a structural approach. In the first place, my study is also a comparative study, so it’s not on the ground of comparative study that this can be said. In the second place, I’d claim Dumézil not only as a structuralist, but probably as the greatest French structuralist, and perhaps the greatest in the world.

There’s some misunderstanding here which arose from the fact that in a book published, if I’m not mistaken, in 1973, Dumézil wrote he was not a structuralist, and I may perhaps explain why. Dumézil, whom I greatly admire, and to whose work I’m deeply indebted, is a very emotional and touchy man. And it so happens that in the years preceding publication of this book, two young French colleagues who claimed to be structuralists were bold enough to use Dumézil’s Caucasian material and to reinterpret it in their own way, which was not Dumézil’s way. And Dumézil was completely indignant about it, and preferred to throw away structuralism rather than to accept that so-called structuralists might deal with those materials. But there’s nevertheless a general agreement all over the world that Dumézil’s work is one of the greatest if not the greatest example of structuralist research.

**David Eyde:** Do you think that the American Indians are consciously aware of the meaning of their myths or do you think there’s a sort of a mythic subconscious at which level the myths are understood?

**Lévi-Strauss:** It’s a question which cannot be answered yes or no. It seems that in some cases, the myth tellers are perfectly conscious of the meaning of their myths and this is the case, I believe, for ancient Greek mythology. The mythology is perfectly conscious of itself.

In the case of the American Indians, we’ve an interesting example with the work of Reichel-Dolmatoff in Columbia, who had an especially gifted informant, who, in a book called *Desana* provided his interpretation of his tribe’s mythology. And I wouldn’t say that his interpretation is exactly the one I would myself have arrived at, but an exchange of ideas would been perfectly possible. It works along the same lines, it makes an exchange of communication quite possible and a discussion quite possible. And in the case of the very intricate African mythology, which Marcel Griaule and Germaine Dieterlen have discovered in West Africa among the Dogon, for instance, and others, it seems that the wise men who tell the myths are perfectly able to interpret them, and it’s possible to discuss the meaning of the myths with them. So I’d answer that it depends; in some cases, there’s no doubt the myth is consciously meaningful, along lines more or less similar to ones we’d attribute to them, in other cases, probably not. It also depends on the social level of the individuals, because in a native tribe, it’s exactly the same as among ourselves, the interpretation of the Scriptures you can get from the man in the street is not the same you’ll get from a bishop or a cardinal. And we probably have the same differences in native tribes. There are learned people and common people who just take the myth for granted.

**Park, Ynhui:** I have three different questions, which I think are related to each other.

The first has to do with the interpretation of transcultural mythologies. The second question concerns your interpretation of mythology as consisting of a means of solving conflicts and problems. Third, it seems to me that you’re trying to interpret the myth as being one of most
original or initial forms of explanation of the experience of nature, so the mode of explanation is the same, but there are different things.

You seem to say that one mythology, the Tan-Gun mythology, can be interpreted in relation to Chinese mythology, which somehow explains the origin of nature, the origin of universal force. Those two different myths of origin can be linked because it can be assumed that the Korean mythology is somehow influenced by the Chinese mythology. But suppose that one society which has become completely disconnected or has never had relations with another culture, for maybe one, two or ten thousand years, and suppose you have two different societies with two different myths. Could you interpret the two myths in the same way as you tried to relate Chinese and Korean myths? Doesn’t your approach to interpretation presuppose that, ultimately, all people are somehow relatives from the original history?

Lévi-Strauss: I never assumed there was a relationship between Korean mythology and Chinese mythology. I just took as an example a paper by Professor Kim Che-won who so assumes, and I’ve taken it for granted just for the sake of my explanation, but personally, I don’t know, I’m not competent on the matter. But this is not the gist of your question, which is: let’s suppose there’s a population which has remained completely isolated for thousands of years from the rest of the world. I think it would be perfectly possible to make a structural analysis of its mythology under the provision that we have a sufficient number of variants of each myth. Because the point is always that you don’t interpret one myth, but a group of myths, which are transformations of each other, and variants of the same myth are transformations of each other.

Park, Ynhui: Your approach seems to depend upon a comparison of myths from different societies. If all you have is the mythology from one society which has been isolated for a long time, doesn’t that mean that those myths cannot be interpreted?

Lévi-Strauss: They can very well. In my book *Mythologiques*, I started with a myth of the Bororo Indians. Let’s suppose the Bororo Indians had been completely isolated from the other South American Indians for 500 years. What I have is a very large corpus of Bororo mythology, about 30, 40 or 50 myths. And I could very well - and that’s what I started doing - try to interpret those myths in relation to each other. Now it so happens that the Bororo were not isolated, they have neighbors with whom they make much intermarriage and the like, and amongst these neighbors, we find variants of the same myth, which make it still possible to go a step further, and from there, a step further, and so on. But I wouldn’t be prevented from doing analysis of the mythology of only one tribe, only one people, if I had enough material for that population.

Park, Ynhui: I think it’s possible to interpret one myth of a given society in relation to given ethnographic data and in relation to the myths of different societies. But this approach must presuppose there must be some cultural connection. If we don’t presuppose a contact between two societies, it’s hard to see how it can be justified to analyze the mythology of one society by making reference to others.

Lévi-Strauss: If I understand your question, you mean I cannot use the myth of one population to clarify the mythology of another population if I don’t presuppose there was a contact between the two populations. I fully agree with you in that respect and it’s a question which I raised and discussed in the concluding section of the last volume of my
Mythologiques. There, I raised the problem of how it is possible that we find the same mythological structures operating both in the northern tip of North America, and in the middle of South America. And I suggest that this will compel historians to reorganize their conception of the peopling of the New World and that it’s not enough to say that nomadic bands entered the Bering Straits and migrated down the American continent, one stopping there, the other in a different place, and the like, and living in isolation. Instead, a lot of things have certainly taken place from the beginning. For instance, there’s no reason to suppose that from the time Asiatic people crossed into North America from the north and went south, there were not later movements from south to north, that there was not a constant agitation of the populations which brought each group in contact with other groups. So, as in a game of billiards the balls don’t move only one way, but they interact, hitting other balls, we must consider that the pre-Columbian history of the New World was something much more complicated than we might expect at first.

Park, Ynhui: My second question is about your views of the function of myth. You said the function of the myths was an attempt to solve certain problems. Are you talking about conceptual solutions or real solutions?

Lévi-Strauss: I think this morning I gave an example of myth providing social solutions, because to establish a taboo between brother and sister, or to divide society in exogamous moieties are social and practical solutions. So, the solutions which myths attempt to offer can be of a conceptual type. After all, myth is theoretical thinking.

Park, Ynhui: Your view implies that social phenomena have to do only with the conceptual level.

Lévi-Strauss: If it were a practical solution, it wouldn’t be a myth anymore, it’d be a legislative reform. We have examples of the kind, for instance, in Australia, where we know very well, because it was actually observed, that people were meeting with some difficulties with their marriage rules or kinship system and they decided to reform them.

Park, Ynhui: But inventing myths as a solution to social problems does not change reality.

Lévi-Strauss: They are not conceptual solutions, but attempts to give solutions to problems that a society is unable to solve, which is not the same thing. The solution has to remain conceptual, because the problem cannot be solved.

Park, Ynhui: It seems to me you’re saying that social phenomena can only be solved on the conceptual level, but we can solve problems concretely by importing or exporting ...

Lévi-Strauss: But it’s not mythology anymore.

Park, Ynhui: Myth as a solution to a social problem is not ...

Lévi-Strauss: I’ve said that all the time. The only thing myths are able to offer are false solutions.

Park, Ynhui: We have many social problems in Korea at the present time. I could make up many beautiful myths by which we could resolve many conflicts on the conceptual level.

Lévi-Strauss: But we wouldn’t create a myth, we would reform society, which is not the same thing.
Bob Scholte: If history is the modern way in which myth remains active, what is the difference between myth and history?

Lévi-Strauss: In some respects, there is no difference.

Bob Scholte: If that is the case, if different myths not only entail different histories, but vice versa, and furthermore, as you said this morning, these can to some extent to be politically motivated and politically consequential, how do I, as an anthropologist, choose between different myths and histories made available to me, and obviously the different politics that attend them? If you say to some extent there are no differences between myth and history, history is perhaps a contemporary form of mythology.

Lévi-Strauss: There’s a difference, which is that myths serve mostly to explain why things should not change, while the use we’re making of history is to explain why things should change.

Bob Scholte: If that is the case, how do I, as an anthropologist, make a decision, primarily a normative decision, a moral decision, about the kind of history or the kind of mythology that will inform my work? You yourself pointed out that both history and myth are related and I assume they’re also related to anthropology as a discipline.

Lévi-Strauss: As an anthropologist, I think the use you can make of history is, for instance, as I, a Frenchman, I take the example of the French Revolution, in 1789. What I should make use of and what I should be impressed by is the fact that the meaning and the actual unrolling of the events are not the same for two members of my own society. To a conservative what took place at the end of the 18th century is not at all the same things as it is for a leftist, and this is what I should take account of as an anthropologist. Now, to take sides for either one interpretation or the other is what you’ll do as a citizen, but not as an anthropologist.

Bob Scholte: Why not? What exempts anthropology from these choices? What in fact exempts the history of anthropology from the history of the West, which is both a political and a scientific history? What in fact exempts science from both myths and history? You seem to stand above these choices, as an anthropologist. My question is on what basis do you presume to be able to stand above?

Lévi-Strauss: I should try to stand above. I’m certainly not able to stand entirely above, because I can’t be a pure scientist, as I’m also a citizen involved in the life of my own society. Then I’m not doing anthropology.

Bob Scholte: I don’t mean to monopolize the floor this way, but I’m still not clear why you allow yourself this split personality between the anthropologist on the one hand and...

Lévi-Strauss: I don’t allow it, I suffer from it.

Bob Scholte: Perhaps that’s an alienation that weighs upon all of us.

Park, Ynhui: You say that myth is the initial form of explanation of social and natural phenomena. How does your view of myth differ from that of Ernst Cassirer? Also how do you distinguish mythological explanation from scientific interpretation?
Lévi-Strauss: About Cassirer, I think Cassirer’s orientation was basically sound, but it was a very general philosophical orientation without any attempt to unravel a particular mythological system. The kind of work I’m doing is more technical than philosophical.

The basis of scientific thought is, we say at least in France, because we’re conceited, in Descartes’ *Discours de la méthode*, whose basic principle is to divide a problem into as many parts as it’s necessary in order to solve it. And this is the basic step that science has taken: to take the problems separately, one by one. And this is exactly the opposite of what mythology does. Mythology is always claiming to take all the problems together and to give an answer which is valid not for one particular problem, but for a whole bunch of problems. And this is the fundamental difference I can see between the two approaches, except that in the case of science, it works, and in the case of mythology, it doesn’t work.

Park, Ynhui: Given two interpretations of natural phenomena, one mythological and the other scientific, how do we choose between them? Often, they are not compatible, and how do we make a choice between them?

Lévi-Strauss: I’m very interested in mythology and I like mythology as something to be studied, but not something to be believed in.

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: You explain myth and sometimes you mention also social phenomena during the explanation of mythology and this is a kind of function of mythology. In social phenomena, especially your marriage regulations, you find two different types; restricted exchange and generalized exchange. Restricted exchange is connected with a binary opposition or moiety system, but in generalized exchange, we should have at least three clans or lineages, it’s not a binary opposition, but a kind of triadic arrangement. If there’s some connection between myth and social life, is there not such a type in mythology, which is connected with this triadic system, rather than binary opposition. For example, in Chinese myths, there’s Heaven, Earth, and in the middle, a human, so naturally, you can interpret this as a binary one because humans live on Earth, but if you think of another level or aspect, you can classify this with three concepts, not two concepts.

Secondly, in your interpretation of a Korean myth, you use myth from another area, very far from Korea. Your explanation this morning was on a symbolic and imaginary level, and there’s no objection to your explanation, but you use a story from a distant place. In your case, you have a very wide knowledge of mythology from all the world, but if we want to analyze Korean mythology and I have no idea of, or no material on, the mythology of the American Indians, how can we then analyze Korean mythology in itself and make such a binary opposition or any kind of structural types?

Lévi-Strauss: Of course, there are ternary oppositions, and we meet and use them all the time. However, it should not be forgotten that it’s always possible to reduce a triadic opposition to a binary opposition. If I have the problem of a triadic opposition between sky, water and land, that could be expressed as a triadic opposition or as two binary oppositions, where we have high and low, and then water and land. So it depends on the case. Sometimes, oppositions are presented as a triad, sometimes binary, but it’s always possible to convert one type into the other. It’s just an operational problem. As to your second question, we should certainly avoid making use of anything for everything. And nothing would be more dangerous, if you’re confronted with a problem of Korean mythology and
have things you cannot interpret, just to go anywhere and to pick up an African mythology, an American mythology or the like in order to fill the gap and provide the missing links. That would be a very bad method. What should be done with any mythological system is first at all, to try to interpret it by itself and for itself. If the only mythological material you have at your disposal were the Tan-Gun myth, it would be very difficult to go further, but I assume you have much more in your traditional literature.

**Lee, In ho:** You made some references to history. On the one hand, you emphasize the importance of cooperation between anthropologists and historians, and also you have been drawing certain parallels between the uses of history and the uses of the myths. I am trying to find out in what way that cooperation can come about. Myth, in my thinking, is the material with which the anthropologist begins his work, whereas history is thought of by the historian as the product of his work. I wonder whether in you thinking one could speak of true history and false history. As I imagine, you cannot speak of true myth and false myth. My second request would be, could you perhaps illustrate the particular way in which an anthropologist and an historian could work together.

**Lévi-Strauss:** Traditionally, there was a big difference between historians and anthropologists. Historians were only interested in big events, kings, wars and the like; and anthropologists were interested in very minor things - what people in the country are doing, believing, which was of no interest whatsoever to historians. This situation is changing very fast and in France most particularly, there is an entirely new field which has developed especially within the so-called “Annales” school, which started with Lucien Favre and which is very active today particularly around Georges Duby, and it is just as if historians had suddenly discovered that very minute details of the life of the people were as important for them as they are for us. And this new field of anthropological history as they call it, is a kind of history which is trying to make use of all the material anthropologists have been traditionally gathering and this is the way anthropologists can be of use to historians and reciprocally. As I tried to show yesterday, there are, in past societies, sociological models of institutions which also exist in the societies studied by anthropologists, but that we have been so far unable to recognize because we didn’t know they existed close by in our own history. So that really the cooperation can and should be both ways.

**Hyun, Theresa:** I’d like to ask a question about the study of folklore. In your critique of Propp’s morphology of folk tales, you say that folk tales are myths in miniature with the same oppositions on a smaller scale, which makes them more difficult to study. How would you adopt the method that you outlined this morning in order to study these weaker oppositions that we find in folk tales?

**Lévi-Strauss:** I’d use exactly the same method, but being conscious that the big oppositions I find in mythology are on a smaller scale. For instance, I’d be quite aware of the fact that a folk tale about a prince marrying a shepherdess is a milder opposition but which could correspond quite well to a junction of Heaven and Earth in a mythological system.

**Hyun, Theresa:** If the same narrative exists in both a folk tale form and in a myth form, could it be studied with the same table of transformations or would different versions be better studied separately?
Lévi-Strauss: I think they could be studied, but only introducing a change of scale. There is one more parameter which is needed.

Cho, Hae Jung: According to your thesis, without knowing the ethnographic context, we cannot really analyze a myth. Then I wonder how we can analyze the Tan-Gun myth now; I feel it will be obviously difficult if not impossible, because first of all, probably we will not know the semantic position of the symbolic object. Secondly, I think the Tan-Gun myth has not much significance to our daily modern life.

Lévi-Strauss: Well, your last argument is irrelevant. A myth can be interesting in itself without being relevant for our contemporaries. As to the first point, it is not for me to decide. I don’t know whether you have or do not have an ethnographic context, but nevertheless, it seems that there have been in the early times close contacts between China and Korea, and that for China, you have a very old literature available which is ethnographic, not only mythological but also ethnographic, and perhaps it can be used.

Hyun, Theresa: If we could reconstruct history, we could analyze ...

Lévi-Strauss: Yes, it would be certainly necessary to be able to reconstruct something of the kinds of societies where the Tan-Gun myth was alive.

Hyun, Theresa: There are so many stories about Yin and Yang relationships. Would you consider these as a mythology?

Lévi-Strauss: It is not a mythology, it is a way of classifying the universe.

Lee, Jung-kee: Because we thought we had no myth of the creation of the world or man, our poetry, till now, has been excessively mawkish. Basing yourself on your interpretation of Baudelaire’s “Les Chats,” and on your interpretation of the Tan-Gun myth as an inversion of the Chinese Pangu myth, showing that we do have a creation myth, how would you suggest that we go about improving our poetry?

Lévi-Strauss: I didn’t suggest it, it is the author of the article I was referring to who suggested it. I don’t feel competent at all to decide if it has any relationship with the Chinese myth or not. I don’t know. As to the field of poetry, I don’t know of course about Korean poetry, but the kind of analysis I try to make with “Les Chats” or with Apollinaire’s poem “Les Colchiques,” first, can probably also be carried out in East Asian poetry, but with greater difficulties, because you have more dimensions in your poetry than we have in ours. For instance, the choice of the Chinese characters: when the poetry is written in Chinese, there is a factor of choice, you are not bound to use one character and only one character, you can make a choice and then the disposition of the characters on the page is also a dimension which we don’t have in our poetry, so, I think it can be done, but it will be more complicated because there are more dimensions.

Byun, Kyu-yong: (in French) My question is related to hermeneutics and structuralism. I think the symbol sets someone thinking, it brings about an interpretation. Myth must be subordinated to story for several main reasons. First of all, a myth is a sort of story, that is, it narrates events from the beginning to the end in a given epoch. This reference time adds a supplementary dimension to the historicity of the symbolical sense and must be considered as a specific problem, and the question is whether the structural explanation can be separated from a hermeneutical understanding.
Lévi-Strauss: I’d say there is only one difference between hermeneutics and structural analysis, but an important one, which is that hermeneutics is only trying to find in the myth what they wish to find in it, and what they have put there in the first place, while we are trying to find out what is in the myth which usually has no relationship at all with what we’d wish to find in it.

Byun, Kyu-yong: Nevertheless, the problem of the time dimension remains. Because the time of symbol is not here the time of myth.

Lévi-Strauss: What is important in the time dimension is not that there is a past time, but that this time is the foundation for the present time and the future time. What is important is not that there is a special kind of time, it is that time is really abolished in mythology. Because the future should reproduce the present and the present only reproduces the past. So, present, past and future are all put together.

Kim, Han Gu: You said a while ago that a myth exists to explain why a given social structure doesn’t change. By definition, is a myth the ideology of a given society?

Lévi-Strauss: Yes, definitely.

Kim, Han Gu: In terms of the use of a myth, I am talking about a more functional sense. The function of myths is the justification of the existing social structure.

Lévi-Strauss: Not only.

Kim, Han Gu: Then furthermore, isn’t a myth a symbolic or ideological force to bring about sociocultural unity among a given society’s members? Do you agree with that?

Levi-Strauss: Yes, it may be one of the functions.

Kim, Soo-Gon: When you talked about mythology this morning, you employed the notion of markedness, which I believe was originally proposed by Jakobson. Is there any basis in principle which enables us to tell which phenomenon is less marked or unmarked and which one is more marked? Do you have any criterion upon which we can depend?

Lévi-Strauss: I don’t think we have a criterion to start with. It just comes out of the material, but of course, we do not use only what specialists of computers would call a digital model. There are also analogic models and analogic models make use of plus and minus, of relative strength, of relative importance, and they don’t work only by yes/no and we are compelled to use both models all the time.

Cho, Ok La: I believe your purpose in your study of mythology would be to look for the working of the mind in human society. In that purpose, you point out the function of myths is the search for actual sociological solutions, and in that sense, you emphasize ethnographic context. Does that mean that you are mainly interested in actual sociological solutions as a function of the mythological working of the mind in human society? Secondly, you emphasize that myth emphasizes the things which shouldn’t change and a lot of the mythology that you analyze contains kinship and marriage systems. Does that mean that kinship should not change?

Lévi-Strauss: As to the first point, I don’t think that my main aim is to find out how the mind works. It is possible that my approach will contribute to a better knowledge of how the mind works, but, for the time being, our problem is to try to work out the functioning of
mythological systems as such. The real answer as to how mind works will not be given by anthropologists but perhaps by neurophysiologists and neuropsychologists. Perhaps our material will be of some use to them. As to the second question, certainly, for the people who have those myths, kinship should not change, because nothing should change in the social order. That doesn’t mean that kinship doesn’t actually change. Certainly it changes. But myth is used as one of the forces acting against this change, though certainly unable to prevent it.

[an interjection or question is missing here]

Lévi-Strauss: Yes, I fully agree with you that the analysis should be as much as possible syntagmatic as well as paradigmatic and it all depends on the kind of material we have at our disposal. Of course when we are working out several variants of the same myth, we have to use a paradigmatic approval because we have to put one variant on top of the other and just try to read vertically. But we have also the case of a single myth, but a single myth which is long enough to be syntagmatically divided in sequences and these sequences can be compared paradigmatically. And this is the case sometimes. In the last volume of the Mythologiques, I have found that some Californian Indian myths differ from each other, not paradigmatically but syntagmatically. The same story but not in the same sequence, and there is a reason why the sequence is being modified. As to your second question, whether this kind of analysis could be applied to literature and the like, I am a little bit doubtful for a simple reason; Jakobson and I wrote a structural analysis of a Baudelaire’s sonnet which is all together 14 verses and it took us 40 pages and if we were to undertake a structural analysis of Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, which might be theoretically possible, it would probably take 100 times as many pages as the book itself to do it seriously. So I am not sure it can be done.

[an interjection or question is missing here]

Lévi-Strauss: We have ambiguous characters in mythology. The trickster is exactly that.

Im, Kaye Soon: I have the impression that you think the role of history in society is the same or close to the role of mythology in society. And I think you already explained some similar aspects of history and mythology. For example, myth is ideology of society, and provides solutions to the social problems. But I am not fully convinced that they play the same function in the society. So therefore, would you please give us a more concrete answer how or in what way history plays the same function as mythology?

Lévi-Strauss: I think a distinction should be made first of all between history and the use we are making of history. And what I have said didn’t relate to history in itself, for which I have a great respect, but to the use we are making of history. In our social life, we use history more or less in the same way as people without writing use mythology, except that we use it for opposite purposes. That is, instead of using mythology to explain why things should remain as they are, we use history to explain why things should not remain as they are, to change, this is what I mean.

Huh, Moon-Kang: (in French) In your Anthropologie sociale, Volume One, in the chapter “Linguistics and Anthropology,” you admired the progress recently made in linguistics, above all since Saussure. And you admitted at the first onset the general semiology of Saussure. And then, in your Pensée sauvage, you used the notion of “insignificant” and “significant” to
develop your mythology. Since you met Saussure, and Saussure is not the only linguist, there are, after him, different modern linguists, such as Martinet, for instance, who sees in the essential definition of language two articulations: “moneme” and “phoneme,” “moneme” being “significant” and “phoneme” “insignificant.” You already answered this question with examples of systems of appellation and systems of attitude. Nevertheless, linguistics is developing so fast, and since you met Saussure, do you hope for future structuralism the progress made recently in linguistics?

**Lévi-Strauss:** I don’t know whether there will be future structuralists. Perhaps what will take place is something entirely different and I certainly hope that this will be the case, because I don’t think for one second that what we are doing will be valid for future generations. That would be disheartening. What future generations will do will probably be completely different from what we are doing; they will probably destroy completely what we have been doing and this is how things should be.
3 East-West Comparative Studies (October 16, 1981)

Kim, Kwang Ok: This morning’s topic is East-West Comparative Studies, and I think there must be some discussion about problems in Korean studies and the relationship between Korean studies and comparative studies between East and West, Eastern and Western cultures. In order for participants from overseas to better understand the specific nature of Korean culture, and in order to make the discussion easier, we will have a brief presentation of the concept and nature of so-called regional studies by Professor Park, Ynhui of Simmons College.

Park, Ynhui: We felt that in order to have a more effective and fruitful discussion, it was perhaps necessary to set some specific themes or problems. Since I am outside of the field of Korean Studies, I can neither give any concrete problem, nor analyze the nature of it. What I shall do, very briefly, is to offer some reflections on the nature of regional or Asian studies in general, new academic disciplines, exemplified by such fields as Korean Studies, American Studies, Asian Studies, Jewish Studies, Arabic Studies and so forth. And if possible on the methods that are applicable and appropriate for these new disciplines. We all are familiar with such academic disciplines as philosophy, literature, history, sociology, physics, biology, anthropology, ethnology, geology and so on. These disciplines belong to one mode of classification. A particular discipline according to this system of classification is based on and justified by the difference of the nature of the object of the study.

The new disciplines such as Korean Studies, American Studies and so on belong to an entirely different system of classification. A particular discipline according to this classification is grounded on difference of geographical or cultural regions or areas. The question is what is the nature of regional or area studies? How this new system of classification can be related to the traditional system of classification?

Since I’ve no definite answers, I only want to suggest just two possible answers. First we can conceive the concept of area studies not as a concept denoting a new object, but an application of traditional disciplines to a specific geographical or cultural region. Korean Studies, for instance, would mean all possible traditional disciplines which are related to Korea as geographical or cultural entity. Secondly, we can see Korean Studies as having an identifiable specific object which is distinguishable from all other objects studied by the existing traditional disciplines, and which can not be identified with any other object or traditional discipline taken either separately or holistically. Such an object can be called Korean things or Korean study, understood as a kind of entity sui generis, a kind of meta-entity, not to be broken down into Korean people, Korean thought, Korean history, Korean geography and so on. The Korean things thus understood denote only Korea taken as a whole, comprising all dimensions or aspects of Korea. Area Studies in this second interpretation are analogous to what are now called interdisciplinary disciplines.

The two possible interpretations of the concept of area studies imply different ways or methods of engaging in them. If we adopt the first interpretation, all that we need to do is to
practice all traditional disciplines about Korea, applying a method appropriate to each of them. No particular theoretical rule or method is needed. If we take the second interpretation, the most appropriate and perhaps the only possible method appears to be structural. For a society, say Korea, taken as a whole, can be identified neither with physical nor ideal aspects. Korea in this case denotes something sui generis. Studying Korea thus defined consists in taking account of all the empirical data provided by all traditional disciplines, and then in relating them to each other in such a way that each of them makes some sense within a single and integral form, namely the Korean stuff or Korean things. In this case, as far as I can see, and if I have understood it correctly, structuralism seems to provide us with the best and only method. The structural method would make Korean things intelligible in relating to each other the many facts found in Korea on the one hand, and in relating Korean things as a whole to other regional or Asian things, such as Japanese things or Chinese things or American stuff and so on.

Kim, Kwang Ok: We’ve already had some questions raised by participants here, printed on pages 7 to 11, and most of the questions raised here are about the relevance of Professor Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism based on his analysis of mostly American Indians and Pacific islanders. The relevance of his structural model to the study of Korean studies. Well, of course, Professor Lévi-Strauss doesn’t have a sufficient knowledge about Korean culture at this stage. I would say Professor Lévi-Strauss’ theory is based on his studies of small scale simple societies, and Korean society may be termed as a small scale, but complex society.

Lévi-Strauss: We’ve spent two days talking about structural analysis, but I’d like to introduce a word of caution. We should not be obsessed by structural analysis. Our problem is to do anthropology and good anthropology, and good anthropology can perfectly well be carried out outside structural analysis. Personally, I do not believe I’m doing structural analysis all the time, but in certain circumstances and about some subjects where it’s fitting to do so. Now, about the problem of simple and complex societies, may I say that in the laboratory of social anthropology at the Collège de France of which I’m the director, there’s a team consisting of four women anthropologists, who have been working for ten years now in a French village of about 400 inhabitants, and this study has already produced three books and fifteen articles, so, really, I don’t see that it’s a problem that Korea is a complex society. It’s very likely that there are some fields of studies, some sectors of Korean life where structural analysis may apply, and we cannot decide beforehand what they will be. What was said a moment ago is effectively true; we should not try to apply a ready-made grid, whatever it is, to a particular social reality. We have to approach this social reality on its own ground, and it’s this reality which will tell us specifically what we have to do when studying it. So I would not like to see a discussion starting with theoretical grounds or abstract problems, such as whether structural analysis is applicable to a complex society or not, but let’s see; we’ll find out during the work.

Kim, Kwang Ok: Professor Lévi-Strauss doesn’t want to be involved in a discussion this morning, what he wants is to participate as only a member of a workshop. He wants to be only one of the participants here. I think Professor Park’s presentation is also related to the problem of the relevance of structuralism for the study of Korean society and what he says is that structuralism appears to be the best and only method in the study of any society, and
then, I think there are some different perspectives about structuralism and I think Dr. Bob Scholte from the Netherlands may have some ideas about structuralism.

**Bob Scholte:** I can ask some questions related to the points that have been discussed now. I can also give a presentation of some other thoughts - not so much alternative thoughts, as thoughts you might entertain in founding the Institute of Korean Studies, or what kind of issues, coming from my perspective, as someone who doesn’t so much work in the structuralist position.

**Kang, Shin-pyo:** As an organizer of this workshop, I’d like to explain a little bit about the proceedings of this seminar. As you noticed, Professor Lévi-Strauss did two days’ full work without getting completely exhausted with this intellectual discourse. We’d like to save his clear mind and brilliant thinking. Why not toss around the future direction of Korean Studies and the way of understanding between East and West?

I’d like first of all to put to all of you the questions we prepared to discuss amongst ourselves. If there is some necessary comment, Professor Lévi-Strauss thinks he might join in to make some additional comment.

Also Professor Bob Scholte from the University of Amsterdam would like to talk about a possible anthropology of Korean Studies. This is not a polished presentation, but he’d like to give about a 45-minute talk. Would that be relevant at this moment or in the second session of this morning’s seminar? I suggest first of all a brief discussion of these main questions, all the prepared ones.

**Bob Scholte:** I came a day late, and what I’ve not heard is what some of the Korean anthropologists themselves thought of in founding an Institute of Korean Studies over and beyond the obvious intrinsic merits of studying one’s own culture. But what specifically are the motives, what are the purposes and goals? Surely, with all due regard to Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism, it can not be simply the enactment of structuralist theory in the context of Korean Studies. Korean Studies, I should think, with again due regard to you, Professor Lévi-Strauss, are more than ethnographic food for structuralist thought. What more do you hope to achieve? I, at least, and I think one or two of my American colleagues, are not quite clear on this. Perhaps some elucidation on this would be helpful and this would be most interesting to me.

**Kang, Shin-pyo:** I’m in charge of this program, and so I have to answer your question. The Academy of Korean Studies has several programs for promoting Korean Studies in order to find our national identity. We want to analyze, to try to understand our Korean “stuff” in new perspectives. In addition, we need some redefinition of our culture as we try to cope with changing directions in the modern world. Korea came from being “the hermit land” to being a modern nation in a very short time. And much of that time, when we could have been preparing to enter the modern world, was lost during the Japanese occupation. Then we experienced ideological conflict during the modern war. We are still having difficulty in adapting to the modern world.

We brought Professor Lévi-Strauss to Korea in order to meet him and to get some idea of the views of society and culture to which he has devoted his life. We’d like to get some idea of what his anthropological endeavor has been throughout his life and also we’d like to get some ideas from his anthropological perspective for the analysis of our own culture and
society. Professor Lévi-Strauss would like to see the Korean people in their own surroundings; he doesn’t want simply to give big lectures, he refuses any kind of big lecture or big gathering. He only would like to meet Koreans as they are, and we really welcome this idea, so we are planning to take him to rural villages and we’d like to show him what he can find in Korean villages, amongst the Korean rural surroundings. And out of this experience, we can get some new perspective from him. That is our purpose.

Bob Scholte: I don’t know how Lévi-Strauss would answer this, but I feel rather uncomfortable about the pretention of getting to know anything about Korean culture without knowing its languages and being here one or two weeks. I’m sorry to be so crude, but as an anthropologist, I can not help but find this either terribly superficial or terribly pretentious.

Kim, Kwang Ok: I know you are a member of a team for the project here, Symbol and Society in Traditional Korean Society. What is your reason for being a member of this research team?

Kang, Shin-pyo: I invited Professor Scholte because he is a specialist in structuralism. Now his research direction is a little different, as far as I understand, but he can contribute to our discussions with Professor Lévi-Strauss. Moreover, Professor Scholte is concerned with ethno-logic. If we can provide him with some material, he could provide another angle to Korean Studies.

Kim, Han Gu: I’d like to comment on Dr. Scholte’s remarks as a participant in this seminar. First of all, I’m so glad that we could have distinguished Professor Lévi-Strauss in our seminar. It is my feeling that at the present moment, the anthropology of Korean society and culture is at the infant stage. We know a lot of approaches: structural-functionalism in anthropology, interactional perspective in anthropology, conflict theory in anthropology, but we have had no contact before with any kind of Lévi-Straussian structuralism, and he enlightened me greatly during this seminar. I think I can see Dr Scholte’s question about the goals and purposes of Korean Studies in anthropology. I wonder myself too, but this seminar is for the development of models for Korean anthropology. In another respect, I’d say that structuralism is a very important model with which we can analyze Korean anthropology. I think that Professor Lévi-Strauss’ contribution to a structural model of Korean anthropology would be very valuable. We have a lot to learn about this field.

David Wu: As I understand it, this conference is like a planning conference for a research project that’s about to be launched. Other than the reasons that Professor Kim has mentioned, as a member of this team, I very much appreciate the opportunity to actually come to visit Korean society, beyond just engaging in discussions and sharing ideas. I wonder if I may ask Mr. Chairman, I’d like to raise the issue, I can wait for later, after we’ve settled this question or I can raise it now. This would be different from the issue I just brought up, but it continues from yesterday’s discussion and is relevant to this morning’s session on East and West Comparative Studies.

My question is this: What are the different levels of collective representation that are significant in helping us to understand the meaning, for example, of myth, or the meaning of culture or society on the one hand, and the meaning of different cultural expressions between two cultures, or between East and West? Allow me to give some examples, to
explain what I have in mind, regarding these issues. Let me be quick and brief. I’m going to explain the main themes of three myths I’m familiar with. Now, there are two myths of contrasting nature on flood.

These are often cited by Professor Francis Hsu, the American anthropologist. To him, the ethos of Western culture can be found in the biblical story of Noah and his ark. God is displeased with men and flooded the whole world with rain and only Noah and his family and one pair of animals of each kind were selected and put on Noah’s Ark and survived. So this may be the beginning of some meaning for the Western civilization. Now, on the other hand, if we look into the Chinese culture, we find the Chinese version of the flood myth. In ancient China, it’s quite different. There was a flood over the Chinese country, according to the myth, and then minister Yu was put in charge to solve the problem. So, he led people to channel the rivers and built dams. During the course of 13 years, I might be wrong, the important point in this myth is that during these 13 years, three times he passed by his own home and did not enter, so the moral of this myth is that the minister has to be dutiful to his emperor and society and people, and pay no regard to his wife. Even three times in the 13 years, he passed by the house, but wouldn’t enter to meet with his wife. When I was visiting the Korean folk village the other day, I realized the separate rooms for wife and husband, so, perhaps, the Korean culture adopted from this ancient myth the division between husband and wife. This is some speculation. Now, if we think about these myths, these are myths of re-creation, not the myths of the original creation. Because the flood destroyed the whole world and mankind, only a couple was left to continue with the population of the world. Now, we find similar kinds of myths in all of South East Asia, especially amongst the Malayo-Polynesian people, but the solution again is very different. After the flood, only a brother and sister were left, so they had to start with a sibling-marriage or incest to continue mankind. Again, here, we see the importance of marriage and sex, rather than in the Chinese culture, where a dutiful minister had to perform his duty ignoring sex. So to put the question again, can we understand a culture, for example, using structural analysis, to accommodate the expression of another kind of level, of different levels of collective representation, to understand a cultural ethos in addition to revealing the basic pan-human unconscious in binary oppositions?

Lévi-Strauss: I don’t know if it’s up to me to answer, but as a matter of fact, I have here the Chinese myth as told by Mencius. And it’s very striking that the Chinese flood is something completely different from the one we have in the Bible. On the other hand, this initial situation resembles very much what in the Oedipus myth was the result of incest, that is, a kind of general confusion, disorder, a kind of proliferation of everything and the reign of a rotten world which is, so it seems, was the initial Chinese situation. So, I’d say that the initial situation where the land was completely flooded is to some extent an incestuous situation. There is too close a relationship between men and animals, too close a relationship between men and Gods and what is needed is to put them at a right distance from each other. Would you agree?

David Wu: I agree, but in addition, should we understand that the Chinese develop certain myths which, as the Chinese people understand them, give them different meanings than the Koreans, and that the Koreans, even though very close to Chinese culture may have different kinds of myths as further compared to the western kind of myths. I’m saying the
myth is already teaching the culture something quite different. So, how do we account for this and what is the significance of these differences?

Lévi-Strauss: We have to try to find out.

Kim, Kwang Ok: There are many historians and philosophers and scholars who are engaged in Korean literature here. As Professor Lévi-Strauss has already mentioned, the importance of cooperation between anthropology and philosophy or history is becoming more and more recognized and popular in the social sciences. For interdisciplinary studies, I think historians and philosophers have important suggestions for the improvement of Korean Studies. Here, Professor Jeong, Chai-Sik, from Yonsei University, seems to emphasize the historical factor or the analysis of culture in historical context, and he raises a question to Professor Lévi-Strauss about universal structural patterns or properties and their relevance to the regional study of Korean society. Could you, Professor Chung, give some more detailed suggestions?

Jeong, Chai-Sik: I’ve written down my question as clearly as I could on this paper, so, I’ve nothing further to say.

Kim, Kwang Ok: We all know that anthropology must cooperate with other disciplines such as history and philosophy. But the problem is how, in what sense, can we cooperate? We all know is that in order to study Korean culture, one must know Korean literature, the Korean language, Korean history, but how are we to put this information together with structuralism and a universal theoretical framework? How do we make this cooperation work?

Lévi-Strauss: First of all, I’d agree with Professor Scholte and say we’re confronted with an initial difficulty that those among us who don’t read Korean, we don’t know what Korean anthropologists have done so far on Korea. So it’s very difficult to offer suggestions. It’s quite possible that you have already done on small Korean communities the kind of exacting work which we’ve done in France on villages to which I was referring a moment ago. If you haven’t, then the only thing I can suggest to those among you who read French, and I see there are many, is that they should read the three books I’ve just mentioned and undertake the same kind of work. My main comment is, however, that I’m worried about the abstract character of the discussion so far, while there are very important concrete problems which we should try to solve together. And let me make two points in this regard. There is right now very important research going on in the USA, still unpublished, except in the form of underground pamphlets more or less, on some Californian languages of the so-called Penutian stock which seems to prove that those languages belong to the Altaic linguistic family. I’m not a linguist, but I’ve seen the material and it’s fantastically convincing.

Now, if this were true, then, the whole position of both Japan and Korea in world history would be changed. Because it would prove that you are, so to say, the living testimony of tremendously important historical events which took place in the Pacific in years past, I don’t know how long ago. That should be considered as a great priority for study.

The other point is that, as you know, there is right now a school in Japan claiming that the ternary, the triadic system of Professor Dumézil for the Indo-Europeans also applies to Japan. And there are really interesting points to support this. Now, if this were true, it could mean two different things. It could mean that the whole Dumézilian theory breaks down,
because if it can be found in Japan, it’ll prove it’s not diagnostic of the Indo-Europeans, or it could prove, and this is the position of the Japanese school I was referring to, that some contact took place between Indo-Europeans and the Japanese (and obviously, involving you, since you’re on the way, if I may so) sometime around the fourth century AD.

This is also terribly important. If we put both things together, it would suggest that there might have been relationships between East Asia and, not simply Eastern Siberia, but Western Siberia at a point where it mixes more or less with Europe. So, we have here a lot of fantastically important historical problems which are presently creeping up and which may modify entirely our outlook on East-West Comparative Studies. And I would say that for you as well as for us, these problems are the kind of problems we should try to solve.

Lee, In ho: I’d like to ask a question which perhaps is related to both what Dr. Wu and Dr. Chung asked. In reading Dr. Lévi-Strauss’ paper, “La famille” pages 67-68, I was struck by the section in which he describes the special features of the Nayar customs or Nayar community and there, he cites the case of Nazi Germany as the possible modernized version of the extreme situation which the Nayar seem to represent. That is, extreme division of functions between female and male members of a society might possibly lead to a form of social organization without a recognizable family cell. In reading the passage, I started thinking perhaps the traditional Korean family, or at least the upper-class Korean family during the last several centuries was perhaps not quite so different from the Nazi model. We did not use the formula three “Ks,” “Kinder, Küche, Kirche,” but instead of the church, we had something called the female, or the womanly virtue. I wonder whether my fellows, Korean colleagues, or also foreign scholars engaged in the study of Korean history or family, would agree with this statement that, perhaps here, in terms of Dr. Lévi-Strauss’ formula, we might have a situation of a social organization without a recognizable family cell, and in that sense, then, the concept of the family is perhaps quite different. In fact, we’re not talking about the future, but about the past, and we may have already had a situation where there was no family cell in the sense the anthropologists have used the term.

Lévi-Strauss: But we can only learn it from you.

Lee, In ho: This is why I’m addressing this question to my Korean colleagues and to the foreign scholars specializing in Korean Studies.

Cho, Hae Jung: Are there fundamental differences between East and West in defining the family?

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: Naturally there is an upper level; we have different kinds of family, for example, the family which emphasizes the patrilineal and the family which emphasizes the matrilineal and there is a family which emphasizes both sides. If we continue this kind of emphasis on one side, this will be continuous for a long period and make another type. This is one level. If you go to a deeper level, though, there is a basic core which combines together the Eastern and Western family, and even the Nayar family. So, in terms of the basic concept, especially the concept of maison, there’s no big difference between East and West.

Kim, Kwang Ok: Certainly, there are some limits and different perspectives on structuralism and in that regard. Dr. Scholte from the Netherlands will give us a brief presentation of his own view of structuralism and secondly, a discussion of in what sense and to what extent
structuralism is in general relevant or important in the study of Korean culture. That is the question raised by Professor Lewis from Canada.

Bob Scholte: If I may first of all, three preliminary remarks. One is, what I’ll say this morning is largely an improvisation in the sense that I only heard 20 minutes to half an hour ago that I was asked to give a talk. Hence, I hope you’ll bear with me if it isn’t quite as polished or as rigorous as it might have been, had I had time to prepare it. Fortunately I did bring some notes and I will use them in the context of my brief talk.

Secondly, I think the impression I’ve taken from this conference thus far, is that, to some extent, it is a celebration of the work of Lévi-Strauss. I think this is a most honorable intent and a very justifiable one and I in no sense mean to impugn or challenge either the propriety of this or the legitimacy of this, but this will not be my concern, I will not be talking, except indirectly, about structuralism. Again, this is in no sense meant as an offense to Lévi-Strauss, it’s simply that I do come from a different tradition. And I hope the kind of very general remarks I can make will be of some relevance to you as Korean scholars.

Thirdly, as I already mentioned in my question this morning, I have not mastered either your language or your culture. I know next to nothing about Korea and Korean Studies. Hence, I can only presume that some of the things I have to share might be of relevance to you. That may, in fact, not be true at all. I will leave that to your good judgement, but, obviously, you’ll have to bear in mind the limitations of myself as a European scholar, an American anthropologist, and one whose ethnographic area is not at all related to Korea. With these thoughts in mind, let me try to give you a sense of what other types of anthropological issues have been raised by the students of anthropology of my generation, that may be relevant to you, and again, I say this with considerable caution, because they may not be relevant to your concern. I would be most appreciative if, after my talk, you could let me know in what sense my remarks are or are not relevant to your concern.

My generation of anthropologists, whether directly or indirectly, was deeply and profoundly influenced by the work of Thomas Kuhn, the book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, a book that came out in the beginning of the 1960 and has dramatically affected our notion of science. It has less explicitly affected the nature of anthropology. My contention is that it is as applicable to anthropology as to any of the other sciences and with certain very dramatic results.

Kuhn used the term paradigm borrowed from linguistics and the term implied many things, but one of the implications it has was that we can not simply assume that we can have a discourse, scientific, aesthetic or otherwise, we can not have a discourse on a knowable universe. In fact, what we have are multiple universes of discourse, and that is a very dramatic epistemological change because these universes of discourse are more than syntactically formal. This is how the history of science has always been written, as a sort of formal grammar of rationality. Kuhn made clear that the formal grammar of scientific rationality is a semantic and a pragmatic, to use semiological terms, affair as well. They are universes that constitute meaning and that meaning is constituted in use. The sciences are, in that sense, cultural and historical phenomena.

What might be of concern to you, and I’ll emphasize it throughout, is that if this is applicable to cultural anthropology, cultural anthropology is a Europocentric and Western science, that
is embodied and embedded in a European culture. Its possibilities and limitations are defined by its genesis, by its culture. Anthropology is a discourse of Europeans on the Other, on behalf of Europeans. I’ll try to illustrate what I have in mind. There’s one note here I’d like to make; it is that developments in anthropology in the last five or ten years have taken up this notion of paradigms in a more distinct and specific ethnographic sense, what has not been talked about here and which might be of interest to you, is to consider the so-called rationality debate in British anthropology. What is being argued there is whether there are universal criteria of rationality, such as are presumed by the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, or whether all forms of rationality are a question of language, to use Wittgensteinian terms, and language games that are embedded in, and defined by, forms of life, a context in that sense. This, of course, is a radical relativity. In anthropology, the name of Peter Winch should be mentioned as a foremost representative of this kind of radical relativization in anthropology. His work is directly related to Kuhn and directly related to developments in the philosophy of science. I’ll talk about that very briefly as well. Anthropological discourse is a paradigm, this would be the implication of Kuhn’s point of view. What is the meaning generally in the philosophical sense of the term paradigm in this sense?

All texts, including the texts of scientists or anthropological texts, are defined by their context. Every logic, including anthropological logic, is at one and the same time an ethno-logic. One of the most remarkable things about anthropology is that we define everybody’s ethno-logic except our own. We presume to stand above it. After Kuhn, in my point of view, that’s impossible; anthropological logic is a cultural, a situational, a historical, a sociological logic. It is any number of things. It can be, by definition, political; it need not be, but all the things, all the kinds of cultural determinations that we attribute to other peoples are relevant to anthropologists as well. We can not presume to stand above the cultural determinations that we so heavily impose upon other peoples. We are not a free-floating intellectual class, in the way in which Mannheim thought of his intellectuals standing above the battles. That is hence my question to you this morning. What motivates you, what are the reasons, why Korean Studies, what is the context of that intent?

You can say it’s simply an internal intellectual enterprise, OK, but I would like to hear that. What is the cultural reason, what is the historical reason for Korean Studies at this time? Dr. Kang mentions something in point of answer to that question. Those are the very kinds of questions you might wish to consider asking in selecting a given methodology, with all its epistemological and ontological presuppositions, which is not merely a scientific question, but a historical question, because all scientific questions are historical questions. There are cultural questions, social questions, political questions; Kuhn, in this sense, implies the kind of radical contextualization and radical relativization of anthropological discourse that should be familiar to the anthropologists. But as I say, he is only willing to apply it to everybody but himself.

The taken-for-granted assumptions of western science are cultural assumptions; they are contextual, they are relative, and they are deeply and profoundly problematic in a very concrete sense, because the culture of science is a culture, a culture that, in recent decades, has been plagued in any number of ways - for example, by fragmentation, specialization, politicization. We’ve had, to use the terms of Kuhn, a sort of crisis in the legitimacy of anthropology as an enterprise. This is from the point of view of my generation.
Again, I do not know and do not presume to know to what extent these very concrete issues move you in any sense. I do not know what the Korean situation is. But that is precisely the point. You could ask similar kinds of questions about the Korean situation even if your answers are totally different. You can say to me: “But we do not have this problem of fragmentation, we don’t have this problem of politicization, or if we have, we don’t talk about it.” That’s fine. But these are central questions that are part and parcel of the kind of anthropology we consider doing, and the reasons for it, which is a question that I would think transcends the utilization of structuralism as such, even if this is a paradigm you would wish to choose. I run ahead of myself. There are other crises, of course. This whole turn, to the paradigmatic sensibility and the use of Kuhn’s terms is defined not only by the crisis in anthropology, but also by the crisis around anthropology. The anthropologists in the 1960s were faced with the fact that the so-called natives were disappearing. If they are not disappearing, they are talking back. In Africa, they are telling the anthropologists to get the hell out: “We don’t want to anymore.”

There’s a change in the notion of what is trivial and what is important in anthropology. My generation and again, I don’t mean to justify it in any sense, went through very real rebellion against the academic definition of anthropology, against the entire academic enterprise, party because the entire moral sensibility that we had when we entered anthropology was in a sense wiped out by the liberal ideology of the academy. Again, this may be totally irrelevant to the situation of Korean anthropologists, but I’d suspect that here, too, anthropology is in that sense embedded in a moral climate, in a cultural climate. What that climate would be, again, I do not know. And of course, in the anthropology of that time, and this is till true, we were faced with the normative reason, a moral dimension, an ethical dimension, or an aesthetic dimension.

In many cases, we were worried about the kind of repressive metaphors of anthropological science, structural functionalism, its role in colonialism, the possibility of an anthropology of emancipation, an emancipated anthropology, the plight of peoples in the Third World. These are question that have no easy and ready answers. I think my generation in the 1960s and 70s was a bit too quick with these answers, that is true, and I don’t mean to minimize the enormous intellectual task of raising these issues and trying to answer them. But that is the kind of issues that motivated disenchantment with an academic anthropology that didn’t speak to these issues, that did not address these issues. Above all, it was urgent in that time because, besides including a moral crisis of western bourgeois anthropologists, it was also a crisis around us. The Third World began to define its own historical destiny, that perhaps more than any other factor, sort of placed our own anthropological enterprise, as a Western enterprise, in doubt, in radical doubt.

We could not do science, in the normal sense of doing science. We asked what is the sense and meaning of doing science in the first place? We recognized, in other words, that anthropology is a mediated, or cultural, historical and socially situated enterprise. But that mediation of anthropology, that concrete situation of anthropology also defined its mediating potential. Its relevance was defined by the way in which it was inhabited, by a culture and in a culture. It was not that anthropology was contaminated by its own culture, that was one problem, but also that its very embeddedness made any definition of relevance possible. It’s like Merleau-Ponty said about history. Historical relativity encompasses all
possibilities of truth on one hand, but it also makes any kind of relevant truth possible on the other hand.

Our situation in that sense was not only a condition for error, but also the very definition for the possibilities of anthropological truth. To what extent that kind of contextual sensibility can or cannot be raised in the confines of structuralism is, I think, one of the most dramatic and urgent questions that a non-structuralist, in my case, a neo-Marxist, can put to structuralism. And that’s an issue Lévi-Strauss should be familiar with, because it’s the cardinal issue that has been raised in the phenomenological and Marxist critique in his own country of structuralism, and I’d be glad to elaborate, if that’s necessary, in another context.

How do we concretize some of these very general ideas that I’ve been putting down here? - and let me try to do this by way of contrast with structuralism. Again, with no dishonorable intent, one is the question of the degree to which one can talk about a continuity or a discontinuity between the anthropologist’s experiences as a human being and the anthropological reality he or she seeks to study. As is well known, the epistemological premise of Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism is a radical discontinuity between experience and reality. The anthropologist of my persuasion, taking a dialectical point of view, would argue that anthropology is only possible by stipulating a continuity between experience and reality. Why?

For one reason, because the philosophy of discontinuity has certain distinctive implications that, I, for one, and others like me, find profoundly problematic. Discontinuity implies that the anthropologist is the observer incarnate, the professional voyeur par excellence, disengaged, objective, realizing western society’s most catastrophic assumption, namely that our fellow men and women can be thoroughly objectified. This leads to the epistemological tyranny of the privileged observer, the anthropologist who stands above the subjects that he studies, or the objects of his investigation. He attributes to himself a sort of divine status, the man or woman who contributes, creates his or her own subject matter.

From this scientist emanates the designs of other cultures. Cultures become the object of a semiotic contemplation, the semiotic contemplation where we do the decoding of them for our own purposes. By what right do we decode is the question. Here, I’ll come back to this. Cultural anthropology in the last instance, as a scientific enterprise, is a solitary and silent act. The natives, as the African anthropologist Mudimbe said, become “des objets silencieux à propos desquels tout discours est possible”. The natives become the “silent objects about which any discourse is possible”. For these and other reasons, I would urge you to consider the possibility of an epistemology which defines the relationship between reality and experience as one of continuity rather than discontinuity.

Anthropology becomes in the first and last analysis, dialogical, it becomes a discourse that is defined in partnership, not as a solitary act. Anthropology, to put it in terms of the philosophy of science, is then a part and parcel of the systems and processes, political, social, economic, and historical they study. This is ecology in the radical epistemological sense of the word. Observation in this sense is not contemplation, but is inevitably a form of participation. This implies that anthropology is not only a theoretical enterprise, nor an observational enterprise, but that it’s a human praxis. It’s not simply a means of subsuming the subject, the self or the other, within a framework of a professional discipline or an anthropological discourse. It’s in this sense a human partnership entailing responsibility,
entailing dialogue, entailing in that sense process and production. It’s not simply the producer, the divine anthropologist and the product, the ultimate ethnological theory. It’s a process of production. Knowledge is in this sense constituted in situ, in dialogical forms. The nature of the encountered phenomena, the ethnographic facts, or whatever you wish to call them, is mediated by the nature of the encounter, by the dialogue, the dialectic if you wish, between producers, production, and product. This contrasts with the philosophy of science where the questioned, the native, is absorbed by the questions posed by the anthropologists and posed in the interest of the questioner. Knowledge, in other words, I would advocate, is process, understanding, is an event; science is ecological in that sense, and much of the philosophy of science is in fact based on exactly the opposite.

What we would ask about our discourse, is, for example, who defines the significance of that anthropological discourse, on whose behalf, but also at whose expense? What is anthropological discourse for? We are not just concerned with the of that discourse, or the scientific verifiability of that discourse. These are important questions. But who is it for, and who defines its significance?

This is a question of indigenous meaning, not just the anthropological discourse in and of itself. Who invests the discourse with authority? The anthropologist? That’s usually the way it has been. Certainly, this is one effect of putting anthropological discourse only in textual terms. The authoritative discourse of anthropology becomes in fact the anthropological tradition itself. But what about the historical context of that discourse? Is it right that the anthropologist should define what is authentic and meaningful about another society? Because that is invariably what he does. Does it become authoritative by the canons of Western science, and is it then legitimate that that discourse should explain the history of that other society? These are extremely urgent questions and they are very concrete questions. Let me give two examples, First, the brilliant work of the British anthropologist Edward Said, who has shown the kind of vested interests that motivate Israeli anthropologists to define the Arabs in a certain way. This is much more than simply a political question. It’s a semiotic question, it’s the nature of the discourse that is affected by the fact that these anthropologists are Israeli anthropologists. And secondly, one of the most brilliant examples of this is the book by Said on Orientalism. I don’t know to what extent this book is familiar but I would urge you all to read it, because what, in fact, Said is showing is that the notion of the Oriental is a creation of Western needs and all its implications. The Oriental is a creation of the West, to suit the West; it’s myth-making, to use the term of Lévi-Strauss. It is a brilliant book. I will come back to it if I have the time. But I don’t have the time.

Anthropological discourse on this point of view tends to be excessively formal. From the point of view of science in a sense that I’m not criticizing, this is a very specific linguistic problem. One does not have to argue in vast philosophical terms, although that is my tendency, as you surely have noticed by now, but one can be very specific in terms of looking at the kind of discourse anthropology is. One of the things that has been quite clear to me in looking at anthropological texts is that the speaker is obscured in the discourse, the person is not there. There is the third person, “he,” that is being used in much ethnographic literature. “He,” the anthropologist, as if it were not a concrete human being with his limitations as a human being. Why then should the anthropologist obscure himself, his
concrete self under the rubric of the impersonal third person “he”? I think there are reasons for that, because science, in the rarefied sense in which science as a discourse has been privileged in the West, science, in that sense, refuses to admit and willfully attempts to obscure the contingency of what is being said, a contingency defined by the person who says it, and, of course, the situation of the person who says it. It’s not the person per se, as a person, but the historical situation of that person. The tendency in other words is to ignore the extent to which the object that is spoken, in this case, the native, is dependent on the speaker, defined by the speaker and his or her language. De-authored speech in science is in that sense a form of objectivism. It’s the speech of the so-called authority, the authority of the grammar of rationality, the grammar of scientific rationality, which leads me to the observation that Nietzsche made: “We’ve not yet gotten rid of God, since we still believe in grammar.”

The authoritative formal discourse of Western science is said to constitute knowledge, but in the process, what it really does is to constitute a subject matter as well. We define the other in the confines of our own discourse, the other is in that sense rendered silent, the object of our own attempt. The natives become the artifact of the intellectualization which is thought to comprehend it. We domesticate the exotic for our own purposes. And I’ll come back to this. In this sense, it is the younger, not any more, but years ago, younger French anthropologists who suggested that we shatter the restrictive syntax of the established order. And it is my generation that sought alternative means in anthropology to shatter that restrictive syntax. Hence, the origin of action anthropology and revolutionary anthropology.

Son, Bong-ho: This morning the discussion was a little bit confused. There were a lot of items spoken of, floods, structures, East-West, Korean Studies, etc. Maybe the West and the East are too close. We need another myth to separate them, but not too far. And then, Dr. Scholte has brought some classifications in one sense and more confusion in another sense. The fundamental philosophical presupposition and methodology had been more or less assumed in the beginning, but then, at the last stage, this fundamental problem has been raised, so it gives us some kind of perplexity. Another paradox is that, when he tells us not to follow the traditional Western methodology, he is asking us to give up following his own cultural heritage. Somehow we feel that we are just pushed to and fro by two Western scholars. We don’t know whether we should follow Professor Lévi-Strauss or Dr Scholte.

We are very grateful for his remarks and I noticed that there are many people who agree with his sentiment at least, if not with every detail of what he has said. Dr Scholte has said he needs to speak for at least 30 more minutes, in order to develop his points; otherwise he will not speak. I have asked him whether he could speak for 10 minutes, and he refused. So, I’d like to ask your opinion, whether we should give him 30 more minutes or just proceed with our discussion.

Kim, Yer-su: I think we should take into account the problems and difficulties in communication and if Dr. Scholte feels it appropriate we can proceed with the discussion of the first part of his presentation right away, and after this discussion, then, hear the rest of his presentation and discuss that part...

Bob Scholte: That’s fine. Let me just correct the impression that I wouldn’t be willing to speak for 10 minutes. That’s not the point. The point is that it’d be quite useless to reiterate
again in 10 minutes what I have said this morning. Hence my asking for 30 minutes if possible. If it is not, that’s perfectly fine, as I said this morning.

Son, Bong-ho: I think I’d follow Dr. Kim’s suggestion. Let’s continue our discussion with what Dr. Scholte has said this morning. And then, if we feel any need of his further elaboration, then, we can ask him to speak further. I don’t know whether I can do it correctly, but I’d like to summarize very briefly what he said this morning. He thinks that the whole methodology of cultural anthropology so far, especially in the line of Professor Lévi-Strauss, is European ethnocentric. That is, that anthropology is loaded with Western presuppositions, not taking into account the persons studied, the cultures studied. Cultural anthropologists and scientists assume that they stand above the cultural milieu as if they are standing outside of all these cultural differences. But that is impossible, according to Dr. Scholte, and he is making use of the famous historian of science, or philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn, whose idea of paradigm may be used extensively. I think that is the key point of the whole thing and the question is: Should the Koreans in this Academy of Korean Studies adapt this Western methodology? I think that’s one of basic questions he has raised. And I think it’s very fair for us to provide a chance to Professor Lévi-Strauss to respond to what Dr. Scholte said this morning.

Lévi-Strauss: Well, I’m at a big disadvantage in trying to comment on what Professor Scholte said this morning because, first of all, I only heard half of what he intended to say, and in the second place, his English is much better than mine. So, I shall try to be short. And my feeling while listening is that, as a matter of fact, what I heard was not new to me. The chairman just spoke of different Western scholars; it’s not so much a matter of school as a matter of generation.

Because in France, we have also among the younger generation of anthropologists people who say approximately the same thing, for instance, for Americanists, that instead of studying Indian kinship system or mythology, you should be satisfied or it should be our duty to join the Indians in their daily fight for more economic advantages and independence. Should we do that, and of course, everybody is free to do that, not as an anthropologist, but as a citizen, perhaps later on, the great grandchildren of those Indians will reproach us for not having preserved a tremendous body of traditional knowledge which they will think at that time to be necessary to build up their own humanism. But my answer will be mostly the following:

If, as Kuhn and Professor Scholte say, every scientific discourse is a paradigm, then Professor Scholte’s discourse on anthropology is also a paradigm, and then it has as much value, but certainly no more value, than the scientific discourse he is criticizing. He has highly recommended a book by Said, which I’ve read, and it is an interesting book indeed, because it’s quite obvious that in his criticism of the discourse of the Western world on the Arabs, he is displaying as much political conceit and displaying as much economic and social interest as he’s reproaching the Western world for having displayed in building up the image of the Arab world. And I quite willingly grant that no scientific discourse is pure. I know certainly the importance of Kuhn’s work for the general epistemological point of view, but as regards anthropology in particular, to me, it is simply begging the obvious, because I, for one, have not waited for Kuhn to insist on the historical links between anthropology with colonialism. Should anthropology be condemned on those grounds?
No more, I think, than archaeologists working in Lebanon should be condemned because it was possible, due to the Lebanese War and the destruction brought in Beirut, to make very important archaeological discoveries. I agree that science works in tortuous ways, that a lot of impure interests are embedded in it, but nevertheless, in this crab-like way, there’s always a leftover, and this leftover is the progress of knowledge. This is a sad result, perhaps, but nevertheless it’s quite possible, and not only possible, but certain, that historical reasons, sociological reasons, explain why biology, for instance, at a certain moment, in a certain civilization, raises some questions, uses a particular ideological framework and the like. Nevertheless, the genetic code is there and I think that it’s true that science is always the victim of, or subject to political, social, economic interests, but at the same time, and this is the greatness of the scientific approach, it is always trying to evade that. It never succeeds entirely, but even if it succeeds for ten percent, or five percent, this is enough and this is a legitimization in my mind of the scientific endeavor.

**Park, Ynhui:** We talked about the motivations for particular sciences, but I think we have to distinguish between the motivation for doing something and what people actually do. The motivations will be quite different whether I do mathematics to make money or become famous, but this has nothing to do with whether mathematical theory is valid or not. And Professor Scholte seems to be making a certain confusion between this motivation and science as a theory.

Professor Scholte talked about Kuhn’s paradigm as being a theory which would deny the structuralist assumption proposed by Lévi-Strauss. I think that the theory proposed by Kuhn does not really refute, it seems not to be incompatible with Lévi-Strauss’ views. Even if it’s true that whatever we try to do is always dependent upon our conceptual system, which may be a reflection of the interests of a particular type of a particular society. Still, I think that whatever paradigm we choose, the way we organize our experience of the world can still be seen as being structured by another system. I don’t know if it’s true or not, but different paradigms can perhaps be seen as different exemplifications of a universal system. My point is that Professor Scholte has presented Kuhn’s paradigm as incompatible with structural theory. But he has failed to demonstrate this.

A third point is that he said that in carrying out anthropological work, we should understand what is in people’s minds, rather than theorizing. I do not deny the reality of the other person, but explanation is not experience itself. It’s a mental, intellectual, or logical presentation of experience. So there is no contradiction. Theory itself can never be living events.

**Son, Bong-ho:** I personally think the disagreement is still not exactly relevant to our discussion because it’s again within the Western field, in the Western world of discourse. But what we now have to speak about, is whether we should adopt this Western methodology, either yours or Professor Lévi-Strauss’, to Korean things.

**Kim, Yer-su:** Coming from a culture that has long been subject to a kind of devaluation, so to speak, at the hands of Western cultures in the broadly conceived sense, the words of Dr Scholte have been a kind of music to the ears of many of my colleagues from Korea. Here is a representative of the Western science which for a long time since Descartes, Leibniz and so forth, has claimed that the science they are conducting is the prototype or the foundation for universal science, advising us that all universes of discourses are equally valid and that
we should try to get away as much as possible from the dominance of Western science. In this sense, it has been music to our ears. On the other hand, I’m not too sure that this position, this sort of extreme relativistic position really takes into account the scientific and scholarly endeavors that we, the so-called scholars, are engaged in. The Kuhnian position from which Scholte has proceeded is, of course, as Professor Lévi-Strauss has rightly remarked, one of many positions regarding the nature of science and scholarly activities, and I’m not an anthropologist, but I have suspicions that anthropology as a discipline is particularly prone to the kind of relativism that the Kuhnian position forces one to adopt. And I’m not too sure that this sort of tendency toward relativization is valid for all disciplines. Even if we do accept certain parts of the Kuhnian conception of science and scientific activities, even if we do accept the validity of various forms of life, and various language games and so forth, the Wittgensteinian position, certainly the position taken by Kuhn, the interpretation that Kuhn places on Wittgenstein’s notions of the forms of life and language games and so forth, is one extremely relativistic position. There are as you well know very many different interpretations of these notions. And why absolutize one particular interpretation of this notion that has very much dominated Western intellectual life for the last several decades? It seems to me that what Dr. Scholte is in fact doing is driving the process of atoning for intellectual hubris in the cultural tradition of the West to the other extreme and in fact co-opting many of the alternatives that we, who come from a cultural sphere other than the Western, could rationally adopt, by saying that everything is equally valid. By saying - I don’t know whose expression this is - but by saying that everything is equidistant from God and so forth. Now this brings us to the question of relating the ideas of Professor Lévi-Strauss to what we call Korean Studies.

We are starting from a very specific problem situation when we talk about the advancement of Korean Studies. Korea has experienced very rapid social and economic changes during the last 20 years or so, and in this intoxicating atmosphere of rapid change, we accepted everything that we could adopt from Western material civilization and so forth. Now this process of change has reached a certain stage and we are beginning to see that many of the side-effects of trying to adopt many of the aspects, instruments and or forth of Western civilization are leading us into a sort of blind alley. So, when we look for a way out, one course, the obvious direction in which we could turn, and we in fact did turn, was to traditional Korean culture, which, as I said in the beginning, has suffered a very serious devaluation for a number of historical reasons which I need not go into here. But we’d like to rediscover and re-evaluate and modify the elements of traditional Korean culture in such a way that it can serve as the basis for a future development of our country. And in this process, we’re not saying that we’re going to rediscover every element, we’re going to identify every element of Korean culture and then absolutize these elements of Korean culture into an absolute value.

What we’re trying to do is to identify those elements which are relevant to the kind of industrial society that we’re trying to achieve. It’s a form of civilization that everybody, I think, with very few exceptions ultimately strives for, and what we are trying to do is to modify this universal civilization in such a way as to make it more humane, and make it more humane on the basis of those elements in our culture which we think are worth preserving. This is a very concrete problem situation.
Son, Bong-ho: I think we should not restrain Dr. Scholte from responding because three speeches were directed against him more or less.

Park, Ynhui: I think that the most important thing that we need to do is to keep the distinction between moral or ideological question and theoretical questions or scientific questions. I think there is a little confusion between the two. The question of how we explain social phenomena, anthropological phenomena, is a quite different thing from whether it’s important to us to do such a study in the first place. The second question is the ideological and moral question. The first question is purely scientific.

Bob Scholte: With regard to the comments of Professor Lévi-Strauss, I think certainly he is quite correct in pointing out that this difference in our sensibilities, really, about the field of anthropology is very much a question of generation. In that sense, too, I think there’s no question that the proposals I make here are bound by my own generation, and future scholars will probably look down upon my efforts as historically and culturally and generationally bound, but that’s precisely the point I’m trying to make.

The point is not to avoid this relativism, but how to get properly into it, to appreciate it for what it is, and to do with it what we can do. In that sense, of course, my point of view is a paradigm; critical consciousness is a moment in the history of consciousness, said Kant, said Hegel, that’s the price of my efforts as well. My point is not to avoid history, not to get out of my own culture, but to properly appreciate its potentialities and its limitations. I think that is my own task really. It has to be my task, since I’m an anthropologist. Again, I agree with Lévi-Strauss that no scientific discourse is pure; in fact, if anything, this is the point that critical anthropologists have been making, both in the context of the history of anthropology and its current practice. But I’m not convinced there’s a leftover, as Lévi-Strauss would argue, that defines the progress of science. I’d like to know what that leftover is exactly and what privileges that leftover has, whatever it is, in terms of the kind of paradigmatic determinations I’m talking about.

What is the leftover? Why is that leftover not defined within cultural and historical circumstances? How is it determined? What is it and why is not it ideology? To come back to the last question that was raised, the point is not to separate science from ideology. The point is, first of all, to see to what extent science is inherently ideological. It’s not that ideology can simply influence science from the outside, it’s that science is embedded in an ideological enterprise, that every attempt to understand nature, to conquer it, to find causal and deterministic laws, to control it in this sense, to manipulate it in this sense - is it not ideology?

I was going to elaborate on that in the second part to my lecture and I mention it briefly here. So that for me, the so-called successes of science and the leftover, the residual quality of scientific praxis that defines it as science, is something I’d like to see defined, and I question very seriously if it can be exempted a priori from the kind of cultural determination that I’ve been talking about.

Lévi-Strauss: The leftover, for instance, is the fact that we have now in the United States a movement called “Red Power”, and numerous attempts by the American Indians to re-establish old rituals and ceremony which were not celebrated for many years and, in many cases, they could not do this if they did not have books on their shelves that were
written at the end of the last century by anthropologists who had kept for them a knowledge which is useful to them, and which otherwise would be lost.

**Bob Scholte**: I think this is one of the benefits of anthropology, but it does not tell me anything about anthropology as a science. I mean, the literary artists who have written down the ceremonies of the Indians could also have provided documents for them to utilize now.

**Lévi-Strauss**: No, it would not be accurate.

**Bob Scholte**: Then, we come back to the question of what is accuracy, what is verifiability?

**Son, Bong-ho**: I think the discussion is now on the plane of the philosophy of science, not quite on the methodology of Korean Studies. How much should we adopt, or how much should we create, or should we agree with Professor Lévi-Strauss that even though scientific methodology is relativistic, there’s still some point which is universal, or should we agree with Dr Scholte?

**Bob Scholte**: With regard to the point about paradigms not denying structures or Kuhn’s perspective not denying Lévi-Strauss’ work, I didn’t say that it did. I simply implied that structuralism is itself a paradigm. What I said was that any and all paradigms had their possibilities and limitations and the point of Kuhn’s work is to define and seek to define what the limitations and possibilities are in any paradigm.

On the other question, extreme relativism, the implication of Kuhn, I should point out that I don’t think these are the conclusions that Kuhn himself would make. I think he retains essentially a progressive and progressivistic definition of science. That Kuhn should be especially appealing to anthropologists because of his relativism, yes, but that is not Kuhn’s intent, in all fairness to Kuhn. Language games and forms of life, yes, I interpreted them indeed in an anthropological context, there are other interpretations and surely the person who raised the question knows that this is a debate in the philosophy of science where people as diverse as Popper, Feyerabend, and others have reinterpreted and interpreted these issues. They are enormously complex issues. I’ve taken essentially an anthropological point of view toward this. I suppose in the context of the history of science that the person closest to the philosophy of science, closest to the point of view I’m elaborating here would be Feyerabend.

With regard to Korean Studies, I can speak to this only in one sense, because I’m not a Korean specialist. The question to me remains why structuralism? What can structuralism do and not do in the context of Korean Studies? This is and remains for me a problem.

If it is the problem of resurrecting and authenticating and legitimating traditional Korean culture, I’d think structuralism would be enormously beneficial, it’s an extremely rich, sophisticated methodology. I would ask if it would be equally relevant to the kinds of transformations and cultural changes, historical, economical, political, that you mentioned as well. I’ve not seen in the structuralist literature the kind of treatment of cultural change, historical transformations, that I would find, for example, in the neo-Marxist literature. To what extent structuralism can address the kind of questions about kinship and feminism raised this morning, that is a legitimate issue. To what extent that is raised in the context of Korean Studies, I cannot say; it was raised this morning. Again, the plea I’m making is not so much a critique of structuralism. I have my critique of structuralism, I’ve written critiques of
structuralism. The point is to what extent is it the kind of paradigm that one would adopt in the context of Korean Studies. One must then ask what must one do in Korean Studies? What does one wish to do there? And what are the possibilities and limitations of structuralism, including structuralism as a scientific paradigm, structuralism as a Western, Europocentric, in that sense enterprise? I can detail that too, and Lévi-Strauss knows the literature better than I, his colleagues in France have been persistent ...  

Lévi-Strauss: No, the Chinese were structuralists centuries and centuries before Europe.

Kim, Yer-su: I’d like to correct what seems to be a false impression. We’re not adopting structuralism as the method of studying Korean culture and conducting Korean Studies. We’re exploring the intellectual conceptual instruments that are offered by structuralism as one of the ways through which we can approach Korean Studies in an objective and scientific way. He seems to think that we’ve adopted in some way Professor Lévi-Strauss as our guardian angel, this is not the case at all. In fact, many of us at the Academy of Korean Studies do not see eye to eye with many of the doctrines advanced by Professor Lévi-Strauss.

Henry Lewis: In the study of Westernization, or what used to be called acculturation (the term is rather moribund in anthropology) we looked at the wrong things. We looked at the manifestations of change, the clothes the people wear, and that sort of thing, and ignored the fact that in the so-called Westernization (I’d say industrialization) dramatic differences were involved.

What we need to do is to look at industrialization here, or in China, or in Japan, to see how different industrialization has been. In North America and in Europe, we are learning some valuable lessons, and costly lessons, particularly with regard to Japan, given what their industrialization has been doing to Western industrialization.

There are two implications for structuralism here. First, we may ask not what structuralism can do for Korea, but what Korea can do for structuralism. I think there’s a kind of natural affinity, or perhaps I should say a cultural affinity, with the basic Asian idea of Yin and Yang. However, I’d be particularly interested to see in a few years what I think would be a new kind of structuralism with some emphases that, perhaps, we, in the West, have been able to provide. I think there would be much more of an emphasis on relations rather than oppositions. As an offhand generalization. Second, I think there’s a word of caution here, just because there is such an affinity. As Professor Lévi-Strauss cautioned this morning, there are certainly many other kinds of anthropological approaches. There is not of course, an anthropological paradigm. There are all kinds of anthropological paradigms within paradigms.

However, I think that it would be important at this stage in Korean social studies and my own field of anthropology that there be an examination as there has been in North America and Europe, a lot of soul searching, about the kinds of questions that Professor Scholte has raised today. When we’re suddenly realizing that we were not the value-neutral science that we thought. I think it’s important that you don’t make the same kind of mistakes that we made, and that you fully understand what it is that would characterize, not just Korean culture, but Korean social sciences. And then, I think we’ll have something, a real
contribution from your and other nations of this rather large thing we call anthropology, or social studies or sciences.

**Huh, Moon-Kang:** Professor Scholte seems to be arguing that structuralism is being imposed upon Korean society and Korean anthropologists. As the science of man and society, anthropology did not begin in primitive societies. The same is true of Sinology, Nipponology, as well as Koreanology. Orientalism certainly began in Europe. We cannot deny that. I can fully understand the sentiment of Bob Scholte. But structuralism, as Lévi-Strauss explained, was found in Indonesian societies. For my part, I would say that Korean society itself has the structural concept received from Chinese philosophy. As we have been saying, it is to be found in the idea of Yin and Yang. Moreover, the idea of structure is not only used in anthropology, but every science speaks about structures: mathematics, physics, astronomy, linguistics, etc. Structure is not just a concept of anthropology. It is becoming the universal concept of all the sciences. It is a kind of ideology of modern societies, modern sciences. Now, the question is whether structuralism is to be applied to Korean society in the future. If not, what method would Dr. Scholte give us as a substitute? At the moment, we have the master of structuralism here, and I propose to talk about structuralism.

**Son, Bong-ho:** Now, I think we can continue our discussion. Are there any structural elements in Oriental thinking? Or is it not necessary that we should find any? It would be interesting to think about that for a while. Maybe we can pay attention to how relevant a structural approach is in studying Korean culture or Korean anthropology.

**Lee, Chungmin:** I think structuralism can be relevant to the analytic system in Korean. As far as I can understand, social organization is reflected in the analytic system in Korea. For instance, I think the Korean language and the language of Java and Japanese are three distinguished languages which have that kind of explicit linguistic honorific forms. We show different degrees of deference or politeness and formality and things like that by way of different endings in the sentence. You cannot make a sentence without an ending which shows the relationship between the speaker and hearer. You have to show somehow whether you’re informal or formal to your hearer, or whether you are polite to your hearer or not. So, that kind of hierarchical honorific system can be well represented by this structural analysis, by way of distinguishing formal, informal and polite and non-polite, and some other aspects. It’s a way of showing the degree of deference, showing the social distance between the speaker and the hearer. But gradually and slowly, the complicated honorific system seems to be changing a little bit, changing into a simplified form. I think it’s partly because of the egalitarian or democratic way of thinking from Western culture. I don’t know whether it’s the most ideal way of change or not, but that’s what is happening, and we cannot do anything about it. We can study it objectively, I don’t know whether that kind of tendency is prevalent in western cultures too.

**Son, Bong-ho:** Professor Lee has suggested that Korean linguistics, studying Korean language can be approached structurally.

**Lévi-Strauss:** It’s very striking that on the French radio, in my time, you’d never hear the name of the President of the Republic of Prime Minister without “Monsieur” before, and now, they use the name without “Monsieur”.
Bob Scholte: Similarly, in the Netherlands, the *tutoyer*, well, has become a common form, and, a couple of years ago, this simply was not done. I don’t know how it is in French, whether the *tutoyer* between colleagues is ...

David Eyde: I’d just like to add that, in the USA, first names, as opposed to Mr. Jones, have become more and more common. It’s also interesting that we regionalize, so that when you progress from the East Coast of the United States to the West Coast of the United States, personal names become more and more frequent, and, in California, let’s say, Los Angeles it’s probably all of three minutes between the first formal introduction and the use of first names. Something which upsets, not only Europeans, but also people coming from the East or the Middle West.

Park, Ynhui: Professor Lee mentioned and some other participants joined him, the fact it doesn’t change the honorific use of the terms, but I think the fact as such has nothing to do with structuralism. The point would be whether such a phenomenon is better explained by structural analysis. 

Lévi-Strauss: I think it’s high time that we stop speaking of structuralism with a capital “S”, and that we consider only that there are very small problems which can be approached more fruitfully with a structural approach than with a different approach. For instance, when we were studying the French villages I was speaking of, we discovered, and this was never possible before, that agricultural goods circulate in different ways according to their nature. There are some agricultural products which go to the market to be sold, some others which are only exchanged between neighbors, and others which are only exchanged between relatives. And the economic approach wouldn’t have perceived this. When we study fairs and markets, we also find that there’s a network of circulation of goods and of social relations which is much more conservative than what is going on outside, and of course, this could never be perceived by having only statistical data about input and output. And it’s not a matter of seeing whether structuralism can be used. A structural approach can be used sometimes for some problems. Now, coming back to what Professor Kim was saying a moment ago about the conflict between Korean values and the scientific approach, it seems to me that, after all, the Western world was in the lead in the scientific approach during the 19th century, but we now know in the West that you knew it long ago, we know, thanks to Needham’s works on Chinese science, that, at an earlier period, Chinese science was much more advanced than the science of the Western world in some respects. Nevertheless, it was able to make progress in a world which had a system of values completely different from what we associate usually nowadays with scientific progress. So, I think it would be very important to understand, find out exactly the kind of balance between a value system and a scientific spirit which were able to go along side by side, and which could be an original East Asian solution.

[an interjection or question is missing here]

Lévi-Strauss: I’m somewhat embarrassed to answer this, because the reference is to my book *Tristes tropiques*, which is, on the one hand, a very old book, and on the other hand, a book where I gave myself freedom to say anything which came to my mind, but not really to make statements having, I wouldn’t say scientific value because that would be too paradigmatic, but having a positive value. And the passage which is referred to concerns my experience when I entered a Buddhist village for the first time in my life in Bangladesh, deep
in Bangladesh, just on the Burmese border where there are Buddhist local populations. And I was just saying to myself that, after all, there was something similar on the economic level between the Marxist aspirations in the West, and on the spiritual level, with the Buddhist aspirations of the people I was at that time dealing with. But this was just a more or less casual though, and I shouldn’t at all insist on it.

**Lee, Kiyong:** In the first session, we’ve been talking about introducing your methodology in Korean Studies, and the question is how do we do that? There seems to be some strong misleading tendency among us, here in Korea, to identify anything new as being Western, while anything old is identified as being Oriental or Korean. Taxonomy, for instance, is Korean, simply because it has been practiced for a long time, while some other approach, or dialectical approach, is Western. But in whatever way we define methodology, my question is: How is it possible to adopt a new method? Is it possible for scholars like you, Professor Lévi-Strauss, to be other than structuralist? Is it possible for a scholar to reject his old methodology and accept a new one? Isn’t the question of adopting a new methodology more of a practical nature than of a theoretical nature? Isn’t there a need now, in adopting a new mythology, to reject old personnel and introduce new persons into the area of scholarly research?

**Lévi-Strauss:** It’s not a matter of adopting a new methodology, and I would not claim that structuralism is a methodology. It’s just a matter of asking oneself some questions one would not spontaneously have thought of. The situation is a bit similar to the role played by some psychoanalysts in anthropology. Personally, I’ve no great faith or great interest in psychoanalysis, but nevertheless, it so happens that at least one psychoanalyst, I mean Roheim, was at the same time a very good field anthropologist, and he was very useful to us, not on account of his theories, but because when he was in the field, he just thought of some questions to ask which we, with our traditional anthropological outlook, would not ever have asked.

And it’s no more than that. The other day, when I gave an example of the kind of questions I would ask myself about the Tan-Gun myth for instance, my question was only; “Could there be some symmetrical relationship between the closeness of Heaven and Earth in Chinese mythology before civilization, and the fact that in your mythology, Heaven and Earth are separated and should be reunited?” It’s just a question to ask. The answer, I don’t know. The answer, you’ll give it yourself, according to your knowledge, according to your tradition, so it can be yes or no. We’re just offering a possible line of inquiry.

**Lee, Kiyong:** You are suggesting that conversion in intellectual life is possible and that it has been exemplified in your own life.

**Lévi-Strauss:** It’s not really a conversion. In my own life, it seems that I was always a structuralist. I’ve been told stories by my mother about when I was two years old and they seemed to show that I was already a structuralist.

**Son, Bong-ho:** I think it’d be very interesting to listen to Professor Scholte’s comment on what Professor Lévi-Strauss has just said.

**Bob Scholte:** My mother didn’t have that many stories. Certainly, I’m not a structuralist. I don’t have any comment on this point.
Lee, Du Hyun: This morning, Professor Lévi-Strauss encouraged us, he suggested some possibility of comparative studies between the Asian continent and the New World, for example, linguistics, and also Japanese studies of myths. I think there are several possible topics, for e.g. myths between our old continent and the New World and also shamanism, and funeral systems, as with the Mongoloid physical type. So, I want to ask Professor Lévi-Strauss for some perspectives on shamanism between old and new continents, suggesting possibilities for future study.

Lévi-Strauss: That would probably be very important. But once again, I must apologize because I don’t know anything about Korean shamanism. But it is certainly a variant of a system which we find elsewhere and to be able to introduce in the general theory of shamanism a variant which has not been taken into account so far, or not sufficiently, can certainly modify our entire outlook.

Now, I’d like to say something which deals directly with the kind of help structuralism may give to the studies of East Asian societies. I would give one example and I’m sorry, I must apologize, but it’ll be taken from the Japanese, because it’s the only East Asian culture on which I have had the opportunity to think a little bit so far. It is very well known that in Japan, tools are not handled the same way as they are in the Western world. The saw, for instance, does not go from the individual to outside, but is drawn toward the individual, and the same with other tools. Now, this is perfectly well known, but my Japanese colleagues were surprised when I suggested to them that this had a much wider application in Japanese culture than only in tool handling. For instance, as far as I could understand, when a Japanese takes leave, he doesn’t say exactly “I’m going out,” but he says “I’m going to return.” Also, in the culinary techniques, a Japanese doesn’t say, as we say, “to plunge something in the boiling oil” for tempura, for instance, but “to take something out of the boiling oil,” and the fact that the years are not counted in the same way, and that somebody at their birth is already one year old, also implies drawing time towards the individual rather than leaving time external to the individual. And these are, of course, structural remarks, but they were accepted by my Japanese colleagues, and they had not thought of them themselves. So, this is the kind of observation or approach where structural study can be useful. But this is just a tiny example. It’s a very concrete example, but it may suggest that one of the differences between, let’s say, Japanese culture and Western European culture, is that in one case there’s a centripetal trend and in the other a centrifugal trend.

Cho, Ok La: I’d like to make a very brief comment on Dr. Scholte, because I feel that I should answer that question, because I certainly belong to the younger generation of Korean anthropologists.

The moral issues sometimes cause me difficulty and conflicts in observing and analyzing things I’m so accustomed to accept. I feel like I play the game between observer and participant at the same time, and I play a role either as a foreigner-like observer, and one who knows well and takes advantage of one’s position to get one’s information, but I don’t know to what extent I can contribute to the study of their communal life, according to their own value system. But these are things we have to decide. And the other point also, about the paradigm. He said relativism is the approach that native scholars have to accept, but I believe that it seems that your comment assumed that the native scholars don’t have their own creative paradigm and adopt Western thought. I believe that even though we try to
accept or apply Western theory and methodology, we also have our own paradigm to select what suits to our studies or not. So, I think your emphasis on cultural relativism could possibly be another form of ethnocentrism.

And the other question is not for Dr. Scholte, but I believe structural analysis can be very valuable to grasp the way that we have adjusted to or accept westernization in our society, because I find a lot of continuity and discontinuity in modern Korea. There are some kind of patterns in selecting what point we continue and what points we don’t continue. So, in that process, I believe there’s some structure for what I’d call an adjustive mechanism, and I wonder whether that is very different from the approach that you used in structuralism, for example, binary oppositions. I cannot find binary oppositions to which I could apply a structural analysis which would help me understand the adjustment or adaptive mechanism in the modernization process.

Bob Scholte: I think the question involves the potential conflict of being both observer and participant at the same time. I think any active observation is also inevitably an active participation. However one solves these dilemmas in terms of a concrete contribution one makes to community life, I think these are ultimately ethical choices, that are left both to the individual anthropologist and, of course, to the values which are derived from his own community, whether that is a community of scholars or the community in the larger sense to which he or she belongs. The problems that are involved in having an observer who is also a participant in the sense of being a member of a culture of course change the picture dramatically. The arguments pro and con about being indigenous to the culture one is studying, are a long issue in anthropology, but with regard to community studies, I think the work of the French anthropologist Duvignot in a book called *A Village at Shabika* is perhaps one of the most dramatic and creative attempts to resolve that kind of issue. One of the problems, namely, was that he had students from urban areas, anthropology students, studying native villages which were essentially poor, poverty-ridden villages and he tried to see the effect that this had both on the students as members of that culture and on the villagers who were observed by members of their own culture. What, however, the answers as such are, this, of course, depends on the context. I cannot offer any abstract possibilities, but this issue has been debated consistently and persistently in anthropology.

The second question, I understand you to say that somehow the plea for relativism, by which, by the way, I mean quite precisely relationalism, in other, words, science is related to a series of cultural, historical and social conditions. Relativism as an ethical attitude is yet another problem, I did not mean to imply that *per se*. But whether relationalism in that sense implies that indigenous cultures do not have their own paradigm, that’s how I understood your question ...

Son, Bong-ho: No, it was that even if the Korean cultural anthropologist adopts a Western paradigm, because he is Korean, the Korean paradigm is sneaking into that methodology, almost naturally.

Bob Scholte: That’s possible. I mean it’s very hard for me to answer that in the abstract. I did, in the remaining part of my paper, there was a whole section on the national character of the social sciences, which is no doubt an urgent question for you. To put it very briefly, it has been observed in the literature that the Trobrianders are not unlike Malinowski, while
the Tikopia are not unlike Firth, and that the savages of Lévi-Strauss are distinctly Cartesian. This is not to make fun of these men or their anthropology ...

*Lévi-Strauss:* Aristotelian, of course ...

**Bob Scholte:** But the point is that these kinds of national sensibilities, these are the resources with which we work, and it is in that sense not so surprising that we tend to project these cultural resources on others. In general, I think it can be said, and it’s both a positive and potentially a negative statement in the sense that it requires critique, but that has been my plea altogether, really, anthropology should be seen as a metaphorical extension of our own cultural resources. And it can be no other, and that can be utilized to a great advantage. It can be also abused, but there’s no way in which to escape. In that sense, we have the hermeneutic circle of the anthropological enterprise. In fact, it is the very circularity of that enterprise that makes it possible in the first place. May I add one more thing, just a concrete illustration? I don’t want to reiterate the illustration, but to refer you to a longstanding debate in American anthropology. In 1945, already, John made the point that because of the kind of political sensibility of the anthropologists, the ethnographic material on the Pueblo was interpreted very differently along with democratic values or more authoritarian values. They had a Chinese anthropologist, Li An-Che, making the same study and he came out with an entirely different attitude to the ethnographic material.

He said this is all a matter of kinship. This is the kind of issue that I mean. You cannot, in that sense, separate the ethnographic product from the producer and the production process that’s ultimately responsible for that product, and there are very concrete examples of this.

*Lévi-Strauss:* We try to explain something. We don’t pretend to be able to explain everything, and generally speaking, I don’t believe that historical events can be explained. They can be described, they can be understood as singular events, but since they are by definition unique, they can never be explained. And then we have to turn to the historian.

**Kim, Kwang Ok:** My question is related to Dr. Cho, Ok La and Dr. Scholte, too. I think Bob Scholte’s comment on rationality is very important in the sense that he warns us against the danger of being too much obsessed with Western theory or terminology. One of the biggest difficulties for us arises when we try to interpret our native culture in terms of a theory or vocabulary presented by Western scholars. For example, as Professor Lévi-Strauss mentioned already, the concept of family or the concept of household, sometimes, we find it more convenient to use “house”, or sometimes to use “family,” in order to explain our concept of “jip” or “ka-jok”. Another example is that in China, as well as in Korea, we do practice the so-called oriental medical science, acupuncture. Until ten years ago, Chinese acupuncture was not considered a science by western scholars, but nowadays, western people are beginning to think it’s a kind of science. Then, it’s not the fact that Chinese acupuncture has become a science, but it’s the change in western people’s attitude or perception about Chinese acupuncture. The problem is how can we overcome the difficulties caused by these different concepts?

**Bob Scholte:** I can only concur with the urgency of the point you made. I think one of the tendencies in anthropology is that in order to compensate in the context of our own history, especially for 19th-century evolutionism, we have really been making the native more rational, in our sense of the word rational, than he or she may in fact be. Whatever
rationality is, we use our own criteria and I tend to see that as something that’s as dangerous as viewing him as pre-rational or less rational, which is what we did in the 19th century. In other words, I’m making a plea that we relativize in that sense the notion of rationality altogether.

How that should be done and what kind of concept of rationality then should prevail is something for which I have as yet no answer. This is one of the issues that are debated in current British anthropology. I think one of the very important conclusions we can draw at this juncture, and it is only a provisional one, is that the most important source of misunderstanding of alien cultures, and I would suspect, as academicians, in terms of our own culture, is that we inadequately master the concept of our culture. In other words, to understand magic, we have to understand the anthropology of science, first of all. That does not of course preclude the possibility that in understanding magic, we may also enhance our understanding of science. But that is at least the first step. We cannot, I don’t think, presume to understand, say, the nature of magic without at one and the same time understanding the nature of science. And we usually forget that latter step.

Kim, Jong Hae: I’m a psychiatrist, and I came here to understand you and your structural analysis, but I still doubt I clearly understand structural analysis. Concerning your experience in Japan, I have some association in understanding structural analysis, some phenomena in Korean life. When we go to the market to buy rice, we say we’re selling rice at the market. Is there any relation with structural analysis?

Lévi-Strauss: It’s something very interesting which should be studied.

Unidentified: Our country is an agricultural country, so we have to be rich in rice and even though we’re go to buy rice, we have to say we’re going to sell rice.

Son, Bong-ho: There are three remarks to be made about this discussion:

1) We have had a strong warning against Western ethnocentrism. We should not adopt Western scientific methods as such, and that has been a general tendency.

2) Structuralism is not structuralism with a capital “S”. It is only heuristic; it helps us to see certain things which otherwise would not be seen.

3) In that sense, structuralism can be very useful for the study of Korean phenomena. We’re not trying to take over everything from them, we are just trying to gain some wisdom.
4 Open Topics and Free Discussion (October 17, 1981)

Kang, Shin-pyo: It’s time to review what we’ve seen, but not looked at, what we have listened to, but not heard, what we have exchanged among ourselves. As far as I understand, a very important concept of Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism is the concept of communication and exchange. Is communication possible between various cultures and various disciplines or existentially is it absolutely impossible? I think we can discuss a little further the first two points Professor Son, Bong-ho raised in his summing up of yesterday’s session. I also suggest that the proposition he made in his third point, that is, that structuralism could be very useful for the study of Korean culture and society, may deserve more elaboration at this point. The analytic concept of “house” brought up by Professor Lévi-Strauss during the first seminar on kinship and social organization is a new suggestion he didn’t really discuss before. During the second seminar on mythology, he made some comments on the difference between myth and history, and he also raised several interesting and concrete questions concerning the future direction of Korean Studies, such as the relation between the American Indians and the Altaic populations, East Asia and Western Siberia, or a comparative study of shamanism. And now, I think it’s time to think of what we have got from this workshop.

David Eyde: Professor Kang suggested that it might useful for me to review the definition and the characteristics of the house, la maison. Professor Lévi-Strauss suggested a definition of a new kind of corporate group, a house, making reference to an article by Schmid on the European medieval “house.” The leading characteristic of this group by contrast with previous theoretical discussion is that the noble lineage within a house does not correspond to the agnatic or the patrilineal line.

The definition I got down is that it was a corporate body, holder of an estate, made up of people related by descent or affinity. Kinship and affinity are mutually substitutable. Then other subsidiary characteristics are that the estate include material and non-material wealth; the chief of the house is rich; fictitious kinship may be used to justify inclusion within the house; there is frequently a line of descent going from a man through his daughter to his grandson; a child is often referred to as the offspring of his or her mother; the group is at sometimes endogamous and at sometimes exogamous: it is exogamous in order to acquire a new wealth, it is endogamous in order to retain wealth that it already has; and finally the house is particularly likely to occur in situations where there is a contradiction between high status of wife-givers and real power of wife-takers, so that the house turns out to be a kind of compromise group which joins the two together.

Now, my question has nothing to do with what I just said, but I’d like to ask it to the Koreans present here. As I went through the National Museum, it seemed to me that, looking at the material from Silla Dynasty, before unified Silla, one could see something which was distinctly and particularly Korean with ties, if to any other area, to Siberia, and then there comes, as a wave into the culture, the influence of Buddhism, and Korea becomes culturally a part of the Buddhist Chinese world. Thus it seems to me that the famous celadons are a
part of this Chinese tradition in some respect. Then it seems to me that something quite different and distinctly Korean begins to emerge in, for example, the Punch’ong ware, and then there is a sort of a wave of Confucianism associated, I would suppose, with the beginning of the Yi Dynasty, in which, once again, there is a Chinese horizon, and then, it seems to me that arising out of the Chinese horizon in the later Yi Dynasty, you see emerging, in the ceramics especially - although I was talking to a professor of art history yesterday, whose name I have forgotten, who suggested that also in the paintings of Chong Son - there emerges a distinctly Korean style. One then walks out and one looks at modern Seoul, and one sees, well, let me call it a Los Angeles horizon, and then, it happens that the first day I was here, I walked into the thirtieth annual exhibit of Korean art at the Academy of Modern Art, and I was struck by a kind of fascination with the rhythm of repeated details which I found at the very least certainly not characteristic of what one would see at the Los Angeles City Museum, something that seemed to me very Korean and very Asian. Is it the case that underlying the overlays of Chinese horizons and European and American horizons, there is a fundamental Koreanness which resurfaces between horizons? I ask this with great diffidence since I’m sure that there are many things that I do not understand.

Kang, Shin-pyo: I think that you brought up a very important aspect in understanding Korean culture in its historical dimension. Up to Silla, there must be some Siberian tradition, then Chinese horizon, then Chinese Buddhism, and Confucianism.

David Eyde: Is there a Korean structure behind all that, which is non-Chinese and, obviously non-Western?

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: If you look at kinship structures, we can find very clearly what is different between China, Korea and Japan. Why? is the question, but the phenomenon is very clear.

Lee, Jung kee: As Dr. Kang said, the meaning of the “house” was quite surprising. I felt the concept of “house” was a kind of symbolism, and I found very striking and shocking the fact that our myth of Tan-Gun could be related to the Chinese myth of the creation of the world, I thought that was also a kind of symbolism.

Son, Bong-ho: I’d like to show the complex feeling we, Koreans, have at this moment. As a Korean student of western philosophy, I feel we still have more complex problems. The fact that we are sitting here is already western. We try to understand Korean culture in terms of western methodology in order to become truly Korean, which is a very paradoxical situation. And I don’t know whether there is any other way than this. When Korea was not much westernized, we paid little or no attention to Korean culture, but now we are more westernized and then we begin to pay attention to our heritage. And we still do not know whether we can really develop an indigenous methodology because the term “methodology” itself is already western.

Sung, Ok Ryun: (in French) Is it possible to interpret myth as infantile mentality?

Lévi-Strauss: C’est un problème qui nous emmenerait très loin parce que cela nous amenerait a discuter toute la psychologie de Piaget, qui est resté jusqu’à la fin de sa vie convaincu qu’il y avait un parallélisme entre le développement de la pensée des enfants et le développement de la pensée des peuples que nous appelons primitifs. Je crois que c’est là une idée qu’aucun anthropologue ne peut accepter. But the situation with children is that at the beginning of his use of language, a little child is able to express all the phonemes of the languages in the
world and it is only progressively that he drops those which he will never use later and limits himself to his own language. It also seems that the child’s mind has such a polymorphism that he is able to experiment with many different kinds of thought, and I have records of little children who have actually invented myths, and myths anthropologists can very well recognize and identify - for instance, inventing a society with dual organization. But that is not really a point on a scale, it is just a stage of general, I would not say confusion, but of general experimentation in each and every direction, and culture and education will narrow down the product of the child’s mind to what is actually needed or permitted in its own society.

**Cho, Hae Jung:** Our society is directed totally towards industrialization and modernization in a sense very much like westernization, because we only have that model. We actually do not have any other alternative to start with. Our biggest difference with the West may be our way of thinking. We think in terms of harmony, Yin and Yang, and westerners tend to think in terms of opposition. But when I look around and when I talk with my students, I realize that they are thinking in terms of opposition, not in terms of harmony. Does that mean that our way of thinking is changing into a new one which is very much Western, or is that our tradition? I don’t know really, and I think this is the problem we Korean scholars must think about. I was really fascinated when I read Levi-Strauss’ book *A Savage Mind* and I respected Dr. Lévi-Strauss for giving me such a new way of thinking about things. Through these sessions, I have gained a new idea, and also, after watching Dr. Eyde’s slides, I’m thinking I maybe should analyze mask drama, which is so popular in Korea now among students, and is the only means for students to express their feelings against society. And I think I can really get a fundamental message from the analysis of this mask drama.

**Lévi-Strauss:** When I visited the Folklore Museum, I was quite interested in the wealth and diversity of masks you have, and that some of these masks, at least to me, pose very striking problems. Why such and such a representation of such and such a character? I’m sure that this would be a very rich field of analysis. You may know that my last published book deals with the structural analysis of masks. And the English translation will appear next year and it could be a starting point for an exchange of ideas or hypotheses between Korean scholars and others.

**Kim, Han Gu:** I understand Levi-Strauss’ structuralism as an anthropological model which can be applied to the understanding and interpretation of various kinds of social and cultural phenomena in the context of the basic themes and premises of a given social system, a system of ideology, maybe ethos or world view. I strongly feel that structuralism is more applicable to stable and static, unchanging societies, and less applicable to unstable, dynamic and abruptly changing societies, such as for example industrial societies, or Korea today.

**Lévi-Strauss:** I’d like to point out that the structuralist outlook can be more or less expressed in terms of Kantian philosophy, that is, our problem is: Under which conditions can communication between cultures be made easier? Since structural though is so widely represented amongst completely different cultures, it is probably by starting with this common ground that we may be able to make communication easier. But that does not mean that we are imposing our western rationalism on other cultures; quite the contrary, it means that we have to change to modify profoundly our own rationalism to put it on the
same footing as other types of rational forms. Secondly, it has been said structuralism is
greater applicable to stable and unchanging societies than to more complex ones. Of course, it
is easier to work on simple material than to work on complex material, easier to work on
relatively stable material than on a material which is changing very fast. Nevertheless, I am
quite convinced that there are, even in complex and rapidly changing societies, things,
limited perhaps, but which can be and should be studied structurally. It is up to us to find
them.

Im, Kaye Soon: I think Professor Lévi-Strauss has researched and analyzed the human mind
and human development as a philosopher and as an anthropologist in various regions of the
world. I would therefore like to hear Professor Levi-Strauss’ opinion as a structural theorist.
How, and to what extent, can a developing country like Korea preserve or change traditional
values and customs in the process of industrialization and modification? I would like to see
how much you will have changed your opinion on Korea after returning from the field trip
you are going to make in Korea, and after having seen much of our country. And how could
you then suggest we modify our tradition in the process of modernization? How do you
think we can adapt to your structural theory in our society?

Lévi-Strauss: If I knew anything about your country, and that means much more than what I
know at the present time, I’m sure I would greatly change my opinion. I do not have and I
would not dare to have any opinion right now.

Cho, Ok La: Professor Lévi-Strauss’ concept of “house” strikes me, because it seems to open
up the possibility of the analysis of dynamic aspects of the structural elements. But it seems
that you limit your structuralism when you say that structuralism would not be relevant to
the analysis of the modernization process. I still believe structuralism could be applicable
more widely and I hope you will allow us to apply your structuralism to the analysis of
Korean society.

Lévi-Strauss: I quite agree with what has been said. When we introduce the concept of
“house” in social analysis, we introduce at the same time the possibility of change. Unilineal
societies are societies which change, but they are trying not to, while societies with houses
are completely oriented toward social change, because they are made up of the rivalries
between the different houses. And new houses appear, old houses disappear, and societies
enter into constant flux. Now, I would like to say that when I introduced the concept of
“house” I never thought that I was particularly doing structural work. I was trying to do
anthropology and I would be the first one to emphasize that structuralism is not the whole
of anthropology and that anthropology does not reduce and should not reduce itself to
structuralism.

Yoon, Hong Ro: It is my viewpoint that Koreans usually think in terms of three elements
rather than binary ones. This way of thinking has a variety of implications. For example, the
Tan-Gun myth can be analyzed in terms of three factors: Heaven, animals, such as tiger and
bear, and human beings. We also find in the vowels of the Korean alphabet three elements.
The vowels are formed by the combination of three elements; Heaven (.), Earth (・), and
human beings (I) - from the ancient Chinese thought or method, yin/minus and yang/plus.
According to your structural typology, binary oppositions play a very important role, but in
Korean tales, the typology consists of three elements which seem to be basic. What would
be your comment on this? The most important problem in changing between A and B is the human mind in Korea.

Lévi-Strauss: My answer to this is that we should never try to impose preconceived ideas on new material. And it is the new material which has to dictate the more appropriate ways to analyze it. And if it is more convenient in Korean though to use ternary models rather than binary ones, then, by all means, let’s work with ternary models.

Choi, Hyup: Professor Lévi-Strauss pointed out that one advantage anthropologists generally have is their ability, to some extent, to keep some distance from the cultures they study, insofar as they study cultures other than their own. As a Korean anthropologist, I study Korean culture without that advantage. Last night, several of us, Korean anthropologists, were talking about the problems we had faced doing our fieldwork here. We were so involved with individuals, mentally and emotionally, that it was extremely difficult to detach ourselves completely from the people we studied. And one of the issues Professor Scholte raised yesterday was related to this problem. Professor Lévi-Strauss and probably other French anthropologists may face the same problem when they attempt to analyze French society. So, I would like to hear more about some of your experiences. Do you have any concrete suggestions to Korean anthropologists who try to identify the nature, or ethos, or salient theme, or maybe structure, or whatever you may call it, of Korean culture?

Lévi-Strauss: It’s difficult to make suggestions to colleagues who have already done a great amount of work, and a work I’m unfortunately not acquainted with. But my recommendation would be, in a theoretical case, that you should not decide on only one approach. You should use several approaches at the same time. It is obvious that in a civilization like Korean civilization, you cannot disregard the historical dimension. So, you should start or continue working on the history of ideas. At the same time, you should also work on the more empirical level, that is, try to study the realities and the small realities of Korean life, as it happens daily in the life of the people, to write monographs on villages, monographs on fairs, on markets, and things like that. And certainly, there are other lines of approach I can’t think of right now. But it’s only if you decide to advance on several fronts simultaneously that, progressively, there will appear a connection between the problems raised by one type of study and those raised by other types of study and that, in the long run, this will make a meaningful whole.

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: With regard to kinship systems, the concept of “house” will be very useful for our future studies. But although you speak of cognatic descent, you sometimes talk of unilineal descent and the house. We need to study further the relationship between the concept of “house” and cognatic descent. Your major fields of study are kinship and mythology. You have also done some work on totemism and castes, but there are other aspects, like religion and rites de passage. Is there any reason why you didn’t analyze or deal with them in terms of structural analysis?

Lévi-Strauss: I would think I did. As a matter of fact, for about twenty years, I held a chair at the École Pratique des Hautes Études at the Sorbonne devoted to the comparative study of religions of people without writing, and all my teaching there was devoted to religious phenomena, such as rites de passage and the like.
Leek, Gwang-Gyu: You mentioned historical studies several times. What is your opinion of diffusionism when we go back to historical studies?

Lévi-Strauss: My opinion is that if diffusionism is considered as a universal key which can enable us to explain everything, it is perfectly foolish. But it is obvious that there have been contacts between cultures, that elements have been borrowed, and that in each specific case, we should first of all try to get from history everything which history may provide by way of an explanation. And it is only when history fails that we are entitled to go to other types of explanation, such as structural explanation. I tried to explain this in a very old paper which was a comparison between the art of Shang China, New Zealand and the Indians of the North West Coast. And the first question I raised was, well, there are similarities, obvious similarities, but were there historical contacts? If there were, then they are a very important part of the explanation. But if there were not, if it is unlikely, then we will have to put the question differently ourselves: Are those societies similar in some respect which may explain why, independently of any historical contact, there is some analogy between their art forms? But historical explanation and structural explanation should always go side by side.

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: This question is related to yesterday’s discussion. The Western style of thought or Western style of science is analytical and the Oriental or Eastern way of thinking or method of analysis is configurational. So, we have two different ways of thinking or methods of analysis. And your structuralism is more on the side of the Oriental way of thinking in terms of configuration. I am not sure if my understanding is correct or not. But through your presentation yesterday, I thought your approach was more like the Eastern style.

Lévi-Strauss: You are certainly right in making this distinction between the Western and the Eastern way of scientific thinking, but my personal impression, and it is shared by many fellow scientists, is that great changes are taking place in Western science and that, in Western science, analytical thought is more and more going away. This phase was perhaps necessary, historically, paradigmatically if you wish, but more and more Western science is becoming synthetic and more and more, it seems to me that Western scientists have the feeling that what Eastern scientists said in the past centuries does make sense in terms of modern science.

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: What is Professor Levi-Strauss’ opinion on the future of anthropology?

Lévi-Strauss: I would prefer to add something to what I have just said. Take, for instance, some very advanced theories of evolution, such as the neutral theory of molecular evolution which is advocated in Japan by Professor Kimura. This is accepted in the West as probably the more sensible way to look at molecular evolution. At the same time, it is deeply grounded in an Oriental outlook, which refuses to be theological, which refuses to say that everything is rational, that everything has a meaning. Because Kimura tells us that perhaps there are a lot of aspects of molecular evolution which do not mean anything, which do not serve for anything, and that we should not try to impose a meaning where there is no meaning. And this is a specific case where I feel that there is a very important rejoining of the Eastern outlook and the Western outlook in a quite modern field, biology.

David Wu: Our concern here is to exchange ideas about the ways to study Korean culture and Korean society. The function of this workshop is to facilitate the meeting of minds, just
as Professor Lévi-Strauss has suggested that anthropologists must collaborate with historians in future studies. Professor Eliot Chapple distinguishes between an interdisciplinary approach and a multidisciplinary approach. A multidisciplinary approach is done in such a way that each participant does his own work on the same topic, uses his own method, uses his own thinking. The others do not share. An interdisciplinary approach is one in which different styles are converted into one frame of reference. This, it seems to me, is more desirable, and it is what we are trying to achieve here. Here, we have poets, philosophers, historians, sociologists, psychologists, linguists and anthropologists trying to make inquiries with one frame of reference. At least, we are attempting to discover a meaning framework we can all share, we can all understand. I am referring to the structural approach that Professor Lévi-Strauss is presenting, and which people, whether they are from anthropology, or literature, or philosophy, seem to share and understand. I suggest that in our future studies, we should think about an interdisciplinary approach. One final remark is for fellow anthropologists here. Professor Lévi-Strauss has said what I wanted to say. I think one method that has held us together is ethnography, we should do good ethnography so that we can provide good data and details, so that in the future, anybody can look at our material, no matter what method they use in analysis.

Lévi-Strauss: I warmly agree.

Bob Scholte: First of all, the kindness and attentiveness of the people here, kindness and attentiveness very eloquently expressed by Lévi-Strauss last night, I simply wish to reiterate the thanks that he expressed, it has been an exceptionally fine experience. With regard to the intellectual content, I detected first of all, the very real and complex question of the crisis in the cultural identity of my Korean colleagues. I think, to some extent, this is the predicament of the anthropologist in any situation, otherwise, he or she would not be an anthropologist. It is perhaps the predicament of the intellectual in any and all situations; I do not know, that is a possibility. This conflict that has been expressed by several people here today, a conflict in part between proximity, in this case to your own culture, and the distantiation that is in part required in the case of any analysis. Thus, for example, the preoccupation of nearly all the people here is Korean culture, very specifically ethnographically.

But the question arises whether a methodology, in this case, the Western scientific methodology, is or is not relevant. Again, proximity in the one sense, alienation, if you wish, distanitation on the other. Of course, this predicament is also very concrete and is a historical predicament. I did not hear a great deal about that, except in conversations, especially with the younger anthropologists. I mean the predicament of a society like Korea, an industrialized, modern society, and the radical transformations that are taking place in it. Again, I cannot presume to speak to these dilemmas. These are your experiences, your dilemmas, that must be very real. I noticed only one instance of this, the question of the role and position of women in traditional Korean society. As you doubtless know, this is one of the most dramatic and urgent question in the West, and certainly in contemporary anthropology, so that there is a great deal of linkage, a potential linkage there.

With regard to the specific situation of the Korean anthropologists, I hope and trust that their contribution to the predicament of anthropologists in general will be great. This is a selfish interest, but a very real one. I experienced it in a very concrete way, because several
people last night expressed to me that my very preoccupation with the critique of science as I have articulated that here yesterday, is to some extent an ethnocentric concern. It is a specific Europocentric preoccupation. I think it is, but I have only understood that theoretically and I have never been confronted with somebody putting it quite explicitly the way it was done last night. Then, there is the open-endedness of the Korean situation as I understand it. The intellectual excitement of alternative possibilities. You are looking around, not only within the confines of your own resources, but perhaps toward others, others from the West, in terms of the kinds of models and sensibilities that we might be able to offer you and which you can use selectively to suit your own purposes. I think I have emphasized one part of this. Anthropology is, to some extent, perhaps, a science that could be, or at least in principle, pretends to be the science of universal aspects of human behavior. Lévi-Strauss, I think, more than any other anthropologist, has articulated that desire for the universal, not, of course, without the very concrete and specific empirical work that has often been the hallmark of his own anthropology.

Just now, he mentioned the possibility that even in the confines of science, there might be a reunification between Eastern and Western science. I have stressed another possibility; the two are not mutually exclusive. I have stressed the possibility learned from my experience of Western anthropology and its history, that anthropology is, as I said yesterday, always a metaphorical extension of your own cultural resources. That has a positive and a negative quality, the negative one within anthropology is considered to be ethnocentrism. It is an ever-present danger. Certainly, it is a danger in Western anthropology, and I would presume the danger lies also within the possibility of the Korean anthropology. But there is a positive pole; it means that knowledge is constituted, and it is constituted by the cultural resources of one’s own environment. It is only this that can make anthropology relevant.

Perhaps I could in a final conclusion paraphrase a remark of Merleau-Ponty. He made it with regard to history, but I think it applies to culture as well. He said, “Looked at superficially, history [...], for our own cultural confinement removes all possibilities of truth and insight. But looked at carefully, history permits us the very ideal of truth.” And he added: “the only truth that can have any meaning for us.” That, I think, is perhaps generally put, the dilemma that I understood here.

**Henry Lewis:** Well, as the token non-structuralist anthropologist, I would only place the role of structural analysis in the context of what I want to say. I’m talking here in terms of Korean Studies as a whole. I would like to compare them to one of the subject that has been of interest to me in my own country, and that is Canadian Studies.

If you feel that you have a problem of identity, as Koreans vis-à-vis North America and, say, Japan and China, you should be faced with the situation that Canadians are faced with. Canadian Studies, in fact, only emerged many years after all the disciplines which now participate in it and as a result, Canadian scholars have most commonly associated themselves with their disciplines, rather than in such an interdisciplinary focus. Certainly part of the problem for Canadian Studies has been the fact that a large, in fact the largest number of Canadian academics, are American trained, or in fact, like myself, are American born. That is the problem of Canadian identity. And Canadian Studies is much more difficult than the situation that faces Korean identity and Korean Studies. Though your scholars are in many cases foreign-trained, often American trained, they are almost exclusively Korean.
And the differences between yourselves and your cultural neighbors, such as Japan and China, are much more pronounced than is the case with Canada and the US. In fact, were I not to mention the fact that I was American born, most Canadians themselves would not be able to distinguish whether I was a Canadian or an America. The very fact that you have an Academy of Korean Studies is itself a great contrast with the situation in Canada. We have no such institution, and I doubt we will ever have. You have the opportunity to make Korean Studies something more than just a collection of programs and publications that have “Korean content,” as we refer to those which have “Canadian content.” We have to search our mind in such publications, to see what is Canadian about them. You have the opportunity to truly Koreanize disciplines, not just Korean Studies, but the disciplines themselves that make up Korean Studies, and not in a simple nationalistic, characteristic way, as unfortunately much of Canadian Studies have become, but you can do this in terms of formulating perspectives and research problems that are appropriate to Korean interests and Korean concerns.

Lévi-Strauss: I would like to say a word of thanks to Professor Kang who conceived this undertaking, and to all of you for your patience and benevolence. It will be also a word of hope about the future of anthropology. It is quite often said that anthropology is bound to disappear as fast as the kind of people we have been studying traditionally. This is a very ancient affair, because if I remember correctly, when the first anthropological society, it was called the Society for the Study of Man, was created in France at the turn of the 18th and the 19th century, the main reason which was given for its existence was that time was limited because the people they called primitive were disappearing very fast. And we find exactly the same preoccupation when, in about 1830, a similar society was established in England. And when Sir James Frazer, in 1908 - the year of my birth - inaugurated the first chair of social anthropology at the University of Liverpool, once again, he was saying time was getting short and that we should hurry. Now undoubtedly, things are going much faster than they were at that time. But, at the same time, we always discover that in another sense, they are not going as fast as we feel they are. And that perhaps we are working with less and less, but since we are working better and better, we are able to compensate, to some extent, for this difficulty. And there have been new fields appearing in anthropological studies which have been neglected for years and years since the birth of the discipline and which we discover can still be explored and be extremely useful. I am thinking, for instance, of the fields commonly called ethno-science, including ethno-botany, ethno-zoology and the like, which are not only important by themselves, because they give us access to a tremendous amount of knowledge about the natural world which it is the privilege of ancient societies to preserve for us, but also because all this plant life, this animal life, is closely linked to the general view of the universe, and even social organization. Even by working on such apparently modest problems, we are able to raise big questions. There is also the fact that, for years, anthropology was not bold enough to approach societies other than the so-called simple societies, but that we were able to devise approaches so fruitful that now we feel that they can be used also, perhaps only partially, but also for more complex societies.

And the fact that here, as anthropologists, we are discussing such high problems as the relationship between Korea and the Oriental world, such problems as the relationship between the East and the West, problems which up to now have been the privilege of social
scientists, historians, political scientists and philosophers, shows that anthropology has really come of age. And let me express the hope that such a fruitful meeting as the one which is now being concluded, is at the same time a proof of the truth of what I was saying, and a new progress towards both the improvement of anthropological thinking and a closer approximation between our respective civilizations.
5  Koreans in the Modern World (October 29, 1981)

Kang, Shin-pyo: Since we met last time, Professor Lévi-Strauss and our other foreign guests have had the opportunity to experience some aspects of Korean traditional culture, visiting various sites in Kyongju, Tongdo Temple, Haein Temple, and two traditional villages: Yangdong and Hahoe. Unfortunately, Professors Scholte, Lewis, and Wu had to leave before this morning’s session. This morning we should like to invite Professor Lévi-Strauss and Professor Eyde to make any final comment they care to make and to invite you to discuss them topics of interest to you. The theme of this seminar is Koreans in the modern world.

Lévi-Strauss: This last seminar comes as something of a surprise for me, because, first of all, I understood my participation would be limited to the two sessions we had on kinship and social organization on the one hand, and mythology and collective representative on the other hand, and besides, it comes so soon after our return from a fantastic trip, which was so diversified, so rich in impressions that I feel somewhat in a turmoil and my ideas are not yet in place. And for those two reasons, I am especially grateful to Professor Eyde for sharing the bread with me, if I may put it that way, of this last session. Yesterday, President Koh, Professor Kang, and I had a very interesting meeting with the press, and one of the journalists who were there raised what appeared to me to be a very sound question. He asked why somebody who did most of his fieldwork long ago, amongst Brazilian tribes, which do not have any writing, and a very low level of economic and social organization should get interested in Korea, and what could he get from a comparison between societies which are so utterly different. What I tried to explain is that, of course, it is not the ethnographer specializing in so-called primitive tribes who may, first of all, benefit from his Korean experience, because in my opinion, nothing could be more harmful and useless than to try to apply to an old culture and a literate one the same kind of approach we use when we visit primitive tribes. And I must confess I have very often been horrified at seeing young anthropologists barging into a village belonging to a society of which they were blissfully ignorant and who sometimes had even received from their masters the advice that they should not read anything before going in the fields, in order not to destroy the freshness of their approach. That seems to me to be exactly the opposite of sensible anthropological research. And what is important for me in the kind of experience I just went through, is not at all a foolish attempt to put on the same level societies without writing and primitive tribes and very sophisticated societies, like yours.

What is important for me is to find out how we may cooperate with you in the study of your society, and also in the study of our own Western societies. Because those societies are more or less approximately on the same level; they belong, grossly speaking, to the same type. And my first impression - I would not dare to say, so soon, a conclusion - my first impression was that our respective approaches could very well be complementary and be of great help to each other. On the one hand, what we saw during this trip was types of social
organization, village layouts still in existence and still to some extent alive, for which we can find comparisons in the past of our own societies. When living in the houses, wonderful houses from an aesthetic point of view, of this rural aristocracy whom you call Yangban, I was reminded of what I have read in the literature about, for instance, the English squire, or in France, the very incipient feudal societies. And it was also a very rich experience for us to visit monasteries which are at the same time big landowners, such as may have existed during past centuries in our own societies. So, to a very large extent, you are, not only for yourselves but for the scientific community at large, a conservatory of forms of social life and social organization which have existed elsewhere in the world, but which can still be studied much more closely and carefully amongst you than is possible elsewhere. But I said the approaches were complementary, because on our side we have developed very modern techniques of studying village organization. I noticed during this trip that ten years was probably a kind of invariant for the time necessary to fully study a village. I met two Korean colleagues who have told me they have spent ten years, one in Yangdong, and the other in Hahoe, and we also have spent ten years, more or less, in the study of French villages. So there already seems to be a consensus between us on the time perspective.

Of course, the work done by our Korean colleagues has been written and published in Korean, and I could only get some very superficial idea of what they have been doing by looking at the English summaries which sometimes appear at the end of their books. And while their research appears quite sound, my feeling was that, perhaps after the first steps they have taken (and which were the necessary steps, I am not going to criticize them, that is exactly how we should begin), it would be possible to use the more elaborate investigation techniques which we have been using in Western Europe recently. I mean, to consider that a social group which can be studied to a genealogical depth of ten, fifteen, sixteen, and sometimes even more generations, where we know for a period of several centuries exactly who married whom, who are the children that issued from the different types of marriage, either with a legitimate wife, or a concubine and the like, I think this is a privileged position from which to consider this whole system, both diachronic and synchronic, as a finite corpus of data which can be exhaustively analyzed. This is a very rare situation in the social sciences, where we usually have to satisfy ourselves with samples and extrapolate from the samples to the wider society. In your case, at least in some of your cases, we can do much more, and do a much more modern type of anthropological research. And if I were to advocate the first kind of concrete cooperation between French anthropologists and Korean anthropologists, I would suggest that some of your anthropologists specializing in rural studies come to France to work with us, and that some of our French anthropologists who are fully conversant with this exhaustive analysis of a finite corpus (which requires the use of a computer, that is absolutely necessary, because the amount of data very soon appears so big that it can not be handled with traditional means) come to work with you. This would produce immediate and very important results. I was also deeply impressed with the role that historians and archaeologists can play in cooperation with your own specialists. One of the stronger impressions I had during this trip was the time we spent in the big plain around Kyongju, which is literally filled with remnants of the great Silla Dynasty. I never suspected that in this part of the world such a density, such a richness of evidence of past culture could be found, and of a culture much higher than I suspected, and one which raises questions of tremendous interest. Let me say, in passing, that when I saw the golden crown, which as
Professor Lee, Du-hyun pointed out in his very interesting paper, was probably made of antlers and not of gold, I was immediately reminded, for instance, of those strange wooden Chinese sculptures of the Chou Dynasty where we also have figures crowned with antlers and with a protruding tongue. I do not know if the protruding tongue is also an element which can be found among you. But the fact that this Silla civilization shows such an original blending of influences from different parts of the world, undoubtedly from China, but also from Siberia, and perhaps also to some extent from the South Seas, makes Korea a unique spot for the meeting of West and East. What we are willing to do together, that is to bring East and West together through Korea, and with the help of Korea, seems to me to renew something which took place centuries ago, when closer relationships between East and West probably did exist in Korea than elsewhere in the world. Perhaps not only between East and West, perhaps also between the Old World and the New World, because I have been deeply impressed by the similarity of several mythological themes in this part of the world and in North America. For instance, the supernatural cultural hero born from an egg, which is an extremely widespread motif in the mountains of Peru, or the vision that is common in China, but I understand in Korea too, of a time when there were ten suns and ten moons, and it was necessary to destroy them to create more livable conditions for mankind. This is also a motif which is widely represented not in South America, but in the northern part of North America. We know from the recent genetic and seric analysis of blood by Dr. Neill in the United States, for instance, that the first immigrants in the New World, perhaps 70,000 years ago, were Caucasoids, very close to the Cro-Magnon man of Western Europe, which later became amalgamated with Mongoloid people, and if this took place in America, it obviously must have taken place too in the Eastern part of Asia. And so we have a problem which we should study together.

I’ll make a few more observations. Thanks to Dr. Lee, Du-hyun, we were able to witness two shamanistic presentations, which interested me a great deal, for two reasons. The first one, I must confess, is that I did not recognize shamanism in the traditional sense of the term. I have seen many shamanistic seances in my life, but here I could see no trance, no possession by a god, no trip to the other world. Perhaps it exists, and we did not see it. But what I saw was of tremendous interest for me, not from a religious but from a sociological point of view. Because it seems to me that shamanism is a way for a woman to exert power over a society of women. And that men are only able to enter this kind of relationship by impersonating women themselves. And this seems to me to be of great interest. We visited villages which were Confucian, and also temples which were Buddhist. With regard to Confucianism, both from the visit to the Confucian University in Seoul, which we did before our trip, and from the visit a to a Confucian school in a remote part of the country, we got an idea of the way a very high type of learning was diffused through out the rural parts of the society. Probably the gap which existed in Western Europe between illiterate people and those who had knowledge did not exist amongst you because there was a much closer approximation between the two. And when we visited the Buddhist temples, Tongdo Temple and Haein Temple (of course, not mentioning the fantastic sight of the 80,000 engraved wooden blocks which are probably one of the great achievements of mankind), I was also interested in comparing what I could see of Korean Buddhism with what I saw of Buddhism in Japan. Buddhism is much more mystical here, I would say, while in Japan an element of, let’s say, business organization seems very prominent in the Buddhist system.
And the fact that probably Buddhism was better preserved in its pristine state in your country than either in China or in Japan is also something of great interest to the historians of religion.

Just a word of conclusion. Generally speaking, Korea impresses me as being in a state of turmoil; of going very fast towards industrialization and modernization, while, at the same time, feeling the need to maintain a traditional spirit, which, as a matter of fact, has succeeded in persisting despite the succession of tremendous ordeals Korea has gone through, with the wars between the first kingdoms, the Chinese invasion, the Mongol invasion, and more recent events which are still before our eyes. But at the same time, and this will be a word not of criticism but of regret, it seems to me the attempt that you are making, successfully and rightly, to reinforce an awareness of tradition, to build up a sense of belonging or to maintain it, applies only, if I may say so, to the higher spheres of spiritual, social or political life. Very little attention is given to the humbler aspects, such as keeping alive traditional handicrafts. When visiting markets or villages, my impression was that Korean handicrafts had practically disappeared, or are on the verge of disappearing. And when talking to people, I had the impression that they were very little interested in their natural surroundings, that the names of flowers, of trees, interested them very little. And this can be very dangerous, because a sense of belonging is not only the sense of belonging to a group of humans, to a society, it is also a sense of belonging to a natural surrounding, and the practice of handicrafts, that is the daily contact, the daily struggle with the material elements which belong to one’s environment, is also a way of building up, of maintaining, this sense of belonging.

And if, in closing this short address, I had a wish to express, it would be that the Korean authorities and the Academy of Korean Studies would not forget that man does not exist only in books, but in relationship with nature and with age-old traditional ways of doing things, which are valuable in themselves, and which may prove extremely valuable in the world we live in, where we are subject to unexpected upheavals. In finishing, I would like to thank again the Academy of Korean Studies, and also to note the fact that the recently created Institute of Korean studies in Paris is not isolated, but is a branch of the Collège de France, the institution to which I myself belong. And it is fitting that a print representing the Collège de France should remain here as the symbol of this incipient cooperation between our two institutions. And so I’m presenting Koh, Byong-ik and the Academy with an old view of the Collège de France as it still exists. You will see that it was called Collège Imperial, because it dates from Napoleon I, and the name was changed after the disappearance of Napoleon. It’s a print which probably dates from 1810 or 1812.

Lee, Gwang-Gyu: As native anthropologists, we suffer from a kind of ethnocentrism when dealing with ourselves. That is a little different from the traditional anthropologist when he does field research on other people and other cultures. How shall we avoid this kind of ethnocentrism in our future studies? And again, as you mentioned, we have been undergoing very rapid changes, especially for the past one or two decades. We try our best to preserve our traditions, but sometimes I am confused myself between keeping tradition and making changes. Especially when we do field work, we are asked about these things and we cannot give clear answers. How would you answer such questions? That is a kind of anthropological moral problem.
Lévi-Strauss: I don’t think the first question is a special problem for the native anthropologist; it’s a problem for anthropologists at large. I always remember that Robert Lowie, who was a great anthropologist, told me that he felt quite at ease and quite happy with the Crow Indians, but that he was never so comfortable with Hopi Indians. And I asked him why, and he said that if a Crow Indian is cheated by his wife, he just cuts off her nose, and this appeared to him quite sound, while a Hopi Indian will start praying that the rain will cease and the whole community will suffer from drought, which struck him as profoundly odd. So we are always ethnocentric, and the best we can do is to be conscious at every moment that we are ethnocentric and that we cannot avoid being ethnocentric, and to make a kind of critical study of our ethnocentrism while we are in the field.

It is much more difficult to answer your second question. You know, we in France are in exactly the same situation, and it is very problematic for anthropologists to try to impose traditional ways of life on people, since that would be an obstacle to change. What we can do, of course, and what we should do, is to record everything which can be recorded before it disappears. And when advice is sought from us, we can say that this is a matter of balance, equilibrium, good sense - but it is impossible to state a rule.

Koh, Byong-ik: When Professor Lévi-Strauss and I had dinner in a downtown hotel a few days ago, you mentioned that if you were asked to pick out two dates in modern history you would name, first, the discovery of America, and second, the opening of the Asian mind.

Lévi-Strauss: I could even say the discovery of the Far East by America.

Koh, Byong-ik: Was this opinion ever published in one of your articles or books? After your discussion with Korean scholars, your stay in Korea, and after making a trip of several days in the countryside, would you still confirm your statement, or argument, or lessen it?

Lévi-Strauss: I would still confirm it. If I may be allowed to explain, the first great date in modern history was the discovery of America, because it was the discovery of an immense continent with tremendous wealth, mineral, vegetable and the like. And to a large extent, the lead which still belongs to the American continent is due to the fact that it is a land where material wealth remained practically intact until a few centuries ago. And there is a strange parallelism with the Far East, because, with the compulsory opening, if I may say so, of the Far East, well first in Japan and later on everywhere, a part of mankind which was still intact was thrown into the international world. And there is something even paradoxical in the fact that this second opening was made by Americans, who very soon discovered that it constituted a frame for their previous pre-eminences.

Koh, Byong-ik: I can not quite agree with you when you say that Asia was opened by America, since the major part of the Asian continent had first contacts with Great Britain and was actually opened by the British. You say that Asia was still intact, but it was perhaps intact only to the European mind, because the Asians had their own international contacts between themselves. Therefore, they would perhaps have thought that Europe and America were intact to them!

Lévi-Strauss: You are perfectly right. What I mean is that the industrial technological world, could avail itself of what I would almost call a virgin humanity, the Far East, which was still fully available, and which can be understood partly in relation to a Japanese concept called shingaku, that is, a kind of exercise of the heart and the spirit, the way thanks to which
individual desires are abolished so that each individual succeeds in uniting himself or herself to both Heaven and Earth. This is the formal expression of a living reality, of a humanity, or rather a human material which accedes to national life and international life, still being completely available.

**David Eyde:** I really did learn a great deal from this experience, which is one of the most memorable of my lifetime. I am feverishly sorting it out. But I think I won’t try to discuss it in the time remaining. Let me instead toss out some ideas about the relationship between modernization or industrialization, the West and the East, not conclusions, but puzzles to think about. Let me start this way. One of my standard favorite jokes in the United States is that I’m a Californian, and Californians in a very special sense can’t go home again, because there’s a supermarket there now. And that joke works very well in the United States, because California is the place that has changed the most. But, of course, I can’t use that joke in Korea because you can’t go home again either, because there is a supermarket there now. And there is something I think is not trivial which needs to be said; it is that it’s not only Asia, but it is also the West, that is in the grip of something that is historically new, that the entire world is in a grip of a complex of a new set of institutions and customs which has transformed Europe and America, and certainly is transforming Asia. What I earlier called the Los Angeles horizon in Seoul is not traditional Western culture, it is rather something that was produced out of traditional Western culture, but it is something to my mind like a mutation, a transformation in world history. There are people who have devoted their lives to thinking about this matter and I am not one of them, but it seems to me that this complex has three legs. One is science, in the sense of the of Western science; two, industrialization; and three, the supply and demand market, in which everything, including land and labor, is for sale according to a price determined by supply and demand.

None of these existed in any clear form, say, three hundred years ago, in European or American society. Let me depart for a moment to a footnote to make clear what it is that I want to say. I live in the southwestern part of the United States, in El Paso, Texas, and we actually do have cowboys, everyone can see them. What is interesting about the North American cowboy is that the whole complex of customs and institutions that go with being a cowboy, in fact, spread from Mexico, and, in fact, historically, perhaps from Spain and with Moorish influence. What is interesting about the cowboy complex in Anglo-America is that along with the essential aspects of the several institutions that go with breeding cattle, there came a lot of incidental things that did not need to come, but which, nevertheless, were part of the complex. For example, linguistically a cowboy is often referred to as a buckaroo, and buckaroo is a mispronunciation of the Spanish term vaquero. With the essential parts of the cattle complex came a whole bunch of unessential parts, which nevertheless became an integral part of the cowboy complex in the Southern United States. I want to suggest that in the spread of a supply and demand industrialism, there are a lot of things which are not essential, which have spread with the complex - to take a trite example, Coca-Cola. You have been subjected to a wave of influence, some of which is essential to the institutions of urban industrialization, and others which are simply being carried along with the tide. There is a question in my mind, I do not quite know how to say this. I suppose that I could look at Seoul and say: “Look at the triumph of Americanization that is going on”, and feel something like pride, something like a warm glow of imperialism. On the other hand, I know that the end result of the kind of supply and demand market individualism that is characteristic of this
new complex, in the West anyway, has not been Seoul; it has been New York City, or many of the other cities of America characterized by a sense of desolation and isolation, and alienation. The rot at the center of American society is very scary. It has not happened to you yet, I don’t think. And I wonder, I don’t have any answer for this, I wonder whether it can be avoided.

Professor Lewis was commenting to me when he was here, that Asia - in Taiwan, in Japan, in Korea - has found a way to create industrialization without alienation, in the form of a fictitious kinship base for corporate organization. I hope he is right. I hope that it is possible to have urban industrialization without the destruction of sensations of group solidarity and meaningfulness. I wonder if, in the final analysis, the logic of supply and demand marketing of individual skills is not ultimately destructive of all primary human relationships. I wonder if the complex that grasps us all does not ultimately lead to New York City. I do not have the answer to that question.

Let me go back and conclude on a more positive note. I said in one of the last sessions that we had that, when I went through the museums and read Korean history, it seemed to me that Korea had gone through waves of foreign influence. Let us start with the Silla Dynasty with a distinctly Korean character, then a wave of Chinese influence in which Koreanness almost disappears, only to reappear, then a wave of Confucianism in which Koreanness almost disappears, only to reappear, and as I said when I asked my question, now there is the Los Angeles horizon, in which Koreanness in downtown Seoul has all but disappeared. It is my fervent hope that Koreanness will once again reappear in a new form out of that horizon.

I hope that Asia comes up with a solution to the problem of how to live with the free market and industrialization without the destruction of interpersonal relationships and the destruction of meaning. And I think, there, I will stop except to say that this last month has really been one of the greatest experiences in my life. I have the deepest appreciation to Professor Kang, to the Academy, to President Koh, to you all, and I think I must single out Professor Lee, Gwang-Gyu, and Professor Chu, Nam-chul, who is not here today, who went through our whole trip with us. I was very fortunate that my native informants all had PhDs. It has been a wonderful experience.

Im, Kaye Soon: You just told us that corporatism might preserve our traditional kinship organization in the midst of modernization, but in Latin American society, corporatism, in fact, hurts democratic society in many ways. So, would you please elaborate more on how we apply corporatism to our kinship organization?

David Eyde: Let me first agree with you. When I look at the urban industrial supply and demand market complex, it seems to me, as I say to my classes, that one aspect of the logic of our system is that it does not really matter whether you have two heads and purple skin. If you know how to program the computer, they will hire you. And therefore, the free market, the supply and demand market in labor, ultimately has a kind of democratizing effect, at least in the sense that there are more flexibility and upward and downward mobility. I also say to my students that the other side of this coin is that this new thing which is upon us is the first system of production in history in which neither the family nor a larger kinship group is the unit of production, nor even necessarily of consumption. If you look at divorce rates in the United States, which among the younger people now hover around fifty
percent, you can see what happens to a society in which, for example, husband and wife really do not need one another economically. So I would argue, and others have argued, that the supply and demand market is really incredibly destructive to kinship relationships or has been in the West. On the other hand (mind you, we have been looking at traditional Korea more than modern Korea), if we take a look at things like the Oyabun-Kobun relationship in Japan, we find a fictitious kinship kind of organization which seeks to replace the extended kin group and provide the individual with a sense of meaning in a society which has been lost in the West, and which appears to solve the problem which has not been solved in the Western system. However, there is a final question. Let us take Japan, for example. As you are all aware, Japan has very, very high levels of protectionism, to protect its system of production from the direct, open free competition with the outside world. Can the Japanese system really survive over the long run in the competition in the supply and demand market? What do the Japanese do with really terrible workers? Apparently, they do not fire them. What do they do with them? If they go on supporting them, doesn’t that lower productivity? What I am suggesting then is that maybe Oyabun-Kobun kinds of an organization ultimately are less efficient in terms of the logic of the market than firing people when they are no longer any good. And therefore, maybe the fictitious kinship corporation is not a solution. I hope that isn’t so. I hope that it is a solution, but I’m raising a question.

**Lee, Gwang-Gyu:** You just mentioned the problem of our industrialization. We feel that industrialization should be based on individualism, and this is based on personal achievement. But in our tradition, we have a kind of group solidarity, and this sometimes has a totally different effect from modernization; it leads to a kind of nepotism. The problem nowadays in Korea is not individualism, but nepotism. How can we solve this problem?

You mentioned the fictive kinship Oyabun-Kobun in Japan, but in Japanese kinship, they already had about 300 years of experience of having achieved status in family life in the Tokugawa period, and this has been the driving force of modernization in Japan. But in that sense, we have a totally different tradition. We have no fictive kinship at all, and we have really very strong blood relationships or nepotism, and this is our main problem in modernization. How far should we achieve modernization? How far should we preserve our tradition? You should not compare Korea and Japan in that sense. Because in that sense, we have very different basic structures. In Korea, we have a version of dependency theory that originated in South America. This theory is very popular nowadays. What is your opinion as an anthropologist?

**David Eyde:** I would comment only on this, and this is not an answer. The evidence that the masses of the Third World want consumer goods, I think, is very strong, and also that no solution which attempts to deny consumer goods to the masses can really be a solution over the long run. How you get consumer goods to the masses without in some way getting into a dependency relationship, I do not know. I know this is not a whole answer, but do you see what I mean?

I think, if one takes a look at the socialist nations which have attempted to cut themselves off from the world market, one finds that there is a rampant black market in precisely the consumer goods that they are trying to get rid of. My hunch is that you cannot solve the problem by trying to keep the urban industrial complex out.
I guess there is one other thing I would like to say. I’ve argued this with Mexican friends often, and it goes back to what I said earlier. This is not my traditional culture, either. We are in the grip of something new for better or for worse, and I see both sides; I really like color television sets. We are dealing with new forms of social organization, the transnational corporations which are coming to dominate the whole world. In the United States, we used to think that the transnationals belonged to us, and then the oil got turned off, and we discovered that the transnationals did not belong to us either. Rather, the transnationals really are transnationals. The world has to figure out ways to live with the transnationals. That’s all that I can say.

Unidentified: I think that the question was more directed to concepts of dependency. In particular, in the case of both Korea and Mexico, I think that the color television and other things to a large extent have hardly hit the villages, and so I think that the question for the future is how and in what ways traditional culture can be preserved within the villages and, on a larger level, how Korea as a nation can maintain its contacts with the outside in economic terms and still preserve a very historical cultural tradition. You centered most of your points on Seoul, the urban aspects of society, and I think that is very influential throughout Korea right now. I think that it will be very beneficial for everyone to consider a sort of cross-comparison between different cities and understanding how different larger cities are being affected right now, how smaller villages are being affected, and really start to examine ways in which change can be implemented, changes can be understood and directed for the future. Because I think Seoul has the potential to change, but at this point, things are changing in the direction of Seoul rather than a sort of crosschange pattern. I think if we can focus on dependency, on relationships with the outside, on culture within Korea, and issues which are deeper than just consumerism and …

David Eyde: Your question summarizes the problems very nicely. And I don’t have any answer to the questions that you raise. I talked about consumer goods, not because I misunderstand the question, but because I wanted to suggest one solution that I thought wouldn’t work. I do not know what one does about dependency, except to recognize that over time with successful “development,” dependency tends to resolve itself. You said something that’s very interesting, that is, it’s quite clear that the urban industrial marketing complex “takes” in urban areas very well; the similarities between Seoul and smaller Korean cities and Third World Cities in, for example, Mexico, is remarkable. There is a certain fundamental similarity between Merida and Kyongju, which has nothing to do with traditional cultures, but rather has to do with the impact of industrialization upon a Third World nation, on an industrializing Third World nation. There is a real question, I think. We know the urban industrial complex can “take” in urban areas, but can it “take” in rural areas? How far can it go? Or are we heading for a world in which the cities are all going to be alike, and the peasant, rural areas are going to be radically different from the cities? If so, there will be one worldwide urban culture and a number of localized little traditions in each nation. Maybe that is the way we are going. The other question is, of course, is there not a limit to the potential for growth of the urban industrial complex? Obviously, if we run out of coal and oil, we can stop talking about dependency.

A Student: Just one thing very briefly: Did you identify any very positive features during your stay, which could be food or material for the future? Things traditional or modern, which seem to be very positive in the light of research or general development for Korea?
David Eyde: For my money, traditional Korean culture is enormously aesthetically pleasing, and I would not change any of it or hardly any of it. Even to live it, I think I would like a little bit of foam rubber padding for sleeping on the floor and a few other things, but fundamentally, it is a beautiful thing. The question that has to be asked is how much of it can be saved. Remember, I am an anthropologist; if I did not have this feeling about cultures other than my own, I would not be an anthropologist. To my thinking, there is something enormously beautiful about traditional Korean culture, but I think if you ask a man, not on the street, but on the road in Yangdong, if he wants a motor scooter, his answer is likely to be “yes,” and hence my reference to consumer goods. Because as soon as he gets the motor scooter, and the transistor radio, other things follow. Even Yangdong is already very well beyond, not motor scooters, but transistor radios anyway. So the question is not what is valuable; the question is what can be saved. I fervently pray that urban industrialization can be digested by Korean culture and by other cultures and that cultural diversity will continue to exist in the world. Cultural diversity, as Professor Lévi-Strauss said, is our protection against disaster. Because if the world ends up with a single uniform culture, and if that culture does not work, we are all the terrible trouble. Diversity is our security, and what is going on in this part of the 20th century is, at a staggering and tragic pace, the eradication of cultural differences. Let us hope it is temporary.

Kang, Shin-pyo: This morning, Professor Lévi-Strauss and Dr. Eyde concluded that Korea was now facing great transformations and that one view of these transformations was possibly quite optimistic, and the other very pessimistic. They suggested to us certain things that could be done for future development not only of Korean Studies but of Korean culture and society in the modern world.

Koh, Byong-ik: As a short closing remark, I have no other words than my deep admiration for the enthusiasm and sincerity of Professor Lévi-Strauss in his search for the nature of human beings, through his anthropological and sociological approach here in Korea. During the last two weeks and more of seminars and observations in the countryside, Professor Lévi-Strauss displayed not only his deep and profound knowledge and understanding to the participating scholars but also showed us a model for a very thoughtful and enduring scholarly approach to the things of our world. He almost reminds us of our traditional scholars in Confucian times, who did studies in their field throughout their lives. His sincere, enthusiastic, and even humble attitude impressed me so much, I must say, that I cannot find suitable words for my appreciation. And I also have an admiration for all those participants from universities and from other academic circles who must be very busy now at the height of the semester, and who gave us part of their time for discussions and also for the field trip to the countryside.

I am convinced that this meeting, sponsored by the Academy of Korean Studies, has been a very valuable occasion for our anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, and philosophers in Korea to get in closer touch with world scholarship through Professor Lévi-Strauss. We have benefited not only from the discussions, but also from the stimulus we got from these discussions, and we will no doubt be pushing ahead with more vigor than before this meeting. And we hope that we don’t stop at this meeting, but continue to strive to do more meaningful research on our society, and also through closer cooperation with scholars from around the world.
Let me again express my deep gratitude to Professor Lévi-Strauss, and in no less measure to Mrs. Lévi-Strauss, who helped Professor Lévi-Strauss in every way, and to the participants from abroad, to Dr. Eyde, who is here, but also to those who have left earlier and to all the participants from Korea. Thank you very much.

**Kang, Shin-pyo**: Thank you, Professor Lévi-Strauss, for your patience, thank you President Koh, for your support, and thank you, all of you, for your participation.
6. Appendix 1 – List of Participants

Byun, Kyu-yong (Philosophy, Keimyung University)
Cho, Dong-il (Korean Language and Literature, Academy of Korean Studies)
Cho, Hae Jung (Anthropology, Yonsei University)
Cho, Ok-La (Anthropology, Sogang University)
Choi, Hy-La (Anthropology, Chonnam National University)
Choi, Jai Seuk (Sociology, Korea University)
Choi, Seung Un (French Language and Literature, Seoul National University)
Choi, Shin-duk (Sociology, Ewha Women's University)
Chung, Ja Hwan (Anthropology, Sacred Heart Women's University)
Eyde, David B. (Anthropology, University of Texas, El Paso)
Han, Hyeong Kon (Italian Language and Culture, Hanyang University)
Huang Sung-mo (Sociology, Academy of Korean Studies)
Huh, Moon-Kang (French Language and Literature, Korea University)
Hwang, Juck-ryoon (Linguistics, Seoul National University)
Hyun, Theresa (French Language and Culture, Hanyang University)
Im, Dong Cheol (Eastern Philosophy, Academy of Korean Studies)
Im, Kaye Soon (Eastern History, Academy of Korean Studies)
Jeong, Chai-Sik (Sociology, Yonsei University)
Jung, Byungwan (Art History, Ewha Women's University)
Jung, Kee-Don (Eastern History, Academy of Korean Studies)
Kang, Shin-pyo (Anthropology, Academy of Korean Studies)
Kim, Chie Sou (French Language and Literature, Ewha Women's University)
Kim, Han Gu (Anthropology, Jeju National University)
Kim, Han-cho (Sociology, Academy of Korean Studies)
Kim, Han-Shik (Political Science, Academy of Korean Studies)
Kim, Hyung-hyo (Philosophy, Academy of Korean Studies)
Kim, Jong Hae (Neuropsychiatrics, Seoul National University)
Kim, Kwang Ok (Anthropology, Seoul National University)
Kim, Soo-Gon (Linguistics, Chonbuk National University)
Kim, Yer-su (Philosophy, Seoul National University)
Kim, Yol-kyu (Korean Language and Literature, Sogang University)
Kim, Yung Chan (Anthropology of Education, Academy of Korean Studies) [김영찬]
Koh, Byong-ik (Eastern History, Academy of Korean Studies) [고병익]
Lee, Chungmin (Linguistics, Seoul National University) [이정민]
Lee, Du Hyun (Korean Philology and Folklore, Seoul National University) [이두현]
Lee, Gwang-Gyu (Anthropology, Seoul National University) [이광규]
Lee, Hyeong-Koo (History, Academy of Korean Studies) [이형구]
Lee, Hyunbok (Linguistics, Seoul National University) [이현복]
Lee, In Ho (Western History, Seoul National University) [이인호]
Lee, Jung Kee (English Language and Literature, Kookmin University) [이정기]
Lee, Kiyong (Linguistics, Chungang University) [이기용]
Lee, Kwang Joo (Western History, Chungnam National University) [이광주]
Lee, Mun Woong (Anthropology, Seoul National University) [이문웅]
Lee, Myung-Hyun (Philosophy, Seoul National University) [이명현]
Lee, Song Mu (Korean History, Academy of Korean Studies) [이성무]
Lee, Taik Whi (Political Science, Academy of Korean Studies) [이택휘]
Lewis, Henry H. (Anthropology, University of Alberta) [박병호]
Park, Byong Ho (Legal History, Academy of Korean Studies) [박병호]
Park, Jae-Mun (Pedagogy, Academy of Korean Studies) [박재문]
Park, Kyong-hwa (Philosophy, Academy of Korean Studies) [박경화]
Park, Ynhui (Philosophy, Simmons College) [박이문]
Scholte, Bob (Anthropology, University of Amsterdam) [손봉호]
Son, Bong-ho (Philosophy, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) [손봉호]
Son, Wou Sung (French Language and Literature, Sungkyunkwan University) [손우성]
Sung, Ok Ryun (Education, Sookmyung Women's University) [성옥련]
Wu, David Y.H. (Anthropology, The East-West Center) [임석재]
Yim, Suk-jay (Folklore, Seoul National University) [유종호]
Yu, Jong Ho (English Language and Literature, Ewha Women's University) [유준영]
Yu, Joon Young (Art History and Folklore, Academy of Korean Studies) [윤준영]
Yun, Hong Ro (Korean Language and Literature, Dankook University) [윤홍로]
7. Appendix 2 - Photos

Figure 1 Claude Lévi-Strauss
Figure 2 Claude Lévi-Strauss sketching a cat during the visit to Kiln Site near Tongdosa Buddhist temple

Figure 3 Seminar Participants at the Academy of Korean Studies
Figure 4 Seminar *Kinship and Social Organization* (October 14, 1981)

Figure 5 Seminar *Kinship and Social Organization* (October 14, 1981)
Figure 6 Claude Lévi-Strauss commenting on the structuralist elements in Ancient Chinese Philosophy
Figure 7 Claude Lévi-Strauss having conversations with Koh Byong-ik (President, Academy of Korean Studies) and other scholars of Korean Studies

Figure 8 at National Museum of Korea
Figure 9 Claude Lévi-Strauss with his wife at Sungkyunkwan University
Figure 10 Claude Lévi-Strauss with his wife at Sungkyunkwan University

Figure 11 Cattle (Cow) Market in Weolseong
Figure 12 Observing Bargains and Cash-Counting in the Market
Figure 13 At Tongdosa Temple
Figure 14 Pyeogan (Monk of Tongdosa Temple) with Claude Lévi-Strauss
Figure 15 Claude Lévi-Strauss Greeting the Abbot of Tongdosa with his palms together
Figure 16 Visiting Yangdong traditional Yangban Village in Weolseong. Claude Lévi-Strauss with Son Dong-man, the primogeniture descendant of the Weolseong Sons at Seobaektang (Son Family Residence). Claude Lévi-Strauss was accommodated here for two days.
Figure 17 Guest Room in *Mucheomdang* traditional Yangban Residence
Figure 18 At Hahoe Village, Observing traditional Hanok (Korean House)
Figure 19 at Main Hall of Haeinsa Temple
# 8 Appendix 3 – Itinerary of Claude Lévi-Strauss

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-Oct-81</td>
<td>Arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Oct-81</td>
<td>Visit to <em>Yongin Minsokchon</em> (Folk Village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Oct-81</td>
<td>Visits to Sungkyunkwan University, National Museum of Korea, and Kyeongbokgung Palace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Oct-81</td>
<td>Seminar &quot;Kinship and Social Organization&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Oct-81</td>
<td>Seminar &quot;Mythology and Collective Representation&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Oct-81</td>
<td>Seminar &quot;East–West Comparative Studies&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Oct-81</td>
<td>Seminar &quot;Open Topics and Free Discussion&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Oct-81</td>
<td>Fieldtrip in Seoul (Changdukgung Palace and Biwon Secret Garden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-Oct-81</td>
<td>Visits to Guksadang Shrine (for Korean Shamanic Practice) and Korea House (for Traditional Performing Arts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Oct-81</td>
<td>Fieldtrip to South Korean Countryside (Visit to Gyeongjoo National Museum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Oct-81</td>
<td>Fieldtrip to Kyeongjoo, and Weolseong Cattle Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Oct-81</td>
<td>Attending Buddhist Ceremony at Tongdosa Temple Meeting with Kyeongdeok of Tongdosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Oct-81</td>
<td>Fieldtrip to traditional Villages, Markets, and Kiln Sites nearby Tongdosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-Oct-81</td>
<td>Fieldtrip to Yandong Traditional Yangban Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Oct-81</td>
<td>Fieldtrip to Villages nearby Yangdong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visit to Oksan Seowon Confucian Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Oct-81</td>
<td>Visit to Haeinsa Temple (Depositories for the Tripitaka Koreana Woodblocks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fieldtrip to Andong Traditional Yangban Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Oct-81</td>
<td>From Andong to Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Oct-81</td>
<td>Fieldwork at Cheonggyecheon–7–ga Antique Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-Oct-81</td>
<td>Seminar &quot;Koreans in the Modern World&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visit to Noryangjin Fish Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q&amp;A Session at the Monthly Conference of Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Oct-81</td>
<td>Departure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4 - Comments and Afterword

by non-Korean Participants

9–1 Some Thoughts on Korean Social and Symbolic Space

David B. Eyde

The following report is the result of three and one half weeks of research and discussion in museums, with Korean scholars, and in the field at various places in Gyeongju and at Tongdo–sa, Haen–sa, Yangdong, and Hahoe. This work, as well as my entire trip to Korea, was entirely and generously supported by the Academy of Korean Studies as part of its “Workshop on Anthropology and Korean Studies with Professor Levi–Strauss” and its research project “Symbol and Society in Traditional Korea.” Both the workshop and the research project were developed and led by Professor Kang, Shin–pyo, Chairman of the Department of Socio–Cultural Research at the Academy. My deepest thanks go to the Academy, it’s gracious President Koh, Byong–ik, and to Professor Kang, for what has been one of the most interesting, and pleasant experiences of a lifetime.

I do not know how to read Korean and have little background in the study of any Asian cultures. Three and a half weeks is far too short a time in which to learn even the rudiments of a culture using only traditional anthropological techniques of participant observation. To compensate, I have shamelessly picked the brains of fellow participants in the workshop and the research project. Most of my “native informants” have had Ph. D. s. They have all been generously cooperative. There is no room for me to acknowledge them all by name, but certainly I must mention Professors Kwon, Yi–gu and Yeo, Jung–chul, both of the Department of Anthropology at Yeung–nam University, who came with us to Yangdong and shared their knowledge of that village with us, and Professor Kim, Taik–kyu, also of the Department of Anthropology at Yeungnam, who accompanied us to Hahoe and helped us to understand it.

In a very special category, deepest thanks are due Professors Lee, Kwang–kyu, of the Department of Anthropology of Seoul National University and Ghu, Nam–chul, of the Department of Architecture, Korea University, both of whom accompanied us on the entire field trip. The lectures and informal discussions of these two men, more than anything else, rendered intelligible what I was looking at. If there is any merit in the following discussion, it results largely from their and Professor Kang’s stimuli. Beyond his lectures and discussions, Professor Lee also served as interpreter in my interviews concerning living area use in Yangdong, interpreter both in the sense that he translated between English and Korean and in the sense that he was able to place informants’ responses in context.

In addition, my fellow foreign co–researchers, Dr. David Y. H. Wu, of the East–West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, and Professor Henry T. Lewis, of the Department of Anthropology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, freely shared their thoughts. Dr. Wu’s knowledge of traditional Chinese culture and Dr. Lewis’ view of culture as pragmatic problem solving provided invaluable perspectives to me. Kim, Bong–young (Mrs. Kang) and Mrs. Levi–Strauss both are acute observers who contributed many insights to the group. Surely, I need not add that the structural perspective of

1 Professor of Anthropology. University of Texas. El Paso, U. S. A.
Professor Levi–Strauss ably expounded by him in the seminars, has been a major influence in my whole approach in anthropology.

It would not be fair to conclude these acknowledgements without mentioning the graduate students who accompanied us on our journey: Bernard Olivier; Kim, Jong–ho; Chung Hee–du; and Lee, Jung–duk. Not only did they act as “bearers” and facilitators in every way imaginable, but their intelligent explanations and interpretations of Korean society and culture were most useful. Finally, thanks must also be extended to the people of Yangdong and Hahoe and to the monks of Tongdo–sa, who were our hosts as well as informants.

In Writing the following, I am extraordinarily conscious of my ignorance of Korean culture and of the material published on it by Korean scholars. I see three possible sources of embarrassment for me. First, the ideas I propose may be so self–evident to any Korean that it may seem ridiculously unnecessary to advance them. Second, someone may well have published already all the ideas that are suggested here. Third, on the other hand, there may be facts of which I am unaware so utterly contrary to the hypotheses being suggested, that the whole thing is absurd. Nevertheless, I think I see some things, and it is my responsibility to point them out, hoping that they may stimulate others, as well as myself, to further research. I plead that it be understood that what follows is a set of hypotheses for future research, not a set of conclusions.

I am fond of the Freudian–Piagetian–Durkheimian (incidentally not very obviously Levi–Straussian) hypothesis that the relationships that a child learns in the context of his natal household during his formative years tend to operate as the principles with which he organizes his understanding of the world throughout life, and that therefore a culture tends, at least to have at its cognitive core a set of “nuclear” household relationships, a “domestic deep structure,” with broader areas of the culture as projections of, and transformations of, that core. The organizing principles that I am most interested in are those that have to do with the layout of family activities in household space, and the way that this is projected on to and/or transformed in other areas of culture.

(Perhaps it is worth emphasizing that I am not saying that all of a culture is necessarily to be seen as a projection or transformation of natal household experience. The Anglo–American who grows up in a world of individualized, flat, rectangular, spaces does indeed tend to project this into city planning, the layout of states and maps, and so forth, but he is perfectly aware that the world is a sphere. Nevertheless, note that he has trouble with the disjunction between the principles of spatial organization he learned as a child and the curved model of space he must apply to large areas as an adult. For example, in the flat American Mid–West straight north–south highways often compensate for the curvature of the earth by making two right angle turns.

Or consider the utter confusion of the typical Anglo–American (including the author) when confronted with time zones, or, especially, the international date line. Perhaps even the problem of “squaring the circle” which has perplexed European and Euro–American mathematicians and cartographers for so long is in part a reflection of the disjunction between natal core cognitive principles and the models which best express large–scale reality in adulthood.)

It is the possibility that there is this sort of relationship between household spatial structure and other aspects of Korean culture that I wish to discuss here. In his lecture on Korean architecture, Professor Ghu, Nam–chul recited for us a poem which, he pointed out, expresses the basic structural relationships in the traditional Korean house. In rough translation it goes:

Building a one–room thatched–roof house After managing for ten years of life.
One half of the house is occupied by the clear blowing wind. The other half by the bright moonlight. Since there is no room for the blue mountains I will enjoy looking at them around the house.

Kim, Bong-young, whose translation I have tampered with only slightly, agrees that any Korean would understand that the clear, blowing wind stands for a male (yang) half of the one room house and that the bright moonlight stands for a female (yin) half of the house. The blue mountains around the house obviously represent nature. As Professor Chu, and also Professor Lee, Kwang-kyu, point out, even in this simplest structure the most basic dimensions of the Korean house can be seen. They can be represented as in Diagram 1.

![Diagram 1](image1)

On our field trip, I did not encounter a one-room house. One is, however, represented in Osgood (1951: 26), if it is assumed that the kitchen does not constitute a room. The simplest house I could find was one in Yangdong which had three rooms, not counting the kitchen. With Professor Lee’s help, I spent a morning interviewing the 75-year-old mother of the house owner. She was taking care of the house and the children during the busy rice-harvest season. Leaving out considerable detail, her conception of the areas of the homestead, (that is, house and all the surrounding gardens and structures within the boundary walls and hedges) As I was able to elicit it was as in diagram 2.
For my present purposes, the following points should be emphasized about the floor-plan in Diagram 2.

1. The homestead is enclosed by barriers of walls and hedges.

2. There is an entranceway, saripmun, which marks a clear transition from outside space to inside, familial, space. Visitors are greeted and bid goodbye to there. When a child is born, a straw rope is strung between two poles there for from one to three weeks to bar entrance except by family members.

3. The living area of the homestead—house, storage areas, and open yard—is approximately central, and is surrounded by a nonsocial, relatively "natural" peripheral within the homestead enclosure, consisting of gardens, ungardened embankment, straw heaps, toilet (tuikan), and so forth. (The inclusion of domesticated animals in the social and the exclusion of urination and defecation from the social arc interesting problems with which I will not deal here.)

4. The living area is divided into two sides. One is composed of kitchen (chong-ji), mistress’ room (an-pang), platform for sauce and kim-chi jars (chan-tokan), well (u-mul), and other areas for essentially female functions. The other is composed of master’s room (sarang), storehouse for agricultural implements and goods (hokkan), chicken house (talkutong), compost heap (korun) and other areas for essentially male functions.

5. The entranceway was also on the male side, as it quite commonly is in Korean homesteads. This gives rise to a terminology of “inner” for the women’s sphere and “outer” for the men’s sphere.

6. I did not ask enough about the yard (madang) itself. Professor Kang tells me that it too is
conceptually divided into a female area an-madang, and a male area, pakat-madang.

7. Nor did I ask enough about the mam. Here it was a woodfloored room closed off from the yard by sliding wood and paper doors, and was used for storage. My informant said it was supposed to be used in the summer for sitting in the open air, but the family was poor, and it had always been used for storage. I do not know whether it belongs on the female side of the house or on the male side.

8. The mistress’ room (an-pang) is a paper floored ondol-heated room. It is usually the wife’s place. Female guests stay there. Many feminine activities, including childbirth, occur there.

9. The master’s room (sarang) is used by the husband. He eats and sleeps there. Male guests sleep there. Any male activity, like sitting together, reading a book, and so forth, goes on there.

10. The use of rooms is really very pragmatic and flexible. In fact the grandmother was sleeping in the sarang with her grandchildren, while her son and his wife occupied the an-pang. But they had offered her the an-pang, and there was a clear awareness of “how things ought to be.”

It is clear, I think, that the division of space within the homestead corresponds to the scheme suggested in the poem presented by Professor Ghu. This is represented in diagram 3.

I will not here discuss the progression of increasingly complex floor plans which I think I see as transformations on this pattern. Nor have I even collected the data necessary to demonstrate what I suspect to be the case: that most or even all traditional Korean homestead layouts can be seen to be elaborations, permutations, and transformations upon this basic structure. I will just make mention of the other end of the continuum. One example of this would be the 99-kan house used by the king as a retreat which is located in the Piwon Garden adjacent to Changdok Palace. This allow the king to have a taste of the commoners’ life. I will not attempt to draw a detailed plan of this complex series of buildings, but the basic scheme looks like diagram 4.
In diagram 4, the division between male and female portions of the homestead has been enormously elaborated, but the basic pattern has been maintained.

There is one difference. This is the addition of an area near the outer gate for servants. At the moment this addition does not appear significant to me, and I will ignore it. But I will admit, that it bothers me a bit.

Remembering that the whole complex is located within Piwon Gardens, which are walled, we can diagram this "homestead" in exactly the same manner as diagram 3.

Without attempting anything here, I will permit myself to note that I have visions of applying the same scheme to Changdok Palace as a whole. It is possible that there the rooms of other homesteads may be elaborated into entire buildings.

If my basic hypothesis has any validity, the principles of household spatial organization ought to be used to organize other domains of the culture. Because it is my purpose here to be a stimulus, even if I make a fool of myself, let me suggest some domains where I would look for similar organizations of and symbolic space.

1. The village. Lee, Kwang-kyu tells me that it is typical oiyangban villages that they are dominated by two branches of a single clan which are to some degree in competition with one another. He says that Yangdong is unusual in that the competition is instead between two clans which were originally linked by marriage. The village is, of course, surrounded by its fields and groves in much the same way that the homestead is surrounded by gardens and shrubbery.

Every Korean I have asked has denied that senior and junior branches of a clan stand in the relationship of yang and yin to one another. Nevertheless, Kang (1978: 57) clearly ties the relationship between senior and junior to the relationship between yang and yin, and he (1978: 66) discusses the problems of individuals interacting with one another who encounter difficulties in trying to define who is yang and who is yin. I suggest that the same kind of thing may be an ongoing problem of two branches of the same clan in the same village, and that it makes sense to say that they stand in a yin–yang relationship to one another, always remembering that which is
yang and which is yin may well change over time, and even may be a matter of differing opinion. If this is so, then a diagram like diagram 5 might well underlie yangban village structure.

![Diagram 5]

I simply do not have enough data to indicate whether such a scheme has any application to a commoner village.

2. The village cluster. From what Professor Lee has told me, I gather that a typical pattern is for a yangban village to be surrounded by outlying smaller villages of commoners. Does this sort of cluster reflect a cognitive structure anything like diagram 6?

3. The region and the nation. I mention these only because if I knew enough about Korean social and political organization I would also look at these levels to see if the sort of structure I’m discussing turns up.

![Diagram 6]

4. I expected to find expressions of this sort of pattern in religious architecture and symbolism, but it is really not all that evident. It is true that there is a good deal of bilateral symmetry in Buddhist temples and Confucian shrines, but then there is a good deal of bilateral symmetry in Christian churches, Moslem mosques and, for that matter, Asmat men’s houses. I think that the triadic relationship under discussion is far more evident in the relationship between Korean religions.

In Yangdong my informant at the house mentioned different spirits which were found in different parts of the house. In shamanistic performances, “shaman and housewife conduct a tour of the entire house, greeting various gods along the way (Kendall 1981: 96),” but apparently not in the sarang, for my informant and Professor Lee agreed there were no gods in the sarang.

Shamanism appears to be a religion especially of, by and for women. Kendall (1981: 94) says, “Korean women look to the shaman as a ritual expert, prime officiant in the woman’s ritual realm.
While men give wine, rice, and delicacies to the family’s ancestors, showing ‘filial piety’ to parents and grandparents beyond the grave, women honor the household gods.”

My informant in Yangdong said that in the house I was investigating, which was the house of a second son, there was no picture or tablet in the sarang. On the other hand, she said, her eldest son keeps a picture of his father in his sarang. This is to look at. He uses a “paper tablet” in ritual service.

In Korea actual tombs are generally located in natural forest areas on the ridges surrounding settlements. At least most of the ancestral shrines I have seen are located in the relatively “natural” peripheral areas of homesteads. So there is certainly some association of the ancestors with nature. Nevertheless, if any one thing was repeatedly driven home to our research team, it was the complex association of literacy, scholarship, Confucianism, the examination system, ancestor worship, lineage, and aristocracy with the sarang in yangban life. I suggest that though the ancestors themselves may be associated with nature the ethos and eidos of ancestor worship and Confucianism are associated with the sarang.

So much for the household level. What about the village and regional level? My informant made the comment that, although she goes to shamanistic performances in other villages, they can not be held in Yangdong because it is a yangban village. This statement implies a complementary distribution of the Confucianism–ancestor worship complex in yangban villages and something else in commoner villages. What is the “something else”? The anonymous author of the Guide to the National Folklore Museum has the following comment.

“The first category in this section [of the museum] includes village rites revolving around the shaman spirit trees, totem poles, and village shrines. The village rite was a farmer’s festival intended to strengthen community unity, which during the late Yi dynasty degenerated into a shaman practice. Be that as it may, the village rite is a humble prayer of villagers for cooperation, independence and self-help. Koguryo’s Tongmaeng rite was continued into Koryo as P’algwan–hoe, which was presided over by the king himself, and the origin of village rites may be sought in this worship of heaven during ancient times. The shaman spirit trees and totem poles stood guard against devils at the entrance of a village, and at the same time served as the boundary of a community. Especially the totem poles appeared in Korea as early as the bronze age (Bureau of Culture Properties nd: 40–41).”

Obviously, what I am suggesting is that commoner community folk religion is to the aristocratic Confucian–ancestor worship complex as yin is to yang. But there is something else. In the seminar Professor Levi–Strauss suggested that in some societies, at least, there is a tension between the patrilineal principal of “race” and the matrilineal principal of “land.” It would appear that this tension makes its appearance in a peculiar fashion in Korea, with a religion of “race,” the Confucian–ancestor worship complex, associated primarily with males and with aristocracy, while a religion of “land,” the shamanistic village rite complex is associated primarily with women and with commoners.

Professor Kang, Shin–pyo informs me that while the yangban village of Yangdong lacks shamanistic village rites, it nevertheless does have a sacred grove before which a ritual involving a tug–of–war between the upper and lower pants of the village is carried out, a nice expression of village structure. Thus a rite of community integration is not completely absent in Yangdong any more than the Confucian–ancestor worship complex is completely absent in commoner villages.

According to Harvey (1979: 10–11), shamanism, and presumably the folk rites associated with it,
were systematically persecuted by the Yi Dynasty and by the Japanese government during the period of Japanese occupation. The present Korean government has mounted a renewed campaign to eradicate shamanism from Korea. “Police raids on shamanistic ceremonies are a commonplace occurrence, and a primary objective of the government-sponsored saemaul-undong ("New Village Movement") is to eliminate traditional religious practices, which are in the main shamanistic in nature. Government newsreels designed to disseminate information on public health single out the shaman as a target of ridicule and attack." It is remarkable that Shamanism has survived so well (Kendall 1981: 94—100). In the rural areas I have seen, nevertheless, there is nothing to indicate that the old village folk religion is still practiced. Though of course much may be going on beneath the surface, my guess is that the village folk religion is in serious decline. As Professor Lewis remarked to me, obviously Confucianism—ancestor worship cannot meet the community needs of commoners who do not have famous ancestors. Nor can the kind of Buddhism practiced in Korea meet those needs. With the decline of village folk religion, one may suspect that it has been preeminently Christianity which has met commoner needs for rites of intensification. This may be a principal cause of the successful spread of Christianity and perhaps other "new religions" especially among commoners.

So much for commoner shamanistic community folk religion and aristocratic Confucianism—ancestor worship. What of Buddhism? There was a time, under the Unified Silla and Koryo Dynasties, when Buddhism occupied a position of power in the cities and palaces of Korea, but under the Yi Dynasty Confucian—influenced rulers gradually drove Buddhism from power. It’s most important temples today are not in the cities, towns, or villages, but in mountain retreats like Tongdo-sa and Haein-sa, and, of course, lesser natural (Coyner 1981: 89). Though Professor Kang informs me it is undergoing a resurgence in the cities, it is certainly significant that the kind of Buddhism practiced predominantly in Korea is zen, with its emphasis on individual enlightenment through a kind of spontaneous “naturalness,” with its centers in precisely the “blue mountains” with which we began this discussion. It seems fair to say that in Korea Buddhism is a religion of “other-worldly mysticism” deeply committed to individual enlightenment through an escape from the world of society and culture. In short, Buddhism in Korea is a religion of “nature.”

To summarize, what has been suggested in this section is that traditional Korean religions are related to one another cognitively as in diagram 7.

5. Symbolic Expression of these relationships. If it really is the case that this sort of pattern
underlies so much of Korean thought, one would expect to find some visible representations of it. Perhaps one does. There is a representation of the pattern: the national flag! Here, the central yin and yang figures are self-evident. But they are surrounded by a white field with four signs of the natural elements: air (heaven), fire, water, and earth. The very flag of the nation thus appears to be expressing the pattern of organization which has been discussed here. This is represented in diagram 8.

Let me conclude with one final question. Suppose that my initial hypothesis is right. What happens to the cognitive models of Korean children when the floorplans of the houses in which they grow up are radically changed? I suspect that this is what is happening in the apartments of Seoul. Perhaps it is also happening in the houses of the new villages which one sees all over Korea.

REFERENCES

- , Guide to the National Folklore Museum.


9–2 Ecological Anthropology and Korean Studies

Henry T. Lewis

Ecology, the study of how organisms affect and are affected by their environment, has become an increasingly important focus for anthropological study. However, ecological anthropology, or

2 Professor of Anthropology, University of Alberta, Canada.
“cultural ecology”, has had relatively little influence on Korean studies, at least not those available in English. Its omission may have certain advantages, however, advantages in that applications could mean that Koreanists will abjure the more programmatic, unproductive, and discursive arguments that have characterized much of ecological anthropology in North America.

So far, a great failure of ecological studies in anthropology has been in not studying the ways by which human populations affect their environments, a failure to properly understand the impact which technological strategies have had in extracting resources from local habitats. Whereas anthropologists are not normally trained to interpret the specific impacts that exploitive activities will have on environmental phenomena (this has to be done by anthropologists in conjunction with specialists from the biological sciences), they can and must provide the necessary human part of the ecological equation.

Korea provides ecological anthropology with a remarkably rich setting of both traditional and modern technologies, a comparative laboratory for examining the ways that human strategies both alter and maintain local settings. This is most important when one considers the example of small-scale farming. In ways quite distinctively Korean, farmers have accommodated new tools and techniques to traditional organizational arrangements, especially the social structure of the domestic family units. This range of techno-economic adjustments, as adapted through the domestic family, can provide important examples for developing countries, examples of how modernization and change can be achieved without fundamental alterations in traditional social relationships.

The view is commonly held that a complex technology is equivalent to a “modern” or “advanced” system, specifically technologies that entail greater amounts of mechanization. This overly simplified interpretation is argued on the basis of evolutionary assumptions, i.e. that evolutionary change proceeds in a direct, “progressive” line from the simple to the complex. In so-called “simple”, labor-intensive farming, for instance, this view overlooks the fact that the strategies of non-mechanized adaptations entail complex systems of understanding, no less complex in their elaborations of understanding systems of cause and effect than those farming technologies which are capital-intensive and highly mechanized. In fact, a peasant farmer, with only a hectare or so of land and little or nothing in the way of capital reserves, must normally develop an elaborated cropping system to meet both subsistence and marketing requirements. Such a farmer cannot afford the economical and simpler alternative of putting his major effort into only one or two cash crops.

As yet we have no real understanding of how these technological strategies either affect or are affected by their environments. Korea offers ecological researchers the rather rare opportunity to study the contrasting strategies of modern, mechanized small-farming with those of traditional, labor-intensive small-farming. This is important to Korea for understanding changes already accomplished as well as those still occurring in some rural areas of the country, and it is important for Third World countries that could well learn from Korea’s success story of national development.

This requires a concerted research effort, essentially one of basic research, to understand how Korean farmers, individually and as parts of local communities, adapt to particular settings and conditions of change. Though we may well understand the larger regional and national aspects of technological, economic, and environmental change, we have little or no understanding of how this has been accomplished and incorporated at the family and inter-family levels. Such basic research can provide important information for both social scientists and socio-economic
planners.

My very limited observations of rural Korea have been made on the basis of a comparison, not in contrast to what I am familiar with in Canada and the United States but, rather, what I have studied over the past twenty years in the Philippines. The differences are striking. Both countries were dominated by colonial powers, devastated by war, and were built upon an agrarian-peasant base. However, the better conditions of farmers in Korea as compared to those of the Philippines are most impressive. And, though there are obvious historical and environmental differences between the two countries, the contrasts in relative success and failure can, to a large degree, be understood at the rural level, on farms and in villages, in terms of traditional Korean culture and, especially, social organization.

Basic or, as it is sometimes called, “pure” research is sometimes viewed as a luxury of developed, wealthy nations. While perhaps true to some degree, it is also the case that basic research has had great social and economic benefits. As a highly developed and increasingly wealthy nation, Korea is certainly in a position to both support and benefit from such studies. Equally important, Korea has the variety of techno-ecological situations which makes such studies, empirical studies, possible. An equivalent range of kinship and reciprocity-based communities is no longer found in North American societies. Such a program of research would ideally and quite appropriately be coordinated through the Academy of Korean Studies, since the results would be of both national and international significance.

There are both contemporary and historical dimensions to such research. Starting with current circumstances, the adaptive strategies of farmers, fishermen, craftsmen, traders, and merchants — and all with a variety of subtypes — represent the variants of Korean culture and social organization as they have adjusted to new conditions and accommodated traditional cultural and social configurations. Each situation represents a laboratory case, a test of the variant and invariant conditions that make–up what are the situationally different and, more important, the traditional and regular features of Korean society. Such comparisons (perhaps requiring no more than a dozen intensive, participant-observational community studies) can provide the salient outlines and central features of what is distinctively and singularly Korean culture and social organization.

These studies should, first and foremost, be in the tradition of anthropological community research: the data gained has to be organized and structured in terms of indigenous systems of knowledge, i.e. the technoeconomic–environmental strategies that people apply in their day–to–day lives. Whereas broadly based, quantitative, survey–type research (that more characteristic of sociological studies) is important too, it cannot precede intensive, qualitative studies at the community level, though it can provide the breadth of information necessary for wider generalizations. Later, when the kinds of information which anthropologists gain from empirical field studies has been brought forward, statistical–quantitative survey work can then be effectively carried out with questions derived from the qualitative information gained by the anthropologists.

In addition to the information and insights that can be offered to other social sciences, synchronic studies can also provide the basis for approaching diachronic, or historical, studies of Korean folk technologies and the various impacts which they may have had for local environments. This can involve essentially two kinds of anthropological interpretation.

First of all, oral histories can be carried out with the aim of interpreting the nature of the changes
which have occurred over the past fifty years, especially where researchers are able to work from
the comparative framework existing techno-economic practices. The dramatic, technologically
revolutionary changes that have occurred in Korea since World War II can still be readily
reconstructed by interviewing older persons. As an important example, though swidden or
slash–and–burn farming has been eliminated, there are still many individuals who understand the
techno-economic strategies that were involved and their own perceptions of how this affected
environments. In another generation or two it will be impossible to retrieve technological
information about this age–old type of agricultural economy in Korea. An understanding of these
and other traditional techniques is especially important for determining the impact which humans
have had on natural settings.

Secondly, the combination of contemporary ethnographic and reconstructed ethnohistoric
studies can provide an important basis for understanding continuities and changes going back at
least as far as the Silla Dynasty. To–date, archaeology in Korea has largely ignored the traditions
and technologies, the folk culture, which provided the building blocks of Korean dynastic history.
Whereas important work has been accomplished for understanding the court life and power
systems of early Korean society, it appears that we know very little about the folk traditions upon
which the High Culture of Korean society was structured. How much more we could know about
continuities and change in Korean culture if archaeologists undertook the excavation of shops,
craftsmen quarters, markets and homes — the towns and villages— of the people that made–up
the citizenry from the period of the Three Kingdoms to more recent times. Whereas Korea has
been much influenced by outside forces, it has remained distinctively Korean in culture, a culture
that is richly unique and which has been and can still be found in the life ways and beliefs of its
ordinary people. I would urge that every reasonable effort be made to study and understand the
similarities and differences that make–up the whole of Korean culture — especially the
technologies, economies, and social structures that have shaped and reshaped the Korean
Peninsula.
I. Introduction

I am privileged to have participated in the project of the Academy of the Korean Studies, which has been both intellectually and experienically rewarding. The main concern of the project, as I understand, is to conceptualize meaningful ways to capture the essence of Korean culture in the modern world. Korea is not alone in being deeply concerned with the integrity of a national culture and identity, in the wake of rapid social change due to Western influence and consequential industrialization. This issue is central to the concern of many Asian and Pacific nations. Since Korea has a long history of civilization, she is in a much better position than many other Asian and Pacific nations in being able to safeguard her cultural heritage and to avoid complete acculturation. It is high time to review the cultural situation and to consolidate individual scholarly efforts towards the establishment of a unified approach to the study of Korean culture and society.

The Academy should be congratulated for its endeavor in organizing this project and workshop on such a grand scale. From all indications this has been an event of national and international significance. I myself have been the organizer of several international conferences and programs of collaborative research at the East-West Center.

Based on my past experience, I would not hesitate to judge this Korean event a success. This project enhances the Academy’s status as a leading institution of higher education and research, especially in the humanistic and social scientific approach to Korean studies. In the capacity of an invited foreign anthropologist, I shall briefly present my personal feelings and findings as derived my participation in this academic collaboration. This report is by no means an evaluative one, although from time to time I may offer personal suggestions which may be of some help in future planning.

II. Participation in the Workshop and Field Trip

A. The Workshop

The workshop was held from October 14 to October 17, with a final seminar being conducted separately on October 29. The workshop included two formal presentations by Professor Claude Levi-Strauss, group discussions with Professor Levi-Strauss, seminars on specific topics, and informal discussions or film presentations in the evenings. More than fifty Korean scholars from many disciplines participated in the workshop, while four anthropologists, including myself, came from other countries to attend. I wish here to comment on the structural analysis as a research method as well as the organizational aspects of this workshop.

From a methodological point of view, the structural approach seems to be appropriate as the central focus for the discussion of Korean culture and symbolism. As Professor Levi-Strauss remarked during the workshop, “the Korean cosmology of Yin-Yang opposition or the Korean social norm based on the Confucian five essential types of human relationship exemplifies a kind of structuralism.” But Professor Levi-Strauss cautioned that structural analysis is but one way of conducting research which would be suitable for the study of Korean culture and society. There are many other anthropological methods to be considered in pursuit of research methodology for...
the Korean study. Professor Levi–Strauss himself mentioned the ethnoscience approach for the recording of Korean classification of the natural and social world, while I emphasized conventional ethnography for systematic recording and description of contemporary Korean society: its culture, behavior, social and religious rituals, social structures, etc. Once we have a better set of ethnographical data, we then can proceed with the analysis of meanings and symbols, whether by means of structuralism or through other approaches.

Speaking of the organization of the workshop, I must say that I was impressed with its design and successful implementation. The organizational success rests on the fact that structuralism was chosen as the main theme and Professor Levi–Strauss — the grand master of structural anthropology — was a leading participant. The impact of Professor Levi–Strauss' work has clearly influenced many disciplines — philosophy, literature, linguistics, history, folklore, anthropology and sociology. The selection of the structural approach for Korean studies can, therefore, serve to link professionals in all these discrete disciplines, and engage them in a dialogue directed toward a common scholarly cause. During the workshop, I thus sensed a communication across the boundaries of disciplines through the use of structuralism as an intellectual "common language."

There are also some intrinsic drawbacks in the organization of this kind of workshop. Designed to encourage scholarly exchange centering on structuralism and with Professor Levi–Strauss’ presence encouraging intensive discussion, the seminar was basically well–designed. However, due to the understandably enthusiastic response from the Korean academic community, the seminar ultimately involved over fifty participants. Clearly, the seminar format was not so well suited to such a large group, and on occasion, meaningful dialogue was somewhat limited and issues before the group could not be given sufficient discussion time. The combination of the large seminar group and the formality of the setting in which it was conducted precluded the necessary time and arena for intensive discussion or design for future research. May X suggest that future planning for workshops of similar nature might include dividing the large group into smaller working sessions during the latter half of the workshop so that issues and methodologies might be given fuller consideration and resolutions might be presented to the entire group which would convene at the end of the conference. Despite the constraints mentioned above, I found the seminar very useful in that I was able to engage in brief personal exchange with many Korean scholars on matters of future collaboration in research.

Professor Levi–Strauss’ two lectures on Kinship and Mythology are worth special mention. First, in his presentation on mythology he emphasized the need for collaboration between anthropologists and historians in search of the meaning relevant to the myth concerning the origination of the Korean people. I am sure Korean scholars fully agree with him. Second, in his talk on "Kinship and Social Organization,” Professor Levi–Strauss revealed a new theoretical point in dealing with family and kinship structure which has never been previously published (at least in English). The point pleasantly surprised Dr. Eyde, Dr. Lewis, and myself since we all have done research among the Maiayo–Polynesian societies. Namely, Professor Levi–Strauss now emphasizes that what is holding the key to the understanding of kinship is not descent lines but is the household, its power, status and estate.” This point definitely will make great impact in anthropological studies of kinship for years to come. Although I personally benefitted a great deal from his new idea because of my long–term interest in the study of the cognatic kinship system, I believe the Korean kinship system should be re–examined from this new perspective. Later, on the field trip, I discovered that the Korean kinship system though based on a formal Chinese structure shows variations in many details from the Chinese one. This perhaps indicates a hidden dimension in the true Korean cultural system and needs to be examined through the study of household and
property rather than through descent lines.

B. Visitation of Cultural Places around Seoul

We had the good fortune of visiting important cultural sites within the city of Seoul and in its vicinity, prior to the workshop and immediately thereafter, thanks to arrangement made by the Academy and informal tours guided by Dr. and Mrs. Kang. The following places were included in our visits:

- Korean Folk Village
- Songgyungwan University
- The National Museum at Kyongbok Palace
- National Folklore Museum
- A Korean Classical Painting Exhibition
- Emillie Folk Art Museum
- Piwon (Secret Garden)
- Namdae–mun Market
- Shamans’ performance at Kuksadang and at a shaman’s home Korea House (dinner and dancing performance)

These visits provided us with more than just a glimpse of Korean way of life and cultural heritage. Many experts at the Museum and from several universities patiently explained for us in great detail aspects of Korean cultural history and contemporary life. Being an anthropologist, I was especially impressed with the Folk Village and the National Folklore Museum, both of which vividly demonstrated the preindustrial Korean society as well as socio-economic and cultural activities. The Museum has not only excellent collections of folklore artifacts that rival those of the best folklore museums in the world (perhaps the only one of its kind in Asia to my knowledge), but the arrangements of life size models in the context of socio-cultural activities are so cleverly done that an illusion is created that we are present in the Korea of one hundred years ago. Although I readily recognize Chinese influence in many aspects of the rituals, costume and artifacts, I was especially impressed with the fact that the blending of Chinese culture in Korea does not fail to reveal a true Korean cultural identity. For instance, while the official uniforms for the males are obviously of Chinese origin, the female dress shows a unique Korean tradition. The back-supported-loom in Korean weaving is definitely indigenous, as are the Korean patterned masks. I also appreciate those artifacts and models that illustrate the influence of the literate of the Confucian tradition, an influence which may have left no visible trace in China for the Chinese people to appreciate inasmuch as the Chinese do not have a folklore museum. Among such articles would be included the sandbox for practicing writing, the model of teacher and students in a private school, the examination result, the silk hat worn by scholarly-officialdom, and the arrow-throwing games favored by young gentry. All these things I have read of in classical writings but had never seen in actuality. The irony is that a Chinese scholar needed to visit Korea in order to learn about Chinese cultural tradition. For the same reason I was pleased to visit the Songgyungwan University and to see the well-preserved Confucian school and ceremonial halls.

Although these visits took place in just a few days under a heavy schedule, we benefited from
them by learning about the core of formal Confucianism, Taoism and Shamanism as well as the informal folk ways. As I have mentioned, we were guided by experts, and we are not ordinary tourists. Anthropologists often say that the fresh impressions (or “culture shock”) experienced during the very first few days of stay in a foreign country usually bring the most insightful views about the cultural manifestation of that society. I may be wrong, but after watching the Shaman performance I quickly gained insight concerning the contrast between Confucianism and Shamanism in Korean culture. Whereas Confucianism symbolizes male domain in the official bureaucracy and code of ethics, shamanism represents a female domain in the folk culture. Behavior in the Confucian system shows the overt, formal, rigid, and serious aspect of Korean culture introduced from ancient China, but the cultural behavior in the shamanistic system indicates a covert, informal, relaxed, and humorous cultural dimension which is definitely of Korean origin. However, during the shaman’s performance, I also noticed the legacy of Chinese Taoist symbols: namely, the five colors of the banners and flags symbolizing the five universal elements and cardinal directions, the deities, including the jade emperor, the legendary generals (both Chinese and Korean), the mountain god and tiger, the 7 dipper stars and the rice container (both names), etc.

In short, the visitations were educational and entertaining. They were important for us, for they provided the necessary background knowledge for our discussion of Korean cultural studies and for our later field trip.

C. The Field Trip

The field trip covers Kyongju area, the Tongdo Temple, the Yang- dong village, the Haein Temple, and Hahoe village. It was exhausting but extremely worthwhile. We were able to observe the way of life of the great Confucian scholars and Buddhist disciples in Korea under the reign of Silla dynasties. On the trip, the presentations by Korean experts and the related group discussions were most useful in helping us understand the past and present of the Korean society.

It would take weeks for any interested observer to fully explore all the archaeological and historical sites in Kyongju, but our swift itinerary did allow us a quick glance of the major relics of the Silla kingdom and Buddhist establishments. The process of culture change and continuity into the modern Korean society fascinates me. I began to appreciate the need for a synthesized approach to study this cultural process and realized how significant the project is.

I was extremely pleased for the first time in my life to live in an authentic Buddhist temple in authentic Confucian yangban villages, and to visit the relic of one of the country’s largest Confucian school: all of them can be associated with Chinese culture and history for the past several hundred years. The temple’s architecture, the strict discipline for the monks, and the learnedness and wit of the high monks all indicate the Korean Buddhist until now has maintained the orthodox and authentic approach to Buddhism. I could not help comparing Korean Buddhism and the Confucianism (as preserved in modern Korea) with that in China, and sadly admit that we Chinese have lost a great tradition while the Koreans have kept the pure forms. For instance, Korean temple kept the ancient tradition of sacrecy and intellectual achievement, whereas the Chinese Buddhist temples have to a large extent catering to the worldly needs and mixed with Taoist and folk religious activities.

I was amazed at the prevalence in countryside the Confucian tradition of appreciation for scholarly achievement and artistic attainment. Poems in excellent calligraphy and tasteful Chinese paintings could be seen not only in ordinary rural homes but also found in restaurants everywhere we went.
The Koreans certainly have “out–scholared” the Chinese in contemporary society.

Because our time was short and our schedule was so compact we had only half a day to conduct individual interview in the village. With the assistance of Dr. Kwon and Mr. Jung–duk Lee, I had an interesting discussion with the matriarch of the Lee family, our host family in Yang–dong, concerning food preparation and health related topics. I wish I could have had more time to conduct more interviews in order to help outline some of my hypotheses. At the Tong– do Temple I also had the pleasant experience of exchanging thoughts with the executive monk, Chian, through brush writing and painting. Again, I wish I had more time to interview him to understand his broad knowledge of Korean Buddhism, although we did have several brief sessions in a group meeting with the high monks to exchange views.

D. Comments and Suggestions

Given my observations of the Korean Confucian and Buddhist practices in which I discovered similarities to and differences from those of the Chinese, I would strongly urge Korean scholars to consider a comparative approach to Korean studies. Through controlled comparison between the Korean and Chinese ways concerning their principles, the contacts, and actual practices, one can then identify the true Korean cultural heritage, and be able to pinpoint what ultimately is the Korean true cultural identity.

I cannot say enough to thank the Academy, the organizers, and the hundreds of people involved in showing me such warm hospitality both during my stay at the Academy and on the field trip. All foreign scholars share the same feeling that we were overwhelmed with excellent accommodation, food, care and comfort both at the Academy and at the Tongdo–sa and at the homes of Lee and Ryo family. I knew that Dr. Kang spent several sleepless nights organizing the events and worried about their outcomes. Mrs. Kang sacrificed several weeks of her family life and work to helpfully assist us, to serve as an excellent interpreter, and to aid the graduate assistants on the trip in many valuable ways. Special credit must be given to the graduate students, Mr. Kim Jong–ho, Mr. Chung Hee–du, Mr. Lee Jung–duk and Mr. Olivier Bernard for their toiling on arduous jobs in logistics preparation. While sometimes required to retire late and eat late on the trip, Mr. Kim and Mr. Lee carried both major responsibilities in facilitating the group tour and made the trip a real success, despite difficult circumstances in the countryside and in remote villages. We also have Professors Kwang–kyu Lee and Nam– chull Joo to thank for their company and their discussions on aspects of the Korean culture. Professors and graduate students from Young–nam University also did a great service to our group in accompanying the group at Yang–dong and Hahoe villages and arranging accommodations. The last but not least I wish to thank the maid at Wunjoong–kwan, the Kitchen staff of the Academy, and the drivers. They were more than courteous and provided efficient services.

III. Outline of a Research Proposal

To maintain good health and wellbeing is a main concern for every individual for the entire society as well. Recently, anthropologists studied the issues of health in many different cultures and discovered that cultural beliefs play a major role in determining a person’s health and the type of therapy acceptable to him.

The Korean immigrants in the United States (e.g., in Honolulu and in Los Angeles) demonstrate a strong reliance on traditional medicine in coping with stress and maintaining health. Many herbal dispensaries and traditional medical practitioners have flourished in the Korean migrant community. This seems to be quite natural as in Korea itself where the traditional medicine and
healing methods are still popular, despite the existence of a modernized Western medical system. During my brief stays in Korea I have seen the traditional medicine, secret formulas, and special Asian therapies being publicized on newspapers and wall posters. I also learned that thousands of herbalists are still in practice.

The cultural interpretation of illness and effective cure are different from the official medical view which is often based on a Western model derived from the Western bio-medical interpretations. Health maintenance in the traditional system means knowledge of traditional cosmology and cultural symbols. Theoretical speaking, therefore, the existence of traditional medicine and related practices would indicate a prevailing world view which must be preindustrial and non-Western. For instance, man must keep harmony with nature and supernature, and must understand the symbols of these forces. To study the Korean cultural conceptions of health would therefore enhance our knowledge on a set of traditional culture and symbol in modern Korean society. With the limited data I have collected on the field trip, I wish to propose to write a paper in order to establish some theoretical models for the study of Korean culture and symbol through the understanding of health issues,
I. Kuhn’s Notion of Paradigm and the Crisis in Anthropology

1. Kuhn’s contribution in a semiotic context:
   From a discourse on the knowable universe to multiple universes of discourse.

2. Universes of discourse are more than syntactically formal: paradigmatic dimensions of meaning (semantics) and use (pragmatics).


4. The message of the paradigmatic:
   a. All texts are defined by their context and every logic is at one and the same time an ethno-logic.
      Contextualization and relativization.
   b. The taken-for-granted assumptions of “normal science” are contextual, relative and problematical:
      –Fragmentation, specialization and politicization in cultural anthropology (Kuhn’s crisis in legitimacy).
      –The natives not only disappear, the ones remaining begin to talk back (a change in the notion of the trivial and the important).
      –The Third World begins to define its own historical destiny (Kuhn’s anomaly).
      –The normative dimension: the repressed and repressive – metaphors of “normal science” (e.g., structural-functionalism and its colonial past).

5. The critique of “normal science”:
   a. The meta-level recognition of the mediated status of anthropology, which also defines its mediating potential.
   b. Toward a normative anthropology: the disenchantment with science and reason as ethno-logical and Western phenomena.
   c. A value-committed anthropology, perhaps outside the academy, e.g., If ‘proof’ is identified with academic research, we may be at a loss to identify our most humane values — that love is preferable to hate, peace to war, food to hunger, etc.

II. The Existential Dimension.

1. The question of the continuity and/or discontinuity between experience and reality.
a. Discontinuity:

– The anthropologist as observer incarnate—the professional voyeur par excellence—disengaged, realizing our society’s most catastrophic assumption, namely, that man can be thoroughly objectified by man.

– The privileged observer: the divine constituting subject from whom emanates the design of other cultures: cultures that become ‘objects’ of semiotic contemplation to be decoded by and for us (cf. below).

– Cultural anthropology as a “solitary and silent act” (Habermas) with natives as “des objets silencieux a propos desquels tout discourse est possible” (Mudimbe).

d. Continuity:

– The dialogical nature of anthropology in situ: anthropology is part and parcel of the systems and processes (e.g., political, economic, social, historical) it studies. Observation is always and inevitably an act of participation.

– Anthropology is therefore a human praxis, not simply a means of subsuming the subject–self or other—within a framework of a professional and reified discourse or discipline.

– The nature of encountered phenomena is mediated by the nature and quality of the encounter. The dialectic between producer, production and product (vs. absorbing the questioned by the question posed in the interest of the questioner).

– Knowledge is process: understanding is an event: sciencing is eco-logical (vs. Althusser, Levi-Strauss, etc.).

c. Formal discourse defined paradigmatically:

– Who defines significance on whose behalf and at whose expense? — both in terms of indigenous meaning and the anthropologist’s discourse? Who authorizes the discourse and/or who invests it with authority?

– The effect of the emphasis on textual analysis: the neglect of authoritative discourse in historical context and the reification of the anthropological discourse that describes and wills, the “authentic” society and that becomes authoritative because it is said to explain (their) history, e.g., Asad on Isreal or Baid on Orientalism.

– Anthropological discourse as formal yet motivated:

  Formal: Obscuring the speaker in speech and thus obscuring the contingency of what is being said (e.g., the use of the third person ‘he’ in ethnography; cf. also writing below)

  Intent: Ignoring the extent to which the object spoken is dependent on the speaker and his or her language–game, ‘viz. the ‘objectivism’ of de-authored speech, the speech of authority based on the grammar of
(Western) rationality (viz. Nietzsche: we have not yet gotten rid of God, since we still believe in grammar).

Intent: The authoritative formal discourse of Western science is said to constitute knowledge, but in the process it also constitutes its own specific subject-matter. It domesticates the exotic for its own purposes. (cf. Burridge: the native as “the artifact of the intellectualization which is thought to comprehend it”).

Normative aim: Shattering the restrictive syntax of the established order, e.g., action anthropology, revolutionary anthropology, dialectical and critical anthropology.

III. The Sociological Dimension:

1. All logics are socio-logics.

   Or the notion of paradigm and the social organization of ethnological traditions.

   a. Professionalism: anonymous, universalistic, bureaucratic, hierarchical, authoritarian, sexist and racist (cf. critique of Feyerabend’s anarchistic liberalism).

      e.g., the assumption of the superiority of Western thought (the anthropologist ‘understands’ the ethno-logical confines of every ethno-science but his own).

   b. The rationality debate in its sociological and ethno-centric dimensions: the natives do not have what we have: generalization (categories and concepts), differentiation (division of labor) and reflexivity (specialization and critique).

   c. The academy as a society of writers (the reflexivity. Specific to elaborate code users).

      – Writing does make criticism possible (e.g., in terms of temporal and spatial changes, viz. Masterman’s critique Kuhn could not have been realized if the latter’s discourse had been oral).

      – Writing also de-contextualizes, systematizes, formalizes and thus simplifies, classifies, manipulates and arrests the ambiguity of speech (e.g., intonation) and the plenitude (e.g., enactment) of verbal performance.

      – The European writes about others in his own behalf. The graphic and often coercive framework of the social sciences “by which the colored man is chained irrevocably to the general truths ... formulated by a White European scholar” (Said)

2. Logic as conventional:

   – The “culture of science” is not universally but conventionally “true” (Barnes).

   That is, ‘truth’ is a conventional representation in conformity, not with the ‘real’, but with the standards of the scientific community—a language community founded on a
form of life and an ideal consensus in which persuasive argument is often more important than ‘empirical demonstration’ and where choices between different modes of explanation may be questions of moral choice and/or coercion, taste, and prejudice.

Said: “we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is *eo ipso* implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven, with, a great many other things besides the ‘truth’ which is itself a representation ... as inhabiting a common field of play defined for (the scholar), not by some inherent common subject–matter alone, but by some common history, tradition, universe of discourse.”

The culture of science as a “cultural habitus” (Bourdieu) and as a way of “learning how to learn” (Bateson), e. g., the danger of oversocialization within the dominant paradigm and the dulling of critical faculties.

3. The comparative dimension of the cultures of science:
   
   a. The national character of the social sciences.

   e. g., The Trobrianders are very much like Malinowski, the Tikopia like Firth and Levi–Strauss’ savages are most Cartesian and make little or no sense in “plain English”. Neither they nor Levi–Strauss conform to the “common–sense” and “reasonableness” so dear to the gentle (and predominantly gentle) Anglo–American anthropological establishments. Hence Levi–Strauss merely “rubs Murdock the wrong way” (cf. provincialism).

   b. National Character and Anthropological Discourse: e. g., inductive empiricism versus deductive rationalism as questions of culture rather than verifiability alone, e. g., Clark on Cartesianism and Spontaneity within French culture: the comparison between the bourgeois “esprit geometrique” and the anti–bourgeois “esprit de finesse.” e. g., Frobinius’ distinction between Hamitic and Ethiopian cultures, though used in Senghor’s Negritude movement of African nationalism, was in fact based on the distinction between French and German culture after W. W. I, especially their respective ideologies of womanhood.

   The above as a new dimension to Kuhn’s contention that differing paradigms entail “a choice between incompatible modes of community life” and that the distinction between “internal” and “external” factors in a given paradigm is, if not arbitrary, at least a question of one’s point of view -- to be assessed a posteriori rather than posited a priori (but compare to Kuhn’s recent remarks on the history of science).

   c. The importance of the comparative dimension in science, technology and its concrete implementation, e. g., ethno– technology and the notions of linear and cyclical time (cf. Lepenies).

IV. The Historical Dimension:

1. All rationality, truth or understanding is conditional rather than unconditional.

   i. e., ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth,’ not merely ‘error’ and ‘illusion’ are culturally mediated and historically situated. Understanding therefore, is an event and more often than
not a political event.

2. The history of anthropology as an anthropological problem.

i. e., the European signature of cultural anthropology.

e. g., the utilization of the categories of time and space to create distance, to create an ‘object’ — the other— for Western man to contemplate and/or to manipulate (Fabian), viz. the “lost paradise” of the Noble Savage as the symbol of European hopes and desires.

e. g., Judeo–Christian and secularized evolutionism and their modern structural and taxonomic variants.

e. g., the Judeo–Christian paradigm and the scientific mission, cf. Burridge or Stocking: “the way in which the Bible functioned as a land of Kuhnian paradigm for research on the cultural, linguistic, and physical diversity of mankind”),

e. g., the conversion of the power of faith into the faith in power: the social sciences as the new secular theology (Marxist or capitalist) and the new imperialism (of modernization and development). This rationality claims to be historical and relativistic but it absolutizes scientific reason instead: the latter becomes the Redeemer of History (which is a Christian and European problematic rather than a ‘scientific’ one as such).

3. Footnote on Kuhn: the disintegration of the cognitive justification of science nevertheless allows Kuhn to retain a uniform concept of science as the study of nature. But what about culturally mediated paradigms of nature and their resultant effect on our definition of the natural sciences? e. g., Barnes on natural knowledge as a cultural product or Mary Douglas on the ‘body politic’ and the ‘body natural.’

4. The European signature of anthropology (cont.)

e. g., nature (human nature included) as an object of investigation rather than a prescriptive force (though law and order in nature can often enough function as rationalizations for law and order in society, cf. Elias: compare Lukacs’ “the mastery of nature is itself mastered”).

e. g., The analogy between nature and reason and its normative import in the West: “What we call man’s power over nature turns out to be the power exercised by some men over other men with nature as its instrument” (Lewis, cf. universal rationality below).

–The European signature of anthropology: Marxism.

Though radical in its analysis of capitalism, anthropollogically Marxism expresses a consensus with 18th century bourgeois rationalism (Baudrillard).

“Marxism exists in 19th century thought, like a fish in water... (Foucault).

–Anthropology and colonialism—the epistemological dimension: The rise of industry, capitalism and science are Western phenomena and do not by definition provide a model of how traditional societies become ‘rational’ (Tambiah: cf. also the role of binary oppositions and developmental schemes).
V. The Philosophical Dimension:


   a. Episemocide (next to ethnoicide and genocide): the cooptation and/or destruction of ‘non-scientific’ forms of knowledge in the name of science.

      e. g., primitive thought "reveals”, “expresses”, but never simply “is” (Feyerabend). But if it “is”, it more often than not “reveals” the colonial anthropologist’s epistemological ideology: a copy theory of verification which merely registers what ‘is’ and thus constituting a mimetic and adaptive exercise on behalf of the colonial powers that ‘are’ (Magubane) and which are equally often and conveniently unmentioned (e. g., structured–functionalism).

      e. g., Ethnographic materials have always been analyzed in the specific context of cross-currents in European culture, viz., from the childlike to the noble savage. In this sense, anthropology has been the meta-language of Western civilization.

      e. g., the native is overlaid with the rationality and/or irrationality desired by the anthropologist. Thus, both the contrast/inversion and the continuity/evolution view of the “great transition” are normatively motivated and paradigmatically defined.

      Yet, making the native more rational than he or she is, in our sense of the term rational (whatever that is), is as dangerous as making him or her pre-rational or less rational.

   b. Understanding Self–Reflexively:

      Anthropology as the “metaphorical extension of our own cultural resources” (Barnes).

      e. g., the most serious single source of misinterpretation of the concepts of alien cultures is inadequate mastery of the concepts of one’s own culture, viz. to understand magic, we have to understand the anthropology of science first (though that does not preclude the possibility that understanding magic might also enhance our understanding of science) (cf. Horton & Finnegan).

   c. Understanding the ‘Radical Other’:

      Universalism:

      Anthropology as a comparative enterprise requires translation and therefore a common language, e. g., ‘rationality’ as ‘common sense’, ‘problem–solving,’ or ‘unconscious patterns’ reflected in language (cf. the rationality debate, Foucault & Levi–Strauss).

      e. g., the allegedly universal topic of the continuities and discontinuities between nature and culture transcend ethnology’s historical situation (cf. Foucault & Levi–Strauss).

      Relativism:

      All possible “epistemes” are discontinuous, i. e., incommensurate and
relative—science (structural linguistics and transformationalism included).

All sciencing occurs in the course of multiple histories and are themselves historical (Nelson).

Traditions (e.g., in science) simply are: they become ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (progressive or not) only from a point of view. Attacking such relativism only bespeaks one’s fear of losing one’s expertise and privileged social position (Feyerabend).

The natural sciences, including the concept of nature, are culturally mediated (cf. Marxism and the sociology of science).

Conclusion:

The tension between scientific generality and historical specificity stems from our own socio-cultural need (Diamond & Burridge)—a need we bring to history, anthropology and science.

d. The Normative Dimension of Universalism and Relativism:

Universalism:

e.g., The ethno-centricity of the languages of ‘common-sense’, ‘problem-solving,’ ‘binarism,’ and ‘transformational’ or ‘structuralist’ reductionism.

Relativism:

e.g., Cultural relativism as the bad faith of the conqueror (Diamond) and the liberal bankruptcy of the academic establishment (Wolff). “Toutsavoir” is “Tout Pardonner” and “Tout Gagner.” (Kuper)

2. Truth, Value and the Dialogical:

—Truth and the anthropologist:

“. . . connected with the realization that intelligibility takes many forms and various forms, is the realization that reality has no (singly) key” (Winch)

Anthropological paradigms, too, are dominant metaphors guiding the anthropological community or different segments in that community in which persuasive argument, aesthetic preference, issues of norms and relevancy are as important as internal and specific criteria of logic or research (Barnes & Kuhn)

Paradigms are culturally defined symbolic forms in which poe—dc, political, or
philosophical motives may pre-figure and structure anthropological data or events (cf. White).

-Values and the Anthropologist: e. g., the normative dimension of ethno-science and the critique of Western instrumental rationality (Diamond, Frankfurt School, Manning & Fabrega).

e. g., “the paradigm-breaking and paradigm-building capacity of non-Western cultures” (Hsu).

The Dialogical in Anthropology:

Instead of the over-arching universal of abstract reason, we can hope to arrive at the lateral and perspectivistic universals of discursive reason (Merleau-Ponty & Wellmer).